

**The Political Cohesion of Middle Class in Pakistan: The Implications on the Economic and Political System**



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**CERTIFICATE**

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*To my family, without whom I would not have been the person I am today.  
Their endless love and support propelled me towards my conviction in what I stand for.*

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## **ABSTRACT**

Middle class usually bode well for a society in different aspects and literature that exists prove this concept. But why in the case of Pakistan, with a huge surge in middle class, can we not reap the benefits of this rising middle class. My thesis is an exploration of the existing social order of Pakistan and the role of its emerging middle class in it to gauge the repercussions on the economic and political systems of Pakistan and its way forward. The fact has been scrutinized if there is a lack of progressive vision in the middle class of the country; something that is a pre-condition for an institutional overhaul in order to reform the overarching structures of the country. My thesis is built on Acemoglu and Robinson's (2001) theory of political transitions and how he assumes that that the ruling under autocracy and the median voter under democracy have 'commitment problem' when it comes to future income distribution. In the case of Pakistan this commitment problem exists. This has its repercussions on the attitude towards regime change. My thesis bridges several lines of research from recent political economy literature and apply them in case of Pakistan. The political cohesion of Middle Class determines the political regime that will prevail. The moot point is that which political regime prevails and which class determines it on the basis of which factors.

## CHAPTER 1

### 1.1 Introduction: The Importance of Middle Class

One of the most common terms in the lexicon of the academic world today is the ‘middle class’. But despite its frequent use, there is a lack of consensus on what this term actually means and what it implies. For some, it is seen as the class that stands in the middle of the lower and the upper class but the precise boundaries of this class still remain uncertain. Historically speaking, the ‘class’ has been a popular concept for a long time now. However, the interest in the middle class has sky-rocketed in the past decade owing to its emergence in various economic giants of Asia; including China, Pakistan and India. This interest peaked in part due to the fact that these Asian economies, especially China and India, retained their growth at a time when the developed economies of the world were struggling to keep themselves afloat during the global recession. Since then, the middle class has held a special status and attention for it is considered to be critical to a nation’s political and socio-economic growth. Academia is divided in its evaluation of the impact of middle class on national and international economies. On one hand, there is a group of academics who suggest that the middle class can serve as a dynamic agent of change (Lash & Urry, 1987). While on the other end of the debate are those who suggest that they can often turn into an influential votary of the status quo by vouching for the existing socio-economic institutional setup.

Middle class is an indispensable element of the market and political structure of an economy. The inclination of their buying patterns i.e. ‘conspicuous consumption’<sup>i</sup>, depend largely upon their income levels and their preference for ‘positional goods’<sup>ii</sup> e.g. a degree from a well-known institute which enhances their capacity for upward social mobility. Their voting preference is highly determined by the party manifesto i.e. the party who represents middle class interests and a democratic aura. But in the case of Pakistan, the middle class is not politically coherent as Pakistan is a multi-cultural and multi-linguist country<sup>1</sup> and is sharply divided on the basis of ethnic and religious fault lines (Zaidi, 2017). It is not only in economist, or more specifically, consumerist, terms that the middle class has made its presence felt, but also politically<sup>2</sup>.

In my thesis, I will explore the venue of how middle class effects the political transition in Pakistan. Research articles state that factors that contribute towards the attitude of the middle class and their stance on the political regime are social mobility, income inequality, fiscal volatility, peoples’ perception about social order, certainty and security. The prime being social mobility. (Xio, 2003). My research will show that an additional factor that has recently been

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<sup>1</sup> Politics of Ethnicity. (n.d.). *Dawn*. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/841563>



added and its importance cannot be understated is the role of social media in playing a role as a decision-making tool.

By scrutinizing case studies of China, India, Venezuela, Mexico and South Korea. I will shed light upon different dynamics of the topic. (Jones, 1998; Choi, 1993; Chen and Lu 2011, Nun 1967; Tedesco and Barton, 2004). The authors suggest that it is material interest that prompt middle class to have strong preference for social over democratization because social disorder among the large lower class may harm the middle class interests in social mobility, employment stability, and private property. Xio (2003) argues that:

“...the stake that the middle class people held in the booming economy hardly made them adventurous political reformists; on the contrary, they worried that too much political change too fast could.....endanger their material interests”

Koo (1991) argues, in the context of South Korea, that the old middle class is more likely to support democratization whereas the new middle class, that is, the people who ascended from lower class, are less likely to support democratization. So the same is the case in Pakistan where the middle class isn't one compact group of same characteristics and therefore entangling the middle class and examining why different segments have different attitude towards democracy is an open question to be examined. (Tilly, 1978) examines the way in which intra-elite competition and contestation for power can lead dominant groups to cultivate alliances within society, ultimately resulting in the capture of state power by those actors that are best able to utilize the resources at their disposal.

One factor that Akbar Zaidi highlights has not been scrutinized by many political scientists in explaining why democracy has not flourished in Pakistan is the role of social groups. He states that social groups are the catalyzers in the demand and struggle for democracy, and often use their influence to impose their will on the state, but in the case of Pakistan, these social groups which include the middle class, already have access to the state, through partial state capture; hence the need to strive for democracy no longer exists. Therefore, Akbar Zaidi argues that there is no real constituency for democracy in Pakistan. In the first decade of Pakistan's independence, the bureaucracy- led and assisted industrialization took place. The bureaucracy therefore was a leading unequal partner in the political settlement that existed between the key players. The industrialists, while gaining economic clout via this industrialization, never became a political force or class. They heavily relied on the munificence of the bureaucrats. For much time, the economic clout remained essentially with the industrialists, but subsequently the capitalist agriculturists emerged to stake their claim. Additionally, this period also witnessed the rise of an aspiring, but small, educated middle class that wanted to impart a vision on the political arena, but did not have the economic clout to do so. Therefore, this group and many others (organized labour, peasants, middle farmers, urban and rural middle class) hooked their hopes to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who became popular with his social and socialist agenda. But the bureaucracy and industrialists were the key "enemies" of this socialist agenda.

The land reforms of 1972 were also meant to reduce the economic and political clout of the large landowning lobby. But the urban middle class eventually joined hands with the bureaucracy and probably the military, and was contributory in removing Bhutto in 1977. Under the democratic order, the large landowners controlled a number of seats, particularly in Sindh, southern Punjab and parts of Balochistan, where tribal lords wielded power. The takeover by general Zia ul Haq, cemented the domination of the civil and military bureaucracy, not just politically but also, economically, by transforming the incentive structure and distribution of resources. The Gulf boom resulted in huge amounts of remittances that were sent to numerous urban, peri-urban, and rural settlements of the country, which led to economic development in other parts of the country. This led to a rise in the previously unskilled workers becoming shopkeepers, setting up small enterprises, investing in the transport industry, etc. All of this development led to broadening and strengthening of the middle class. So the main beneficiaries of the Zia regime were the then urban and rural middle classes, religious strata and the military bureaucracy. Nawaz Sharif, a product and beneficiary of the economic policies of Zia ul Haq; joined politics with the blessing of Zia ul Haq. Many members of the economic and industrial elite now joined politics. Not only at the national level, but economic actors at the local and provincial level started to play an active role in politics by supporting different contesting political parties. 1990s was the era when the middle class desired and put efforts to use politics for economic gain. Once the middle class had accomplished this goal; the need for democracy became redundant. The politics of middle class has been based on opportunism and not principle. But not all the middle class groups supported Zia i.e. the ‘liberal and progressive’ section of middle class resisted him while the “conservative and religious” section of middle class supported him. The space each new economic group was allowed in the political arena depended on the blessing of the more powerful and organized institutions in the country. So though the economic landscape transformed with these rising economic groups but their political role was restricted. In contrast, a large section of the middle class supported Musharraf (Zaidi, 2005).

### **1.1.2 Aim of the Study**

The aim of the study is to explore the existing social order of Pakistan and the role of the emerging middle class in it to gauge the repercussions on the economic and political systems of Pakistan and its way forward. My objective to write this thesis is to see the implications of middle class on different societies and why haven't Pakistan reaped the benefits of such a huge rise in the middle class. There is a lack of progressive vision in the middle class of the country; something that is a pre-condition for an institutional overhaul in order to reform the overarching structures of inequality in the country. Studies have shown that in countries where the middle class is coherent, the political system is designed according to their prevalent interests whether it be in a dictatorship or democracy. But the important point often missed is that what if the middle class isn't politically coherent as in the case of Pakistan and I will also try to highlight the factors that contribute towards this political incoherence.

### **1.1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The main objectives of the study are:

- To find out whether the middle-class segment in Pakistan have established an impersonal intra-elite arrangement or an inter-middle-class coherence yet?
- To find out the role of middle class has played internationally and nationally as academia is divided about middle class's role.
- To find out whether Pakistan's emerging new middle class can prove to be a critical juncture in the history of Pakistan and give recommendations on how can the state reap the benefits of this emerging segment?

### **1.1.4 Research Questions**

The study will try to answer the following questions:

- In case of Pakistan, why different segments have different attitude towards democracy?
- The economic implications and whether these are sustainable or not?
- Probe the factors that mold the political preferences of middle class in Pakistan?
- To analyze the external environment that play a role in their decision making process?  
What are the recent trends when it comes to middle class preference?
- To what extent is this political incoherence dangerous for Pakistan?
- What measures can help make the current arrangement smoother?

### **1.1.5 Scope of the Study**

When there is an increase in the downward mobility for the middle class there are strong incentives for middle class to retaliate against the status quo force as depicted in the case studies of South Korea 1987; Chile in 1980s and Mexico in 2000. But if the middle class feels secure about the socio-economic status i.e. China, then they let the political regime continue. The figure below is taken from the Journal of Conflict Resolution; Social Mobility, Middle Class, and Political Transitions (Leventoglu, 2014). This study will prove to be very resourceful for policy makers and implementers who like to work on economic well-being of economic classes and also create national narratives.

Figure 1: Social Mobility and Class Behavior




Figure 1: Social Mobility and Class Behavior

Source: Bahar Leventoglu (2014)

But this cannot be witnessed in the case of Pakistan as the middle class is not secure about their socio-economic status. My thesis will try to highlight factors that contribute to this. I will shed light upon the incoherence of our middle class due to the huge disparity in our middle class. And will examine its repercussions on the society. Meanwhile, the country is being run by economic growth models backed by the elites and the state establishment. So, while the country may boast a sizeable chunk of middle class, the implications of this middle class do not translate into results as issues like disempowerment and socio-economic inequalities remain unaddressed<sup>3</sup>. The middle class which has different social moorings therefore subscribe to different "fractions and factions". Akbar Zaidi argues that Pakistani middle class is now pre-dominantly urban but it has not brought about a progressive political movement which is in any form modern or democratic. Pakistan's middle classes have rather joined hands with the authoritarian and military governments compromising at each historical juncture (Zaidi, 2005). Moreover, the experience of democracy during the 1990s has found few supporters for the idea and practice of democracy

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<sup>3</sup> Ali, S. (2017). *Middle class Pakistan*. [online] The Express Tribune. Available at: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1389218/middle-class-pakistan/> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2019].

in Pakistan. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no substantial real and concerted constituency in Pakistan for democracy. The middle class is opportunistic and largely interested in fulfilling their narrow economic goals.

This moment in time is a critical juncture for Pakistan. It is a country that boasts a sizeable middle class and a huge chunk of youth. According to the National Human Development Report of the UNDP Pakistan, it is suggested that Pakistan hosts the largest percentage of youth population in its history as the people below 30 years of age account for almost 64 percent of the total 208 million populations. The time is ripe for a gradual overhaul of institutional structure so that the chronic issues like that of inequality may be sufficiently addressed.

This study is fundamentally focused on exploring the existing social organization of Pakistan. The study also intends to analyze the factors of political incoherence of middle class in Pakistan; its repercussions on the economic and political system of the country. This topic is very broad and different political scientists subscribe to different factors and reasons of this incoherence and this makes the scope of my study quite difficult yet interesting.

#### **1.1.6 Significance of the Study**

The findings of this study will be quite accommodating to the researchers and policy makers because this study is first of its kind - examining the political incoherence of middle class in Pakistan. It is not just like any other political or economic model; it is profoundly a very contemporary approach to social science analysis with the augmented lens of economics, politics, anthropology, sociology and public policy. Hence, this study will be providing useful contextual insights for the researchers and also for those in policy making domain of Pakistan and I hope my thesis will provide a building block for further research on this crucial topic.

Cross comparison will be done with other countries like India and China (Secondary data like articles) who have also seen rise of middle class and what implications they saw due to this rise in their middle class. My thesis will examine the rise of our middle class and what implications does it have on our economy or political system.

### **1.2 The Rise of Middle Class and its role in Pakistan Movement and After Independence**

Let us now turn towards the middle class of Pakistan. In a report by The Wall Street Journal in 2017, it was estimated that on the basis of income and expenditure on consumption goods, almost 42 per cent of the Pakistani population belonged to either middle or the upper classes. Moreover, as per the official figures, the number of households that own a washing machine or a motorbike had also risen significantly over the last decade and a half.

Pakistan's ideology was never to establish an Islamic state for Muslims of India. Islam was only used a political tool by the incompetent politicians and illegitimate military regime for legitimacy in divine ordinance. To justify and reinforce this claim, Pakistan's captive media

played a huge role in reinforcing this ideology. The mockery of the argument that Pakistan was founded to establish an Islamic state lies in the fact that every religious group and organization in the Subcontinent of India was hostile to Pakistan movement. It is argued by Hamza Alvi that rather the primary force behind the Muslim movement was a class which he calls the salariat i.e. the urban, educated classes who qualified for employment in the colonial state. The associated new professionals i.e. the lawyers, journalists and urban intellectuals allied themselves with this salariat as they shared the same aspirations. The Pakistan movement was weakest in the Muslim majority provinces especially rural classes. Hamza Alvi states that it was this Muslim salariats from the different regions of Indian subcontinent with different ethnicities that united and strived for Pakistan movement. Once Pakistan was created, this coalition started to crumble as a new competition for the distribution of privilege started between this group now. The term 'middle class' is not used by Hamza Alvi as he states that the term is too wide and 'bourgeoisie' has connotations to the Marxist political discourse, which is not the class he is referring to. In essence, Jinnah's 'Two Nations' theory expressed the ideology of the weaker Muslim salariat vis-a-vis the dominant high caste Hindu salariat groups. Once a new State was achieved, the Punjabis in coalition with elite group from muhajirs, dominated the bureaucracy and the army while the other ethnic salariat groups were marginalized in their access to education, jobs and power. The 'Muslim' identity was laid to rest and new ethnic identities emerged. On the other hand, the dominant group i.e. Punjabis subscribed to Islamic ideology to justify their dominance and this is how Islamic ideology became the center of political debate. Politics of ethnicity and religious ideology therefore remain closely Intertwined. But it was only subscribed to for a few symbolic concessions and the dominant class had no intention of allowing mullahs and Islamic ideologues to encroach on their monopoly of power and privilege (Alvi in Gardezi & Rashid, 1991).

Attempts to quantify Pakistan's middle class, largely based on income and the purchase of consumption goods, show that as many as 42% of Pakistan's population belong to the upper and middle classes, with 38% counted as "the middle class". If these numbers are correct, or even indicative in any broad sense, then 84 million Pakistanis belong to the middle and upper classes, a population size larger than that of Germany and Turkey. This bodes good news for the Multi-National Corporations since it means that there exists another market which can tap into for successful returns. Expensive and latest cell phones, pasteurized milk and even junk food from the likes of McDonalds and KFC can rejoice at the increasing bulk of the middle class in the country from the economic perspective of consumption-induced growth.

## CHAPTER 2

### 2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Nancy Birdsall (2010) has analyzed through different surveyed data, compared and differentiated the Poor and Middle Class in the developing countries with those of the developed countries and argues that the growth, benefitting the middle class, is likely to be more sustained economically and politically. This middle class, being an outcome of the growth, supports good governance, stable political and economic institutions, by getting and implementing laws to encourage investments and protect private property rights, to perpetuate its economic interests. She refers to authoritative studies and opines that tightening of fiscal costs for benefitting only the poor can lose the political support of the middle class. However, trade-offs emanating from focused pro-poor policies versus inclusive and sustainable growth policies, benefitting the middle class, cannot be generalized and are variable over time according to the circumstances. The real trade-off is benefits for the poor and the middle class together versus the rich. Inclusive growth translates into increase in the proportion of people in the middle class and its economic and political command. Development economists differ on the minimum income threshold for middle class in a developing country. Economic security implies that one does not need to sell households / assets or to deprive one's children from schooling, and is insured against such like risks. Middle class should be counted on the basis of reliable measure of permanent income but this is a difficult and evasive task in itself. Gini co-efficient can be used as a simple measure of potential income / consumption of the middle class. Its sense of economic security can be compared with those in the lower income group. Increase in middle class is increase in its size and political and economic command, implying that the growth is self-sustaining, transformative and conducive to wealth creation.

Piketty (1995) aim to come up with a rational learning theory on politics of redistribution that seek to elucidate the major factors regarding the impact which social mobility has on the political attitude of the individual and the political outcomes as a whole. The author provides a theoretical foundation in order to get a better grip over the various dimensions of redistribution in the political economy and the impact that social mobility has on the political attitudes with regards to redistribution. With this, the author aims to highlight the importance of belief systems and the varying inequality dynamics. In doing so, the paper introduces a model to comprehend a conventional fact regarding distribution i.e. that the voters who share similar incomes but hail from dissimilar social origins cast their votes in different manners. In addition to this, Piketty demonstrates that even if the voters share similar goals, they may opt for different levels of redistribution, provided that they have different opinions regarding the level of the persistence of ex-ante income and how redistribution shapes the incentives to go to work.

Lipset (1960) was among the very first to establish a theoretical link between a country's probability being democratic and its level of development, at a time when democratic governments were a rarity on the global stage. He is often associated with the presentation of a simple correlation between democracy and per capita income. However, his view was more broad in nature, something that "all the various aspects of economic development – industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education – are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy" (Lipset 1960, 41). These are the factors, according to Lipset, which make up the sufficient (not necessary) conditions for democracy. Furthermore, Lipset also put emphasis on the increasing strength of the middle class in what he called a modernized society" by highlighting the social mechanisms. In this context, equality is of paramount importance both in the economic and socio-political footings. In his own words, "the gap between income of professional and semi-professional (...) and ordinary workers (...) is much wider in poorer than in developed countries" (Lipset 1960, 49). Hence, it can be deduced that Lipset believed that modernization manifests itself by altering the social conditions which breed and develop a culture of democratic norms. This is reflected in the developed societies where the workers are exposed to better education and possess a stronger human capital which in turn makes them amenable towards the value of democracy and hostile towards other ideologies.

Tedesco and Barton (2004) take into account the condition of democracy in response to the mounting disenchantment with the democratic regimes in Latin America, in their book on the state of democracy in Latin America. The authors take the case studies of Argentina and Chile in an attempt to explain the reasons behind the failure of the democratic transitions in providing socio-political stability in the region amid socio-political and economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Tedesco and Barton stipulate that it is pertinent to keep formal institutions into account as they serve as exhibits of social processes. They are of the view that a "new liberal consensus" was reached in Latin American countries which led to an agreement of a new social contract. This contract was in favour of a neo-liberal setup with limited government capacity for intervention in the society and economy. The authors use Chile and Argentina as examples to illustrate the necessity to ensure good governance by modernizing state institutions so that public services are delivered in an efficient manner.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) tackle an ambitious task as they look to transform the existing work on democratization into what they call as "the first systematic formal analysis of the creation and consolidation of democracy." Their main theoretical contribution was the introduction of dynamic game theory into the realm of democracy and analysis of regime change. They employ comparative statics so as to foretell a non-linear relationship between democracy's advent and inequality. "[T]here is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between inequality and democratization. Highly equal or highly unequal societies are unlikely to democratize. Rather, it is societies at intermediate levels of inequality in which we observe



democratization...having democratized, democracy is more likely to consolidate in more equal societies” (p. 244). Their findings run contrary to the results from the results of static models of democracy and redistribution, which look at linear relationships. The game theory in this article is based on politics, which is build up as a dynamic game consisting of two players, the Elite and the Citizens. Even though the Citizens are more in number, the Elites hold the vast majority of the wealth in the economy. The Citizens face the choice of whether or not to begin a revolution while the Elite decide on whether to choose a tax rate or democratize instead. A&R believe that the Elites will democratize only when the threat of a revolution is just below a specific point and when the cost of repression is plentiful. The Elite may mount a coup but it depends on their perceived cost of democracy. Moreover, A&R are of the view that democracy is not consolidated in the situation when inequality runs high and the Citizens are unable to reduce taxes to the point that the coup becomes unattractive to the Elites. In a nutshell, the Elite go for the coup when they possess the power and they opt for democratization when the Citizens have it. However, the authors can be found guilty of providing quite vague concepts of terms like “consolidation” and “institutions”. The concept of politics and economy are also over-simplified. Moreover, the authors seemed to have turned a blind eye towards the collapse of Soviet Union and the resulting shifts in institutions on a massive scale.

The three regime patterns that emerge in equilibrium can be either be:

- Stable democracy
- Democratic transition and stable democracy
- Democratic transition and unstable democracy

But each choice has its own tradeoffs. The classical work by Moore (1966) links democracy with the rise of middle class. Some other scholarly works also show the same relationship (Lipset 1960; Rosendroff 2001) while other scholarly works highlight the fact that it is not the middle class but rather primarily the working class that fuels democratization (Therborn 1979; Rusechemeyer, Huber, & Stephens 1993). Collier (1999) provides examples of both sides of the argument while others argue that middle classes are not the prime factor for democratic transitions but rather make democratic consolidation more likely once the regime transitions towards it.

In the case of Pakistan though much literature on Pakistan’s military being ‘a state within a state’. Ayesha Siddiqi argues that the Pakistan military has become a major stakeholder in the economy. It has gradually moved from the traditional model of claiming the state’s resources in the name of defense budget to a situation where it has crept into all segments of the economy such as agriculture, service and manufacturing industries. The military controls around a quarter of the corporate sector as reflected by owning of two of the largest conglomerates in the country i.e. the Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust. The political clout of the military in

Pakistan's political settlement has implications for the influence they enjoy in economic decision-making, both at a macro level generally, and at the micro level specifically as Ayesha Siddiqa argues that it is due to the military's economic interests which inadvertently creates "a vested interest" that restricts the democratic institutions from flourishing. Therefore, the greater the bid to enhance its economic power, the more entrenched in politics the military would be (Saddiqa, 2017).

There is also literature on the role of judiciary, media, gender, and how they have played a role in changing the structure of our society<sup>4</sup> (Khalid, 2012). Ayesha Jalal has given an elaborate analysis of the three countries India, Bangladesh and Pakistan and how the elected and non-elected institutions played a role in alliance/competition to change the structure of their respective countries. She explains; In India, democracy was able to take roots, as the elected and non-elected institutions were in an alliance that paved the way for formal democracy, instead of substantive democracy, to establish in the barely modified structures of British India's unitary state system. The holding of regular elections did lent legitimacy to the government and gave power to the Indian voters to discredit governments but the electoral verdicts did not adequately empowered them in shaping the state's social or economic development policies. This has inadvertently exposed the existence of political privilege in alliance with the elitist and bureaucracy, and the streak of authoritarianism that exist in the Indian political economy and state structure. But the frequent elections have mobilized the people enough which can be reflected in the recent assertion of the people's political muscle i.e. the backward and scheduled castes as well as the newly emerged middle class has molded Indian political scene. The trauma of partition in 1947 meant that the first priority of both India and Pakistan was to set up strong central governments. Nehru, the first premier, relying on his personal stature, projected a brand of socialism and commitment to social justice that could appeal to the populace while taking care to cultivate the support of the bureaucracy as well as the elitist groups. But the elitist support base was too narrow and without the necessary organizational reforms, Congress was losing its position. Though Shastri, losing his position instead sought refuge among the notables of the higher civil services but Congress was expelled from power in a number of states. Afterwards Indira Gandhi, tried to lure the intermediate castes and classes, especially big farmers and middle to richer peasants, with her populist anti-poverty program. This development came as left-wing coalitions along with Maoist Naxalite movement, involving poor peasants and militant student, was giving Congress a tough competition. But Indira Gandhi always took the high-caste, old landed elites along. Her tactical alliances with populist leaders and her strategy of keeping the old associations with the civil bureaucracy and sizeable fractions of the industrial capitalist class intact payed off. But Indira Gandhi's success in restoring the Congress electoral fortunes came to

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<sup>4</sup> Ashraf, A. (2013). Impact of New Media on Dynamics of Pakistan Politics. *Journal of Political Studies*, 20(1), pp.113-130.

be seen as a threat to dominant rural groups and the bearers of central state authority. But implementing the populist initiatives on behalf of newly empowered subordinate castes and classes was tougher than she thought. The relationship between the centre and federating units transformed as Congress consolidated the gains of the new and broader-based electoral alliances as strengthening of popular regional leaders meant the weakening of the centre, therefore, modifying both the party and the state structure. In Bangladesh on the other hand, after its succession, the leaders of the new state also started constructing a new central government apparatus with powers to assert authority over the federating units through manipulation of the political process. Though elections were held within the ninety days of independence, Mujib ur Rehman's populist economic measures could not reap benefits as the ravages of war and the splits in the armed forces, led to the defeat of the Awami League. This led Mujib as well to adopt authoritarian methods and he announced the setting up of a one-party socialist state. The middle classes and the intelligentsia resisted this move and this paved the way for the first martial law by General Ziaur Rahman. Conditions were created and elections were held at the local level and Ziaur Rahman became the president and this eventually paved the way towards a subservient parliament. The second military dictator, General Ershad, gave added impetus to the politics of localization and the economics of privatization. But due to rampant corruption, Ershad could not resist the powerful pro-democracy movement. Since 1990s, Bangladesh has held three general elections leading to the formation of governments and rooting of formal democracy but substantive democracy has not been able to grow roots due to the state structure that was formed on the lines of authoritarianism and the Cold war era factors that also led to similar imbalance in the state structure of Bangladesh as these factors worked to undermine the role of politics and democracy. In case of Pakistan as well, the Cold war era international and regional factors, as well as domestic factors led to the tilting in the balance of power from the political to the administrative arms of the state. In 1958, Pakistani military directly intervened into politics due to this imbalance. This led to depoliticize of Pakistani society. The institutional shift from elected to non-elected institutions came in different forms i.e. controlled politics, 'populism', outright authoritarianism and even the much vaunted party-based system of parliamentary democracy between 1988 and 1999. Ayub Khan used the strategy of controlled politics by extending differential patronage to carefully vetted segments of society. This form of selective mobilization ensured stability in Ayub's regime. But paradoxically enough, the very groups he gave patronage to were the cause of Ayub's downfall. The centre's attempts to subdue the provinces cause the provinces to feel marginalized and caused resentment e.g. Ayub's basic democracies order of 1959 is an example. It was this marginalization, that even led a democratically elected, Bhutto, to order a military crackdown to ensure stability of his regime but this inadvertently gave the army high command an opportunity to regain its lost space i.e. after East Pakistan was lost. By this decision, Bhutto himself ignored the provincial autonomy provisions of his 1973 constitution. Without an effective PPP organization at his disposal, military-bureaucratic alliance took advantage and in collusion with a cross-section of industrial and commercial groups, Bhutto was ousted from power. General Zia-ul-Haq, had the tacit support of fractions of dominant social

classes, landed as well as industrial, who were anti-Bhutto. But Zia wanted to further expand his support. Zia used the platform of religious parties like the Jamat-i-Islami and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, and promised to establish an Islamic social order as he lashed out against the moral turpitude of PPP. But more than the regime's religious credentials it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that enabled Zia to divert the attention of the people and consolidate his hold on power. Zia, unlike Ayub who relied on civil bureaucracy, preferred to give military officials key positions within the civilian administration as well as in semi-government and autonomous organizations (Bose & Jalal, *Modern South Asia; History, Culture and Political Economy*, 2004). This further corrupted the military officials by giving them access to a variety of lucrative business enterprises, and this created an even bigger stake for the military to further entrench itself into the existing extractive structure and political economy of Pakistan. By selective patronage and mobilization of the segments of the dominant socio-economic strata i.e. landlords and nascent commercial and industrial groups, the regime had garnered enough of a support base. The Eighth Amendment allowed the continuance of Zia's authoritarian rule with a democratic facade. The military-bureaucratic state in Pakistan and Bangladesh has extended its patronage to win over segments of the dominant socio-economic elite and in the footsteps of the colonial state, the political horizons are localized. Elections are held in both the countries but the casting of ballots cannot be confused with the full restoration of democracy as long as military authoritarianism exists.

One factor Akbar Zaidi highlights that why democracy has not flourished in Pakistan is the role of social groups which he elaborates. He states that social groups are the catalyzers in the demand and struggle for democracy, and often use their influence to access to the state, through partial state capture; hence the need to strive for democracy no longer exists. Therefore, Akbar Zaidi argues that there is no real constituency for democracy in Pakistan. In the first decade of Pakistan's independence, the bureaucracy-led and assisted industrialization took place. The bureaucracy therefore was a leading unequal partner in the political settlement that existed between the key players. The industrialists, while gaining economic clout via this industrialization, never became a political force or class. They heavily relied on the munificence of the bureaucrats. For much time, the economic clout remained essentially with the industrialists, but subsequently the capitalist agriculturists emerged to stake their claim. Additionally, this period also witnessed the rise of an aspiring, but small, educated middle class that wanted to impart a vision on the political arena, but did not have the economic clout to do so. Therefore, this group and many others (organized labour, peasants, middle farmers, urban and rural middle class) hooked their hopes to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who became popular with his social and socialist agenda. But the bureaucracy and industrialists were the key "enemies" of this socialist agenda. The land reforms of 1972 were also meant to reduce the economic and political clout of the large landowning lobby. But the urban middle class eventually joined hands with the bureaucracy and probably the military, and was contributory in removing Bhutto in 1977. Under the democratic order, the large landowners controlled a number of seats, particularly in Sindh,

southern Punjab and parts of Balochistan, where tribal lords wielded power. The takeover by general Zia ul Haq, cemented the domination of the civil and military bureaucracy, not just politically but also, economically, by transforming the incentive structure and distribution of resources. The Gulf boom resulted in huge amounts of remittances that were sent to numerous urban, peri-urban, and rural settlements of the country, which led to economic development in other parts of the country. This led to a rise in the previously unskilled workers becoming shopkeepers, setting up small enterprises, investing in the transport industry, etc. All of this development led to broadening and strengthening of the middle class. So the main beneficiaries of the Zia regime were the then urban and rural middle classes, religious strata and the military bureaucracy. Nawaz Sharif, a product and beneficiary of the economic policies of Zia ul Haq; joined politics with the blessing of Zia ul Haq. Many members of the economic and industrial elite now joined politics. Not only at the national level, but economic actors at the local and provincial level started to play an active role in politics by supporting different contesting political parties. 1990s was the era when the middle class desired and put efforts to use politics for economic gain. Once the middle class had accomplished this goal; the need for democracy became redundant. The politics of middle class has been based on opportunism and not principle. But not all the middle class groups supported Zia i.e. the ‘liberal and progressive’ section of middle class resisted him while the “conservative and religious” section of middle class supported him. The space each new economic group was allowed in the political arena depended on the blessing of the more powerful and organized institutions in the country. So though the economic landscape transformed with these rising economic groups but their political role was restricted. In contrast, a large section of the middle class supported Musharraf. The middle class has different social moorings therefore subscribe to different "fractions and factions". Akbar Zaidi argues that Pakistani middle class is now pre-dominantly urban but it has not brought about a progressive political movement which is in any form modern or democratic. Pakistan's middle classes have rather joined hands with the authoritarian and military governments compromising at each historical juncture. Moreover, the experience of democracy during the 1990s has found few supporters for the idea and practice of democracy in Pakistan. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no substantial real and concerted constituency in Pakistan for democracy. The middle class is opportunistic and largely interested in fulfilling their narrow economic goals. (Zaidi, 2005).

In case of Pakistan, survey conducted by PILDAT shows that army is the most trusted institution of Pakistan. A recent survey by DAWN Team sponsored by British Council<sup>5</sup> have also showed a positive attitude of people towards military intervention in politics. However, it cannot be stated that it is specifically middle class opinion.

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<sup>5</sup> 70 YEARS, 70 QUESTIONS. (2018, April). Retrieved December 18, 2019, from <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398570>.




Figure 2

Source: 70 YEARS, 70 QUESTIONS. (2018, April). Retrieved December 18, 2019, from <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398570>

### How have the following influenced the political situation over the last 70 years?




Figure 3

Source: 70 YEARS, 70 QUESTIONS. (2018, April). Retrieved December 18, 2019, from <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398570>

## How have the following affected the outcome of elections?




Figure 4

Source: 70 YEARS, 70 QUESTIONS. (2018, April). Retrieved December 18, 2019, from <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398570>

Social media in olden days came with the promise of enlightened politics, as truthful information and open communication helped the masses in knowing the ill-conceived activities and helped them drive out corruption, bigotry and lies. But with the Russian meddling in US Presidential elections which even Facebook acknowledged that around the presidential elections time period, around 146m users were prone to getting exposed to Russian misinformation on Facebook platform. Not only Facebook, but YouTube and Twitter have reinforced the same stance. Instead of helping strengthen democratic values of transparency and accountability, social media has become a tool that has been used by status quo/ autocratic powers to spread misinformation and propaganda. All of this has led to corroding of voters' judgment and aggravating partisanship leading to intolerance and autocratic values being upheld. Social-media platforms being open to a huge audience wields mammoth power. Data is the new currency. Social media uses the data

you feed into it against you by drawing your attention to things that the ones who control social media wants you to see. An economy built on attention is easily gamed. In this “attention economy”; Bots are often used to amplify political messages often corroding democratic values<sup>6</sup>.

From the protests around the 2009 Iranian elections to the uprisings of the Arab Spring, the role of social media in political uprisings in dishonest countries has been appreciated. Though social-media-fuelled movements often did not achieve anything in the end. But the idea that social media gives the masses a voice thus social media can become a tool for plurality, democracy and progress. Social media has rather been used as a propaganda tool by a practice known as doxing in which videos, articles and documents are oozed to humiliate enemies. Twitter and Facebook boosts memes. Empirical evidence shows that the far-right Alternative for Germany party won 12.6% of parliamentary seats because social media was used to exploit the fears of the people by boosting anti-immigrant and fake news on social media. Research shows even in Kenya, weaponized online rumours and fake news has eroded trust in the country’s political system. Social media is usually used by autocratic regimes such as Philippines’ President, Rodrigo Duterte, relies on a “keyboard army” to circulate false stories. In South Africa, Jacob Zuma, also employs the same tactics. Vladimir Putin’s regime has used social media to export false propaganda to the neighboring countries by use of BOTS with outfits like the Internet Research Agency; where professional trolls work in 12-hour shifts to target millions of users. The RAND Corporation, a think-tank, calls this integrated, purposeful system a “fire-hose of falsehood”. Jürgen Habermas, a noted German philosopher, years ago had indicated that though social media might destabilize authoritarian countries, it would also erode the public sphere in democracies. Herbert Simon, a noted economist, wrote in 1971<sup>7</sup>. A “wealth of information,” he added, “creates a poverty of attention.” The working of social media is done in such a way that maximizes “engagement” by showing users the information they are more likely to interact with. This tends users to gel into clusters of like-minded people sharing like-minded things thus leading from political moderation to political polarization.

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<sup>6</sup> Do social media threaten democracy? (2017, November 4). Retrieved December 18, 2019, from <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/11/04/do-social-media-threaten-democracy>.

<sup>7</sup> Once considered a boon to democracy, social media have started to look like its nemesis. (2017, November 4). Retrieved December 18, 2019, from <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/11/04/once-considered-a-boon-to-democracy-social-media-have-started-to-look-like-its-nemesis>.



The transformation of in the nature of class composition over time<sup>8</sup> has also been transformed as the distinction of class composition is no longer simple as definitions have evolved overtime for middle-class (Durr-e-Nayab, 2011). Previously, simplified class categories such as feudal, industrialists, and “the working class” existed with sharp distinctions, but these classes have transformed and their distinction has become problematic. Easterly 2001, Birdsall et al. 2000, Ravaillion 2009 as cited by Dr. Jawaid Abdul Ghani state that Middle class in the “service class” who possessive human capital and stable employment relationships are more likely to invest in securing their own and children’s future. Empirical evidence shows that this eventually induces economic growth. This is the reason middle class is considered as “the backbone of both the market economy and of democracy in most advanced societies.” Most of the upper middle class reside in urban areas. The total assets of Upper middle class are enough thus providing a cushion against economic shocks, and therefore, they have the confidence to invest in physical and human assets. The lower middle class however still are in a position to get effected by economic shocks. As households move up the ladder, they re-allocate their expenditure by curtailing the budget share on essential foods and apparel and thereby increasing the budget share of high value added products and services rent and services, education and health. Finally the greater spending on education, festivals, and durables is consistent with the notion of Engel Curve (Ghani, 2014).

Easterly (2001) based on cross-country comparison states that countries with a larger middle class have comparatively faster GDP growth rates, with the condition that the country is not too ethnically diverse. Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato (2000) lament the shrinking of the middle class—in the face of expanding globalization which has led to deteriorating democratic values in advanced countries. Three tradition arguments made in support of middle class. The first argument to which Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997 subscribe is that new entrepreneurs emerge from the middle class and therefore, they create employment and leads to productivity and economic growth for the rest of society. In second argument presented to which Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005, 2007 subscribe; is that the middle class is not the entrepreneurial class but rather a source of vital input for the entrepreneurial class. This is because of their “middle class values” i.e. the importance they place on the accumulation of human capital and savings. This makes the middle class central to the process of capitalist accumulation. The third view to which Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989, subscribe is that middle class is indispensable for the business class as the middle class consumers are willing to pay a little extra for quality. This demand for quality products feeds investment in production and marketing, which in turn raises income levels for everyone. But are these arguments applicable in today’s developing countries? The paper emphasizes that middle class spending on education and health increases as they move up

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<sup>8</sup> Farid, J. (2017). *The Pakistan middle class estimation challenge*. [online] Finance Training Course. Available at: <https://financetrainingcourse.com/education/2017/12/pakistan-middle-class-estimation-size/> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2019].

the social ladder indicating importance of human and physical capital for them. In rural areas, rural middle class are mostly local entrepreneurs i.e. self-employed outside agriculture domain of rural area. Though in some countries like Guatemala and Mexico, this does not hold. The middle class is quite diversified depending from country to country, where middle class households receive incomes from multiple sectors. The rural middle class, unlike the urban middle class who spend more on education and health, spends approximately the same fraction of income on education as the poor. Bannerjee and Duflo (2008) conclude that middle class people usually have a relatively secure job and therefore are less susceptible to economic shocks, thus they are more likely to invest in health, education, and other “rent generating” credentials (Banerjee, 2008).


## CHAPTER 3

### 3.1 Research Methodology

#### 3.1.1 Conceptual Framework

The basic idea that is pitched in my research is that it is basically the incoherence or different social moorings of the middle class that shapes the economic and political system that prevails in a country. A social segment can actually be taken as sum of all the income streams of each household and their consumption pattern in a society. Most of the societies work under a very consolidated and organized structure of power, patronage, privileges and rent-seeking mechanisms. Koo (1991) argues that the old middle class is more likely to support democratization whereas the new middle class, that is, the people who ascended from lower class, are less likely to support democratization.

The classical work by Moore (1966) links democracy with the rise of middle class. Some other scholarly works also show the same relationship (Lipset 1960; Feng and Zak 1999; Rosendroff 2001) that Moore suggests. Therefore, these conditions consolidate the middle class interests and contribute to their decision of which regime to support and its implications for the society as a whole. The following are the factors that I will analyze that will affect the political cohesion of the middle class.



**Source:** Author (Ana Khattak)

Based on the analysis of numerous researches on social cohesion available in the literature, as Jenson elaborates a classification using five dimensions of social cohesion and how adequately the various institutions represent the people and their interests (Jenson, 2010).

Bernard (1999) further develops Jenson's approach by broadening its dimensions and proposing a typology based on two facets. The first one describes the spheres or domains of human activity (economic, political and socio-cultural). The second one distinguishes social relations regarding their nature. Social relations pertain on one hand to social representations like values or attitudes. On the other hand, they refer to observed behaviors or practices. Bernard refers to the last aspect as "substantial relations". Bernard considers social cohesion as a quasi-concept, i.e., a hybrid mental construction proposed by the political game and – at the same time – based on a data analysis of the situation; such a construction must remain quite undetermined in order to be adaptable to the necessities of political action (Bernard, 1999).

In the same way, the three dimensions I have chosen are group compatibility, external effects and group strength and weakness. The variables constructed for this and its mechanism is explained in the theoretical framework section of this thesis.

### 3.1.2 Going Forward

Elections are the outlining features of representative democracy. They serve as the essential instrument for confirming that governments are responsive and accountable to their nations. Elections symbolize the democratic principle of political equality: every eligible voter has the right to vote and every vote counts correspondingly. In practice, however, the rules that manage elections are certainly biased<sup>9</sup>. They endure the electoral chances of some political parties and encumber to others<sup>10</sup>. They may also discourage the formation of new parties. However, parties respond to the opportunities and restraints affects the choices that are available to voters on Election Day. The result is that some citizens are less likely than others to make their preferences count and if their preferred party is systematically disadvantaged or if no party shares their positions, voters may ultimately lose confidence in the democratic system. On the other hand, a proliferation of parties may lead to ineffective or unstable governance.

The most fundamental institutional rule is the electoral system, which defines how votes are cast and seats are allocated in a given election (Blais and Massicotte 2002).

There are following four basic kinds for the rules of game influence electoral system

- i. Plurality (*the candidate with the most votes wins*)
- ii. Majority (*it takes more than half of the votes to win on the first count or round*)

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<sup>9</sup> Ghulam Rasool Dehvi, "[Pakistan Elections: How the country's judiciary and military gagged the media and influenced public opinion](#)", *Firstpost*, 27 July 2018

<sup>10</sup> Junaidi, I. (2018). *HRCP pessimistic about free, fair election*. [online] DAWN. Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1420583/hrcp-pessimistic-about-free-fair-election> [Accessed 26 Nov. 2019].

- iii. Proportional representation or PR (*the number of seats a party obtains is established on the basis of a divisor or quota*)
- iv. Mixed (*a combination of PR and plurality or majority*).

As stated above, the effect of election system on the performance of political parties and on voters is based upon condition, and so this study elaborate certain courtesy on the electoral context, especially point out the behavior of voters for vote.

### **3.1.3 Theoretical Framework**

In economic theory it is relatively easy to assign goals instruments and their equilibria but in political theory the simple identification of goals is the core problem. The theorist can neither believe on people or their goals nor trust his or her own acknowledgements because most of people exaggerate selflessness. Furthermore, idealistic collaboration itself affects the theorist, it is imperative to differentiate between idle wishes and feasible choices. The threshold difficulty to political theory is to pinpoint feasible goals of people that can actually be used for search.

The most appropriate technique adopt for that purpose is rational choice model. The assumption for political theory i.e. goals are unobservable and unknowable will remain. The physiologist cannot simplify or imagine the goals. However, it is necessary to work out or forecast the goals of people which they have. The physiologist assumes that goals are relevant to their subjects and then predicts choices. Whenever, physiologist observes the goals, the research is complete. If, explained outcomes fail to observe the goals then they are reconsidered for prediction. This type of testing and revisionist techniques are not possible for behavioral generalizations but rational choice technique is permitted for revision and testing. The most well-known behavioral generalization in politics theory is the association between political party identification and voter sample surveys (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & intention, as self-reported in Stokes, 1962). Inappropriately, generalization is not exclusively accurate because behavior varies for e.g., some people have party affiliation while some vote for candidate affiliation. However, the behavior cannot be predicted as this method only examines the voter's objectives and ultimately goal of my research is to see middle class voters' objectives and what factors molds their voting pattern decision making.

Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory committee structures facilitating, as intended, the legislators' distribution of gains from trade to their interest group clients (Weingast, 1981; 1987). So that, dispute about objectives is not over or yet clear how physiologist will resolve this issue. There is still some debate about the factual evidence, but it is to be reiterated that the resolution method of rational choice analysis, though makes resolution difficult and accountable, theory is much more difficult than economic complications. In other words the fact is that political theory is much more challenging than economic theory.

Building upon Jenson (1998) and Bernard (1999) explanation of social cohesion; and building upon the paper variables; my questionnaire questions are designed in such a way that the

questions are grouped together to get the variables constructed for political participation (PP), political awareness (RMED), political independence (IND) and quality of democracy (QD). For example, the questions, D12. Do you cast vote independently without any pressure and the question D14 (Acket, Borsenberger, Dickes, & Sarracino, 2011). Will all your family member vote for the same party as the party you referred to in D11; are grouped together for the construction of variable i.e. political independence. The question D04. In your point of view, is intra-party elections for democratic development important and question D08. In your view, how important is it that people vote in elections? Such questions were grouped together for construction of variable i.e. political awareness.

In the same way, the other 2 variables also have questions grouped together for construction of variables on the basis of prior literature. These 4 independent variables are regressed against the dependent variable i.e. the income quintiles. Simple OLS is used to get regression results for all the quintiles while bootstrap regression is used to get an overall relation of the dependent variables with the average income quintile to get a more generalized picture for analysis.

### **3.1.4 Survey Based Study of Three Constituencies**

My study is survey based. My survey is based on data collected from three constituencies i.e. NA-16, NA-53 and NA-88. Three constituencies have been chosen to keep the sample representative. Survey methodology studies the sampling of individual units from a population and associated techniques of survey data collection such as in my case questionnaire construction and methods for improving the number and accuracy of responses to surveys. Surveys are best for such social and political topics as it provides important information for all kinds of public-information and research fields.

### **3.1.5 Data Description**

This study will be unique as I will be collecting primary data via questionnaires to analyze the political cohesion on political party strategies and voters' behavior in election, after which I will be able to know their political preferences and the factors that are incorporated in their decision making. To do so, I will conduct a systematic analysis on voter behavior in a variety of contexts. In a democracy, voters decide who will govern them. It is very important to understand why people make the choices that they do. To do so, it is necessary to tap voters' attitudes and perceptions and to examine how they relate to the ultimate decision.

### **3.1.6 Data Collection Methods**

The data is being collected through questionnaires by adopting team approach comprising of male and female enumerators. In each field team, female enumerators interviewed the female respondent and male enumerators interviewed the male respondent.

### **3.1.7 Questionnaire Design**

Questionnaire for this study is designed accordingly and the main aim of this questionnaire is to categorize the family budget. The section C of the questionnaire about family budget is to collect

information on consumption/expenditure patterns of household as it will help in deciding which class the respondent falls in. To enhance the data quality, I will adopt the integrated surveys technique by team approach and try to avoid duplication and imputation in data for unbiased analysis. The collected data is also used for developing a series of socioeconomic and political cohesion indicators e.g., income classes of household, political parties' preferences, and candidate performance. The main structure of this questionnaire to investigate voting preferences and factors that play a role in decision making while casting vote. The questionnaire design is as following.

### **STRUCTURE OF QUESTIONNAIRE:**

**SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**  
**SECTION B: HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION**  
**SECTION C: SOCIOECONOMIC INFORMATION**  
**SECTION D: POLITICAL COHESION**

The survey questionnaire divided into different sections. The first includes questions related to the demography where the respondent belongs. This will help in probing if constituency is the reason a respondent does not cast vote or not, also if he/she casts the vote due to ethnic or lingual reason. Section B contains questions regarding the households information which will help me probe how many members there are in each household and what is the level of education which will help me gauge the education tendency in that specific middle house household. Section C contains questions regarding spending and consumption patterns and this will help me in determining to which band of middle class the household belongs. The methodology of computing quintiles is based on national survey of Household Integrated Economic Survey (HISE) on consumption/expenditure. Section D – carrying twenty-seven questions – is the most important section and it is from this section that I will construct my variables for gauging the political moorings of middle class. Each question was framed in a way that allowed the respondents to provide well thought out and nuanced answers. For example, one of the questions asking the respondents to given their opinion about how satisfied they are with the present Pakistan electoral system, which is supplanted with additional questions for probing answers.

The questions were also carefully constructed so as not to let any bias get into their wording. For example, instead of asking, “In some countries, people are required by law to vote. Would you support such a law for General elections in Pakistan?” instead my question asked, “In some countries, people are required by law to vote. How supportive would you be of a law like this for General elections in Pakistan?” The options provided to answer the question were also not presented as cut and dried. These included: a) Very supportive b) Somewhat supportive c) Somewhat opposed d) Very opposed or e) Don't know. This was done in order to discern the various shades and nuances of public opinion. The ‘I don't know’ option was also included in the

survey in order not to force the respondent to answer any question even if he does not understand or have an opinion about the question asked.

### **3.1.8 Sample Design**

Keeping in view the core objective of this survey, for that purpose I will collect the sample in various areas of the constituencies chosen that has been fixed at 350 and comprising of households that belong to rural and urban areas and which is expected to produce reliable results at other constituency areas.

The data generated through the primary data collection will be used for descriptive and regression analysis and to generate voting preferences results. Therefore, two stage stratified sampling method is adopted for this survey. The stratification plan for this survey is urban and rural areas of specific constituency.

### **3.1.9 Data Quality and Reliability Analysis**

In this survey, the data quality is ensured through a built in system of checking of enumeration work by the supervisors in the field. The supervisors thoroughly review and edit the questionnaire to check the inconsistency or omissions during field work by the team. In case the enumerators do not properly collect the data, then they revisited the household to enhance the quality and reliability of data. The entire data entry and data cleaning was carried under a trained data entry operator. Due to this, it is safe to assume that the results of the survey provide an accurate reflection of the public's perception of Pakistan's political environment.

An enormous complexity exists in the survey as it collects information on a number of different socio-economic dimensions. The graphs and tables presented will comprise of different income groups and areas of constituency. Furthermore, regression analysis is carried for possible interpretation of estimated coefficients. The graphical and tabulation presentation is based on consumption/expenditure quintiles. The methodology of computing quintiles is based on national survey of Household Integrated Economic Survey (HISE) on consumption/expenditure.

The data collection was supervised by me and coordinated accordingly from time to time with my supervisor Dr. Karim Khan.

## **3.2 Quantile vs Linear Regression**

### **3.2.1 Linear Regression**

Linear regression technique is claimed to produce parameters with appropriate features, which are best, linear, unbiased estimators (BLUE). This means that parameters estimated through linear regression method have the minimum variance, linear model have relationship between endogenous as well as exogenous variables, and values of parameters are a representative of the population. However, these features only hold if there are no violations of the model assumptions or there are no influential outliers as stated by Berry, (1993); Hao and Naiman, (2007); Pedhazur, (1997). Heteroscedasticity will make parameter estimates no longer BLUE (Berry, 1993), while in the presence of outliers, this will affect the regression line to be leveraged in the outliers



direction as stated by Moore, (2007); Pedhazur, (1997). In addition, the presence of outliers also violates the model's assumption and then the regression line is insufficient to depict the relationship between variables for the whole distribution as stated by Hao and Naiman, (2007). Linear regression method has still inherent disadvantages even when procedures to overcome the effects of violation assumptions and outliers are applied. Models suggested by linear regression cannot be immediately extended to other locations in the distribution to be investigated in other studies as suggested by Hao and Naiman, (2007). Linear regression technique may give inaccurate information about the nature of the relationship between endogenous as well as exogenous variables. When heteroscedasticity occurs and the slope of the regression line on the conditional mean is zero, linear regression overcomes heteroscedasticity and will suggest no relationship between variables, though there will be a relationship between variables on non-centrally locations or on other distributional parameters for example, scale, skewness; as suggested by Cade and Noon, (2003).

### **3.2.2 Quantile Regression**

Quantile Regression is a robust methodology and estimated regression coefficients have additional beneficial features. Outcome variables are not affected by outliers because quantile regression estimator is based on the quantiles of variables instead of the overall variable itself. Each quantile variable is bound to its location relative to overall groups, in other words, as long as the extreme values do not change their location relative to its group, estimation of parameter in quantile regression will not be effected as stated by Hao and Naiman, (2007); Koenker, (2005). Quantile regression estimates are also unaffected by heteroscedasticity for the same reason. Each quantile is bound to its quantile and the range of quantiles is stable across the values of endogenous variable, thus eliminating the requisite for processes to overcome heteroscedasticity. The stochastic part of the quantile regression technique, the error term, is not dependent upon certain distribution function such as the normal distribution, so it is not required to assume normality of error distribution. It will make quantile regression applicable to data that have very skewed error distributions Gilchrist, (2000); Hao and Naiman, (2007). Quantile Regression can provide a regression line with non-central locations because of its capability to scrutinize the association between variables on any quantiles in a conditional distribution. This will enable researchers to conduct dissimilarity studies including non-central area of the conditional distribution Cade and Noon, (2003); Hao and Naiman, (2007); Koenker, (2005). In addition, this feature also enables quantile regression to examine the association between variables on other parameters of the conditional distribution such as scales and skewness. Quantile Regression will provide information about how response variables affect the scale or skewness of the conditional distribution of the outcome variable Hao and Naiman, (2007).

Quantile Regression also has the feature of monotonic equivariance, Hao and Naiman, (2007) or "*equivariance to monotone transformation*". This means that monotonic transformation of the data will not change the way the result will be interpreted and linear regression only has a feature of equivariance of linear transformations:

$$E(c + ay|x) = c + aE(y|x)$$

Quantile Regression has both equivariance of liner transformation as well as monotone transformation Hao and Naiman, (2007)

$$Q^{(p)}(c + ay|x) = c + aQ^{(p)}(y|x)$$

$$Q^{(p)}(h(y)|x) = h(Q^{(p)}(y|x))$$

If apply log transformation on liner regression then;

$$E(\log(y)|x) \neq \log(E(y|x))$$

In case of applying log transformation on quantile regression then;

$$Q^{(p)}(\log(y)|x) = \log(Q^{(p)}(y|x))$$

Maximum possible information that we can get from quantile regression is as follows:

There are at least three types of information that can be derived from quantile regression about the relationship between endogenous as well as exogenous variables: central and non-central location shifts, parameter variances between quantiles, and shifts of other conditional distribution parameters. Affiliations on central and non-central location shift and parameter differences between quantiles can be derived immediately from parameter estimates on median or quantiles. Information regarding scale and skewness shift should be developed based on parameters acquirement.

One possible measure of distribution developed based on quantile regression that is interquartile range (IQR). IQR is the difference between upper quartile (Q3) and lower quartile (Q1).

$$IQR = Q_3 - Q_1$$

or

$$IQR = Q^{75} - Q^{25}$$

Hao and Naiman, (2007) proposed a technique of approximating scale shift based on the IQR difference between two adjacent points, namely reference and comparison  $C = R + 1$ . The dissimilarity between IQR for two contiguous points will provide evidence about the variable of increase of scale shift as a endogenous variable increased one point. It was shown that for one predictor.

$$IQR = \beta^{75} - \beta^{25}$$

Inter quartile range will be zero if there is no scale shift across the values of endogenous variable. It will be negative; if the scale of the conditional distribution of the exogenous variable becomes smaller as the value of endogenous variables increase and positive; if the scale becomes

larger as the value of endogenous variables increase. This procedure will be applied for estimating the scale and shifts the locations as one increase of a certain predictor assuming other predictors in the model are constant.

### **3.3 Ethics and Confidentiality**

Consent will be established grounded in the research ethics for in-depth interviews. The respondent's privacy will be kept confidential throughout and after the study. It will include name of the respondent, address of the respondent, contact and/or service position of the respondent. No personal details of any respondent will be disclosed with anyone whatsoever. The confidentiality will be ensured as per research ethics. Questionnaires responses will only be analyzed for research purposes and personal information won't be disclosed to anyone.

### **3.4 Thematic Areas**

#### **3.4.1 Theme 1: Relative V/s Absolute Middle Class**

Classical Models of middle class development relates the growth in the middle class to increase in the entrepreneurial activity, Investment in Human Capital and democratic measures.

*Barrington Moore (1966) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1959,1960) or David Landes (1998)*

The economists working on the emerging economies' depend on the statistical definition of the term middle class that in relative term. Different countries consider different income ranges and social factors to define the middle class in their country and this creates a dilemma of an absolute definition of the term on global bases.

This lack of an absolute term makes it harder to compare the living conditions of the same group of the society around the world.

#### **3.4.2 Theme 2: Social & Economic circumstances of lower Middle Class/ Venerable group**

Vulnerable groups are the catalyst for the change, according to Ansell and Samuels (2010). This group creates demand for the economic and political liberty.

The members of this group protect their economic earned means and assets from elite of the society, hence they opt for follow the trends of upward mobility.

Theories on elite and middle class perceive that the as the more people will join the segment of lower middle class, the demarcation of inequality and poverty will fall.

#### **3.4.3 Theme 3: Issues with the three standards definition of middle class**

Currently, middle class group of the society is further divided into three segment namely, Upper Middle class, middle-middle class and lower middle class.

The affluent segments in the middle class group tends to follow the social and political fronts of the elites of the society and this results into further sense of deprivation among the vulnerable lower middle class.

#### **3.4.4 Theme 4: Political and Social implication of “New” Middle class**

So far the available literature on middle class income and growth take the prevailing concept of middle class and test the same models using the same parameters. The definition of middle class is mostly defined using the official data widely available to the public, but we need to go beyond the limits and look at the factors that differentiate “New Middle Class” from the old one.

The official data can easily report the changes in the per capita income up gradation of the middle class group, but it might not be a suitable representation of political and social changes faced by this group. The evidence in literature of the impact of social and political behavior of individuals in upward mobility is either very rare or very weak.

The quantitative data on this topic is very weak and most studies depends on surveys and interviews of the target group. Subjectivity of both the interviewers and interviewees make it further difficult to draw a demarcation line on upward mobility trend.

#### **3.4.5 Theme 5: Demand for protection from Income, health or economic shocks**

In the times of economic depression, this group, i.e. middle class rely more on the state for relief from the economic downturn than their own means of production or savings.

There is a dire need for state sponsored health insurance demanded by this group.

#### **3.4.6 Theme 6: Prospects of Upward mobility and demand for redistribution**


Education is one of the factors that bifurcate between the various segments with in middle class group. It work as a barrier to upward mobility for the vulnerable group.

But, there are some positive signs that the income spent of education will matter less in the upward mobility in the future.

## CHAPTER 4

This chapter will elucidate the results that have been derived from the questionnaires. The urban sample is taken dominantly from NA-53. This constituency most consists of urban areas of Islamabad in addition to Bhara Kahu and abbotabad. The sample chosen all belongs to this constituency on the basis of sample randomness. The rural sample of households have been taken from scattered regions such as NA-16, NA-53 and NA-88 which has made the sample more representative and unbiased. The urban sample is a bit larger than the rural sample as some rural households' questionnaires had to be dropped due to vagueness of data feedback from them and also because rural people were more resistant to providing information. Each table or pie chart shown below is accompanied with its respective description and analysis and which is the contribution of me towards this field. The results are totally unbiased and the deductions drawn may be contested based on data limitation, sample, analysis via different approaches.

### 4.1 Percentage sample size in rural and urban area:



**Fig 5.0**

Figure 5.0 shows result of the study which took 53% sample from the urban area and 47% of the sample from the rural area. The total sample size is 330 households i.e. 175 households from urban area and 155 from rural area.

#### 4.2 National Assembly:





Fig 5.1

The Figure above shows urban sample has been taken only from NA-53 while the rural sample has been taken 3% from NA-16, 38% from NA-53 and 6% from NA-88.

#### 4.3 Education by Region:




The above diagram shows 8% in the sample got only primary education out of the 47% rural population, 12% got middle level education, 13% did matric and 14% did intermediate. While on the urban side 18% of the urban population had done intermediate, 25% had done Bachelors and 11% had a Master degree with no one having a degree below intermediate level. Therefore, it

can be concluded from the sample results that middle class spends more on education compared to lower class. The sample also suggests that urban middle class spends more on higher education compared to rural middle class which has no percentage of population sample with a Bachelors and Master's degree. Urban higher middle class spends the most on higher education as only they had a Master's degree and which may have helped them rise in the class ladder by opening more avenues of opportunities of growth. This is a recall of what has been suggested in the section of my thesis, 'The Importance of Middle Class', where it has been suggested that the inclination of middle class' buying patterns i.e. 'conspicuous consumption'<sup>iii</sup>, depends largely upon their income levels and their preference for 'positional goods'<sup>iv</sup> e.g. a degree from a well-known institute which enhances their capacity for upward social mobility. Education is one of the factors that bifurcate between the various segments within middle class group. It works as a barrier to upward mobility for the vulnerable group. This refers to the findings of Dr. Jawaid Abdul Ghani (2014).

Easterly 2001, Birdsall et al. 2000, Ravallion 2009 state that Middle class in the "service class" who possess human capital and stable employment relationships are more likely to invest in securing their own and children's future. Empirical evidence shows that this eventually induces economic growth. This is the reason middle class is considered as "the backbone of both the market economy and of democracy in most advanced societies." Most of the upper middle class reside in urban areas. The total assets of Upper middle class are enough thus providing a cushion against economic shocks, and therefore, they have the confidence to invest in physical and human assets. The lower middle class however still are in a position to get effected by economic shocks. As households move up the ladder, they re-allocate their expenditure by curtailing the budget share on essential foods and apparel and thereby increasing the budget share of high value added products and services rent and services, education and health (Ghani, 2014). Finally the greater spending on education, festivals, and durables is consistent with the notion of Engel Curve.

#### 4.4 Occupation by Region




This diagram describes the occupation of the people in targeted area. It shows 3% population in the sample are government employees, 23% are private job holder, 12% are doing their own businesses, 5% are retired from the civil sector services and 5% are retired from the armed forces in the rural areas. On the other hand, in the urban area the diagram shows 8% are serving in government sector, 28% are working in the private departments, while 12% have their own business, 4% are students and 1% belong to the retired armed forces.

Occupation wise there is no major difference between urban and rural class but the proportion of urban middle class in govt. and business segment is higher indicating more chances of urban people being selected for govt. jobs due to their better qualification proportion as indicated in the education segment. Also upper middle class preferred private jobs and businesses more due to better financial position and market opportunities in urban areas. Pakistan does have a large urban population, as Duflo (2008) calls middle class an urban phenomenon. In undivided, colonial India, the term “middle class” was associated with Indian officials, bureaucrats, doctors, lawyers and teachers who were linked to the colonial state-but many of them came from the aristocratic and landed backgrounds. But now in the last two decades, an emerging new middle class is rising as suggested from the data as the proportion of private jobs has grown at a faster pace compared to middle class from aristocratic and landed backgrounds, CSPs, bureaucrats etc. CSS and govt. jobs though with all its colonial privileges does hold respect in the eyes of people, but middle class children are preferring private jobs rather than govt. jobs with high chances of growth in it though no matter the tough competition (Siddiqua, 2017).




#### 4.5 Quantiles by Region:



The study divides the population of the sample in four quantiles on the basis of the income. The first quartile that is called lower class and its range is from Rs. 15000- 30000. The population lies in the range of 22% from the rural area. In the second lower middle class quantile, the income slap i.e. Rs. 30001-50000, the number lies 25% in rural area and 15% in urban areas. The range of middle class 3<sup>rd</sup> quantile is from Rs. 50001-80000 and population lies 33% only in the urban sector. The last and 4<sup>th</sup> upper middle quantile, its range is from Rs. 80001-150000, in this quantile 5% population lies in the urban area.

The result suggests that the lower middle class and second lower middle class reside in rural areas while the more above the income ladder one goes, the middle class resides in urban areas. This can be taken as a clear reference to Lipset (1960) who established a theoretical link between a country's probability of being democratic and its level of development. He is often associated with the presentation of a simple correlation between democracy and per capita income. However, his views are broader in nature, something that "all the various aspects of economic development – industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education – are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy". According to Lipset, these are the factors, which make up the sufficient conditions for democracy. Hence, it can be deduced that Lipset believed that modernization manifests itself by altering the social conditions which breed and develop a culture of democratic norms. The sample here shows that upper income quantiles live in urban areas but unlike Lipset conclusions, my data shows that urban areas have comparative preference for dictatorial tendencies in the regression analysis section of my thesis .

#### 4.6 Political Cohesion:




This diagram shows the reaction of the respondents when asked about the political cohesion section of the questionnaire for the variables I had constructed. 27% out of the population are fully aware about the political condition in the country through different sources like (social media, television and newspaper). The section on ‘Sources of Awareness’ makes the break up clear of how a major chunk of this segment relies on social media to get information and the bootstrap regressions shows the implications of this dependence on social media for political information. 24% of the population want to become a part of politics. They are vying to become/stand in politics or get ticket for economic gain. Democracy is just a façade to fulfil one’s own narrow interests. This can be seen in the light of Akbar Zaidi’s theory that many members of the economic and industrial elite joined politics in the era of Zia who made an alliance with them for his support. Not only at the national level, but economic actors at the local and provincial level started to play an active role in politics by supporting different contesting political parties that had the patronage of the status quo forces. 1990s was the era when the middle class desired and put efforts to use politics for economic gain. Once the middle class had accomplished this goal; the need for democracy became redundant. The politics of middle class has been based on opportunism and not principle.

18% are the people who cast their vote without any family, culture and social norms pressures. This is a low figure and the greatest chunk of this figure lies in the 2<sup>nd</sup> quintile of middle class.

31% of respondents from the targeted population have a strong belief in democracy of their country. This is an interesting figure as shown in the sections below especially the regression results show how much dictatorial tendencies exist in our country so the belief in the quality of democracy yet the variables constructed showing dictatorial preferences is what causes the confusion and impact our political environment. This maybe something that takes us to Ayesha Saddiqa’s theory of a hybrid government that is quite popular in Pakistan (Saddiqa, 2017). With a civilian façade, the working of authoritarianism is at play. Such concepts are very difficult to prove but figures like this with contradictory results are often indicative of such concepts.

**4.7 Political Cohesion on Regional Basis**




This diagram shows 19% population are fully aware about the politics in urban area and 8% in rural area. 12% people of the population cast their vote without any pressure in urban area and 6% from the rural area. 20% believes in democracy for the country development in urban while 11% from the rural sector. 20% people want to join politics in urban area and 4% in rural area.

From the above observations, one can deduce that the spirit of democracy is slowly creeping into the social fabric of the society, albeit at a snail’s pace. The momentous rise of social media websites and the growing use of internet since the dawn of the new millennium has ensured that more people gain political information even though the waves of fake news may somewhat taint such information. However, one can see that this political awareness in the country is quite striking in the middle class, especially among those residing in the urban areas where internet facilities are readily available. As a result of this growing awareness, more people are willing to take part in the country’s political process than before. One can draw lessons from Acemoglu

and Robinson (2006) who believes that highly equal or highly unequal societies are unlikely to democratize. In the same vein, comparisons can be drawn with Pakistan where the socio-economic structure reeks with inequalities. A voter faces pressure from multiple angles such as society, family, tribe, etc.

This matches the conclusions drawn by Lipset (1960) as per his theoretical link between democracy and underdevelopment. This is especially auspicious in the rural areas where much of the population suffers under the shadows of illiteracy and poverty which clouds their judgment and leaves them susceptible to the aforementioned foreign pressures. As a result, the right candidates are rarely elected to the public offices which effects the delivery of public services and is against the spirit of democracy and the purpose it means to serve. Hence, it is not surprising that only a handful of the sample population are left standing with their faith in the quality of the country's democracy intact.

#### 4.8 Political Cohesion on the basis of quantile



This diagram describes the political Cohesion based on quantiles.

**Political Preference:** In lower class 7% people are interested to take part in politics, 10% in lower middle class, 6% from the middle class and only 1% from the upper middle is interested in taking part in politics. So the greatest chunk of the population interested to take part in politics lies in the second quantile.

**Quality of Democracy:** 6% of lower class believe in the quality of democracy, while the second 10% of the 2<sup>nd</sup> quantile believes in quality of democracy. 11% of 3<sup>rd</sup> quantile middle class believe in quality of democracy while only 1% from the upper middle class believe in the quality of democracy in Pakistan. This indicates that the upper the ladder one climbs, trust in quality of democracy decreases and vice versa. It is the the median range where quality of democracy is trusted.

**Political Freedom:** 5% people who cast their vote without pressure lie in the lower class, 08% from the lower middle class, 4% from the middle class and 1% from the upper middle class. The greatest chunk of the population that is politically free to choose for themselves and it lies in the second quantile and a positive link can be seen between freedom to vote without pressure and the level of trust in the quality of democracy.


**Political Information:** 3% people are fully aware about the politics in the lower class, 8% in the lower middle class, 15% from the middle class and 1% from the upper middle class. Again, the greatest chunk of population with political information lies in the third quantile which shows that it is the middle class that takes a lot of interest in politics and keeps it up to date with the political happenings.

**4.09 Segment of the sample who casted the vote:**




This diagram show that 89% population cast the vote and 11% respond they did not cast the vote.

#### 4.10 Reasons for not Casting Vote:



This graph describe 4% population in sample did not cast their vote due to conflict of different parties. 5% were unable to cast a vote due to unawareness and 2% could not cast a vote due to non-availability in the constituency.

#### 4.11 Casting Vote by Parties:



Above diagram shows out of the total population size only 28% people cast the vote in the favor of PML (N), while 32% to the PPP and 28% to the PTI.

Democracy is rather a futile exercise if the right to casting the vote is left unexercised. With this said, it is refreshing to see that majority of the population in our sample successfully cast their vote in elections. This indicates to what Ayesha Jalal refers to as ‘formalistic democracy’ rather than ‘substantive democracy’ as she refers to the military-bureaucratic state in Pakistan and Bangladesh which has extended its patronage to win over segments of the dominant socio-economic elite and in the footsteps of the colonial state, the political horizons are localized. Elections are held in both the countries but the casting of ballots cannot be confused with the full restoration of democracy as long as military authoritarianism exists (Bose & Jalal, Modern South

Asia; History, Culture and Political Economy, 1998). At first glance, the contradictory sentiments that emerge may surprise, but they provide evidence of the multilayered and complex disposition of Pakistani society. Expecting a rational and linear narrative from a survey of perceptions would mean disregarding the varied experiences of Pakistanis. There appears to be considerable support for the military's role in politics, as evinced by the enthusiastic endorsement many respondents give to its continued intervention in electoral processes.


This flies in the face of the received academic wisdom and that suggests that elections are an indicator of people's trust in the democratic process and that the military has often been a counterproductive force when it comes to the development of Pakistan's democracy and democratic institutions. Yet, this finding of people casting votes yet having preference for dictatorial tendencies and having lost trust in the quality of democracy is unsurprising when we consider how the military's political role has long been valorized in public discourse that has largely been characterized by the existence of a dichotomy between civilian politicians – who are largely seen to be venal and incompetent – and the military generals who replace these politicians only in the greater national interest. Old tropes about the relative merits of civilian and military politics continue to have a tremendous sway over popular imagination.

With respect to those who did not cast their vote, three reasons can be identified namely party alliances, illiteracy and constitutional issues. Among these, I would like to focus on the constituency issues with respect to the middle class. It is quite common for the members of the middle class to migrate to urban centers in search for employment. And while this rural-urban and urban-urban migration has its respective pros and cons in the social and economic realm, there arises another issue of voting constituency. It is often found that many of such migrants face the situation whereby their registered votes are in their native areas and while many people are willing to make the journey during elections, there are always a few who chose not to cast their votes due to the shoe-leather costs involved which dampens their will to cast their vote.

In concomitance to this, we can draw comparisons of our results with the view of Nancy Birdsall (2010) who opined that the middle class, being an outcome of the growth, supports good governance, stable political and economic institutions by getting and implementing laws to encourage investments and protect private property rights, to perpetuate its economic interests. Hence, they are attracted towards the policies that cater to their interests. We can see from the above survey that a sizeable number of our sample population cast their vote in favour of the PPP who portrays itself the champion of the downtrodden and an ally of the common workers/labour. The high support for the PPP is in line with Birdsall (2010) who argues that the growth which benefits a major chunk of the population is likely to be more sustained economically and politically; as is the case with Pakistan which has a large and growing middle class. On the other hand, those belonging to the more affluent cadres of the middle class, especially the businessmen, are likely to be attracted towards the PML (N) and their industrialist policies. The different vote base of PPP and PML (N) can be explained by the conclusions drawn

by Picketty (1995) who observed that that the voters who share similar incomes but hail from dissimilar social origins cast their votes in different manners. Meanwhile, the ones seeking institutional reforms and structural change against corruption are more likely than not swayed by the emerging PTI, especially the millennial participants in our survey.

#### 4.12 Source of Awareness by Region:



This diagram helps to understand, how the rural and urban population got awareness about politics. So 24% in rural and 19% from urban got awareness from news channels. 14% of the urban population who follow the newspaper. Meanwhile, 24% rural and 20% urban population got awareness from the social media.

Lipset (1960) believed that modernization manifests itself by altering the social conditions which breed and develop a culture of democratic norms. This is reflected in the developed societies where the workers are exposed to better education and possess a stronger human capital which in turn makes them amenable towards the value of democracy and hostile towards other ideologies. In a similar vein, it would not be wrong to say that the rural areas of the country are blessed with a smaller reach to the wider world than the urban ones. Especially in Pakistan, the disparities between the rural and the urban areas are quite striking. Rural areas are mostly underdeveloped with mundane technological access and reeking with illiteracy and poverty, which puts them at a slight disadvantage to the urban centers when it comes to indicators such as literacy rates and human capital indices. Hence, it is easy to generalize the above results of my survey. One can aptly state that since the rural areas do not have access to sophisticated technologies, and as literacy levels are low in the rural areas, the use of newspapers as a source of information is almost non-existent.




#### 4.13 Significant Issues in Pakistan:



This diagram describes the significant issues of the Pakistan that are responded by our sample population. The problems of the middle class are quite different from the ones faced by either the poor or the affluent class. In this way, the middle class is stuck in the middle. On one hand, they have enough resources to not complain about food, cloth or shelter like the poor. On the other hand, their resources are not enough to divert their attention to more aesthetic issues like gender equality, global warming, etc. Hence, the middle class considers those issues as problems, which endanger their resources. For example, inequality in the society makes it almost impossible for the middle class to climb up the income ladder to the affluent class. Similarly, issues like poor governance, corruption and economic mismanagement threaten the ability of the middle class population to earn and protect their resources. However, not all these issues follow the same rule of thumb. Nonetheless, almost all cadres of society face some issues such as human rights violation, terrorism, international interference etc. and consider them as such.

#### 4.14 Politician Representation by Region:



This table describes the response of individuals regarding the selection of political representatives. 27% people agreed that the political candidate must be selected through the formalistic system in rural area and 16% gave the same answer in the urban area. 21% in rural area and 18% in urban responded in the favor of symbolic representative and none in rural and 18% in urban area liked descriptive representation<sup>11</sup>.

Considering that Pakistan has not had a consistent spell of democracy, it is pertinent that it has the support of a major chunk of the country’s population (i.e. the middle class) so that the current spell of democracy may continue. Elections are a trademark characteristic of a democracy in today’s age as they provide us with a systematic set of rules and procedure for the selection of the country’s policymakers and rulers. Formalistic form of representative means that a presentative obtains his/her standing, office, position by a process (i.e. elections). The different form of representation that people of middle class subscribe to represent the different social moorings that Hamza Alvi refers to. The phenomenon that it is the urban middle class that subscribes to descriptive middle class is quite interesting as it is usually considered a rural phenomenon that representatives “stand for” to the extent that they resemble, in their descriptive characteristics (e.g. race, gender, class etc.) But in Sindh, (urban Sindh) MQM was supported by Muhajirs. This therefore, need not be that surprising as middle class does at time form alliances with the representatives on the basis of race, gender, class but ethnicity, race etc. are just subscribed to for political and economic gains as detailed by Hamza Alvi. He states that Jinnah's 'Two Nations' theory expressed the ideology of the weaker Muslim salariat vis-a-vis the dominant high caste Hindu salariat groups. Once a new State was achieved, the Punjabis in coalition with elite group from muhajirs, dominated the bureaucracy and the army while the

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<sup>11</sup> Detail definition in Appendix.

other ethnic salariat groups were marginalized in their access to education, jobs and power. The ‘Muslim’ identity was laid to rest and new ethnic identities emerged. On the other hand, the dominant group i.e. Punjabis subscribed to Islamic ideology to justify their dominance and this is how Islamic ideology became the centre of political debate. Politics of ethnicity and religious ideology therefore remain closely intertwined as Islam was used as a deterministic representation by the status quo force (Alvi, 1998).

On the other hand, symbols are also an effective way of garnering political support, something which is used quite effectively in our country. One need look no further than PTI’s usage of ‘Tsunami’ of change as a means to garner support, especially from the youth and the middle class eager for ‘tabdeeli’.

#### 4.15 Median Bootstrap Regression:

Median bootstrap regression (IQR)					
<b>Raw sum of deviations</b>	138.8751		<b>Number of Obs</b>	330	
<b>Min sim of deviations</b>	97.74463		<b>Pseudo R-square</b>	0.2963	
<b>SEs</b>	10.64665				
<b>Income</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Stander Error</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P &gt;  t </b>	<b>[95% conf. Interval]</b>
<b>PP</b>	- 0.17958	0.059473	-3.01	0.003	[-0.29619 --- -0.062157]
<b>QD</b>	0.01616	0.005019	0.32	0.747	[-0.082418 --- 0.11474]
<b>IND</b>	0.10261	0.020487	5.01	0.000	[0.06235 --- 0.142915]
<b>RMED</b>	-0.39863	0.045274	-8.81	0.000	[-0.48769 --- -0.309575]
<b>Constant</b>	10.9807	0.082179	133.62	0.000	[10.81903 --- 11.14237]

This study also estimated bootstrap regression technique for appropriate unbiased analysis. The

empirically estimated results of this regression support estimated coefficients of the quintile wise regression as given in section 4.14. The slope coefficients of political preferences (PP), and political awareness (RMED) have a negative relationship with middle income class people and the result is statistically significant. This means that middle class income (median) have preferences for dictatorial leadership style and they are not politically aware as the role of media is negative or we can say due to asymmetric information they get. But middle class is politically free to choose whom to select without any pressures of family, caste etc. as the political independence (IND) is positive and highly statistically significant. But this political freedom is very ironical given that they are not politically aware due to their minds being caged by the role of media providing asymmetric information. This indicates to in which he states media is a tool in the hands of the status quo forces in disseminating asymmetric information and the status quo forces defend the economic, social and political agenda of the privileged echelon thus leading to political independence with our minds caged (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). This takes us to the article published in Economist which states that democracy has diluted due to social media's use as a political tool in the hands of the status quo forces. Regression fitness is reliable as stated by the value 0.2963. Had the value been greater the reliability would have been even better. The quality of democracy is positively association but insignificant value eliminate this role.

#### 4.14 Simple OLS Regression

Simple OLS					
				<b>Number of Obs</b>	330
				<b>F(4, 325)</b>	52.54
<b>Source</b>	<b>SS</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>MS</b>	<b>Prob. &gt; F</b>	0.0000
<b>Model</b>	32.2553	4	8.0639	<b>R-squared</b>	0.5927
<b>Residual</b>	49.8839	325	.1535	<b>Adj R-squared</b>	0.5852
<b>Total</b>	82.1391	329	.24966	<b>Root MSE</b>	0.3918
<b>Income</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Stander Error</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P &gt;  t </b>	<b>[95% conf. Interval]</b>
<b>PP</b>	-0.0790121	0.03063	-2.58	0.010	[-0.1393 --- -0.0187]

<b>QD</b>	0.0255713	0.02545	1.00	0.316	[-0.0244 --- 0.0756]
<b>IND</b>	0.1826206	0.02609	7.02	0.000	[0.1314 --- 0.2338]
<b>RMED</b>	-0.1545396	0.02078	-7.43	0.000	[-0.1954 --- -0.1137]
<b>constant</b>	10.53062	0.03928	286.07	0.000	[10.4533 --- 10.6079]

**Table 1:**

<b>.25 Quantile Regression</b>					
<b>Raw sum of deviations</b>		113.8517		<b>Number of Obs</b>	330
<b>Min sim of deviations</b>		86.9542		<b>Pseudo R-square</b>	0.2363
<b>Income</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Stander Error</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P &gt;  t </b>	<b>[95% conf. Interval]</b>
<b>PP</b>	-0.078507	0.054172	-1.45	0.148	[-0.18517 --- -0.02807]
<b>QD</b>	0.015171	0.045019	0.34	0.736	[-0.07339 --- 0.10373]
<b>IND</b>	0.256710	0.046025	5.58	0.000	[0.16616 --- 0.34725]
<b>RMED</b>	-0.118325	0.036769	-3.22	0.001	[-0.19066 --- -0.04599]
<b>Constant</b>	10.32683	0.069486	148.62	0.000	[10.19013 --- 10.4635]

The study follow the sample ordinary least square method. That show the relationship to the lower classes of political preferences (PP), quality of democracy (QD), political freedom (IND) as well as political information(RMED).

The table indicates that IND (political freedom) is positive and strongly significant. QD also has a positive relation but the result is statistically insignificant.

PP is negative showing dictatorial preferences but the result is statistically insignificant. (RMED has negative relation showing asymmetric information being reached to the sample leading to low political awareness and the result is statistically significant.

**Table 2:**

<b>.50 Median Quantile Regression</b>					
<b>Raw sum of deviations</b>		137.8751	<b>Number of Obs</b>		330
<b>Min sim of deviations</b>		100.6788	<b>Pseudo square</b>	<b>R-</b>	0.2698
<b>Income</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Stander Error</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P &gt;  t </b>	<b>[95% conf. Interval]</b>
<b>PP</b>	-0.085587	0.034279	-2.50	0.013	[-0.15302 --- -0.01815]
<b>QD</b>	0.0197895	0.028487	0.69	0.488	[-0.36254 --- 0.07583]
<b>IND</b>	0.1708503	0.029124	5.87	0.000	[0.11355 --- 0.22814]
<b>RMED</b>	-0.1573045	0.023267	-6.76	0.000	[-0.20307 --- -0.11153]
<b>Constant</b>	10.55831	0.043970	240.12	0.000	[10.47181 --- 10.6448]

In regression analysis, the variables: political preferences and political awareness, have negative relation to the lower middle class again showing dictatorial preferences and lack of political awareness due to negative role of media while quality of democracy and freedom of voting have a positive relation. Except for quality of democracy, all other variables are statistically significant.

The interesting point observed that role of media or political information performed asymmetric information among overall people.

**Table 3:**

<b>.75 Quantile Regression</b>					
<b>Raw sum of deviations</b>	100.6074	<b>Number of Obs</b>	330		
<b>Min sim of deviations</b>	77.1732	<b>Pseudo R-square</b>	0.2329		
<b>Income</b>	<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Stander Error</b>	<b>t</b>	<b>P &gt;  t </b>	<b>[95% conf. Interval]</b>
<b>PP</b>	-0.083459	0.0412562	-2.02	0.044	[-0.16462 --- -0.002295]
<b>QD</b>	0.038479	0.0342861	1.12	0.263	[-0.02897 --- 0.105929]
<b>IND</b>	0.153844	0.0350522	4.30	0.000	[0.084886 --- 0.222815]
<b>RMED</b>	-0.160227	0.0280055	-5.72	0.001	[-0.21531 --- -0.105138]
<b>constant</b>	10.81078	0.0529202	204.28	0.000	[10.70668 --- 10.91489]

The 75% quantile tells about the upper middle class, and its relation to the different variables. Political preferences (PP) and political awareness have the negative relation showing dictatorial preferences due to lack of political awareness due to negative role of media. Quality of democracy and political freedom have positive relation to the middle class quantiles. Only quality of democracy variable is statistically insignificant while the rest are statistically insignificant.

## CHAPTER 5

### 5.1 Challenge for Future Researchers:

The troubleshooters is the segmentation of middle class i.e. middle lower, lower middle, upper middle - to get to 'middle-middle', aka hard core middle class, where the middle class legion plunges to only a small segment of the population depending on whichever definition you decide upon. This problem is accompanied by the notion of the wealth band, not income range, which Credit Suisse used in its Global Wealth Report 2015. This gives a completely different outlook of the constitution of the middle class segment. The findings of my thesis give analysis based on middle-class groups as per HISE methodology rather than Credit Suisse' Global Wealth definition of middle class (Banerjee, 2008).

This flaw may not be resolved as different jurisdictions characterize middle class as per their call. In a thought-provoking piece of the magazine 'The Economist'; it branded middle class as having a judicious amount of discretionary income and defined it as simply the people who have 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of their income left, after paying for food and shelter, for discretionary spending (on consumer goods, better health care and children's education).

My thesis is a depiction of the negation of the different positive trends that middle class were associated with. This may be due to the factor mentioned above i.e. it may be the middle-income group rather than the middle class phenomenon. This limitation will always exist as middleclass and middle-income class often overlap and therefore blurs the conclusions of the research questions public policy makers taken into account. This is the reason Hamza Alvi in his book in which he has probed the role of middle class in the independence movement has rather preferably called this group 'salarial class' rather than middle class as he criticizes the word to be too broad to draw any conclusions (Alvi, 1998). The reason why these views are built on relatively shaky ground is not just because people cherry-pick data and history, but because of this broadness of definition. Talking about a middle class (instead of middle-income strata) automatically forces people to think along the lines of a monolith that simply does not exist. The image most conventionally attached to a middle class is found in just one constituent portion of the middle-income population, i.e. the educated, white-collar, 'striving' demographic. However, a far greater portion lies in other occupational categories, such as farming, government, private jobs, multi-national companies, armed forces, retail-wholesale trade, construction, and small-scale manufacturing as my data even reflects.

Moreover, household income is merely one of several characteristics that affects social and political positions. Other determinants include ideology and moral-ethical disposition, ethnic and communitarian affiliation, and even sense of place and belonging. As stated, not all the middle class groups supported Zia as the ones who belonged to civil society organizations, NGO's, and especially the women of the middle class no matter Zia's the political patronage he extended to



the middle-class in general (Zaidi, 2005). All of these factors have, in a wide variety of country contexts, been found to affect an individual's worldview and their life choices contrary to what their income position or consumption patterns would dictate.

## **5.2 Conclusion:**

As per the results of my thesis data, social mobility, self-interests, different social moorings do have a role to play when it comes to middle class preferences towards a specific regime but my results have an interesting dynamic not covered much as it is a new phenomenon, which is brewing. My data has shown a strong co-relation between use of social media and preference for authoritarianism, which proves the theory of Noam Chomsky's 'Manufacturing Consent' in his book *Manufacturing Consent – The Political Economy of Mass Media* (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). As social media is more popular amongst the middle and upper classes of society, the notions of religious intolerance and extremism as a middle class phenomenon are emergent (Butt, 2017). Social media compromises the reliability of political information being disseminated. This effects the political preferences of the middle class which effects the fourth variable i.e. quality of democracy.

Going by Pakistan's own recent history, we can see middle-income groups exhibiting great variation in terms of their political and social positioning. For example, as researcher Ghazala Mansuri points out, while middle-income groups are generally thought to be more vocal in demanding services, this demand may not extend beyond their immediate selves. Karachi's example is instructive in this regard, wherein significant sections of the middle-income population have engaged in a politics of ethnic rights or targeted delivery of services, rather than some broad-based improvement in urban governance. The same holds true for urban Punjab as well, where middle-income groups who have supported the PML-N since the 1990s demand particular kinds of service delivery, but are content to obtain it through patronage, rather than programmatic politics.

The point of consensus when it comes to 'middle class' and 'middle-income strata' is that of growing consumption. And my data shows that middle class i.e. urban middle class with more disposable incomes, Pakistan's middle-income demographic exercises — as Homi Kharas puts it — chooses in a number of domains as they have augmented purchasing power with rise in the social mobility ladder. These expenditure patterns include expenses on food, housing, services future occupation, education, entertainment and leisure. This is in contrast to the lower class who are bound to make difficult choices when it comes to spending. Therefore, the economic implication is therefore positive and this trend in increasing consumption means more consumption-driven economic growth. However, whether the economic growth is sustainable is a moot point as sustainable economic growth requires structural reforms in the economy and the middle class has not made any efforts in that end. Another finding in my thesis deduced is that such households are more likely to be found in urban areas who are more likely to invest in

educational attainment making the ‘middleclass’ phenomenon an urban one (Banerjee, 2008). This has historically been true for male members in middle-income households, and is now increasingly true for female members as well who not only go to colleges but also have seen a surge in university enrollments and the bulk of this can be traced back to upward mobility into the middle strata. This particular transformation, however, has not led to significantly greater female participation in the labor force in Pakistan as researchers from the “Institute of Development Economic Alternatives” have shown. No matter the spending trends on education and the rise of political participation, the in-cohesion of middle-class or the cohesion when it comes to dictatorial tendencies is a red-flag for policy makers.

The recent trend when it comes to middle class is there is a strong dictatorial preference in the middle class of Pakistan whether it be urban or rural class, which has a strong implication for the political system of Pakistan. This strong dictatorial preference is supported by the results of the regression analysis. Sam Wilkins in his book ‘History Repeating’ has stated that the urban middle classes in a society is the core strata of the resistance movements against populist governments. However, Wilkins theory is hugely defeated in my thesis findings and the general trend in the history of populism in India and Pakistan because a contrasting model of populism has been developing here. However, there was a difference in the populism of the 1970s in these countries as the populists then appealed to the sentiments of the have-nots and by vilifying the economic and political elite. The Z.A. Bhutto regime did in Pakistan what the Indira Gandhi government did in India. However, the recent trends of the two massive electoral victories of India’s Hindu nationalist party, the BJP and the coming to power of Imran Khan’s populist PTI in Pakistan, did indeed get its utmost support from the middle class specially urban middle of both countries (Bose & Jalal, *Modern South Asia; History, Culture and Political Economy*, 2004). Yes, both Modi and Khan’s rhetoric vilified the established political parties — the Congress, the PML-N and the PPP. As an alternative, the disparagement of opponents and their ‘corruption’ was combined with similes of a country, which mostly entices the desires and imagination of India and Pakistan’s urban middle classes i.e. the end of corruption rather than slogans of ‘roti, kapra, makan’ for the have-nots. Therefore, this is a new brand of populism that is a product of the middle class. This new kind of populism brand is baptized as ‘the middle-class demagogue’ in today’s lexicon though historically middle class has been against populism as it is thought of in negative terms and indecent politics.

The incoherence when it comes to democratic preferences or even the variables that form political cohesion i.e. political preferences, trust in quality of democracy, the credible source of political information and political independence has had negative implications and is a reason Pakistan has not been able to reap the benefits of its surging middle class. The area where coherence can be witnessed is the preference for authoritarianism, which have not been directly suggested by my results, but the conflicting figures and preferences of people inadvertently refer to this preference. As stated in my results where 89% of my sample gave vote in the recent elections, my data contradicts the view that elections are an indicator of people’s trust in the

democratic process. This may indicate to what Ayesha Jalal refers to as ‘formalistic democracy’ rather than ‘substantive democracy’. She refers to the military-bureaucratic state in Pakistan which has extended its patronage to win over segments of the socio-economic segments of society. The casting of ballots cannot be confused with the full restoration of democracy as long as military authoritarianism exists (Bose & Jalal, *Modern South Asia; History, Culture and Political Economy*, 1998). People casting votes yet preferring dictatorial tendencies and having lost trust in the quality of democracy is unsurprising when we consider how the military’s political role has long been valorized in public discourse and politicians are seen as incompetent and corrupt. Old tropes about the relative merits of civilian and military politics continue to have a tremendous sway over popular imagination.

### **5.3 Measures that can help make the current arrangement smoother**

My thesis is a vociferous outcry to the policy-makers that the goal should not be to simply provide impetus to the people to get above the poverty line and celebrate the large-size of the middle class. Rather, the goal of the policy makers when it comes to mounting its middle class ought to be an augmentation of their competences and a complete institutional overhaul in which they can prosper and contribute to the overall progress of the economy and society. In case of Pakistan, it is a pity that despite of such a huge emerging middle class, the fruits cannot be reaped due to their material interest (patronage politics) and political incoherence or coherence for authoritarianism.

As of now, middle-income segments in Pakistan have created no such reform-oriented platforms as explained in my analysis of the results. Despite the urban middle class higher preference for positional goods; no such positive externalities can be witnessed as it is more of just an urban phenomenon and also because those positional goods are not generating any positive externalities. However, the rise of middle-class bodes a good news for Multinational Corporations to invest in Pakistan but this consumption-driven economics is not sustainable. The policy-makers should introduce structural reforms, in which the rising middle-class is incentivized e.g. to become entrepreneurs. This will be a step towards sustainable growth and a positive economic implication of the rising middle class.

## Appendix

### 1. Definitions:

**Formalistic form of representation** refers to the procedure of representative selection whereby formal rules and procedures are followed, the most common of these procedures being the election process. Within this formalistic form of representation, there are two differing views namely the authorization and the accountability views. The authorization view views the representative as an individual who has been granted the authority to act on behalf of a specific individual or a group of people. Meanwhile, the accountability view sees the representative as someone who is accountable to the ones who he/she represents.

Pitkin (1967) famously differentiates representation as the way in which “the political representatives ‘stand for’ the ones they he/she represents’. In this light, The **Descriptive form of representation** refers to the cadre of politicians who represent the larger group of people from which they themselves came from. They ‘stand for’ and represent these people on the basis of some characteristics that are descriptive in nature such as race, color, gender, language, region etc. Hence in this way, a Pathan is to vote for a Pathan representative, a Punjabi would vote for a Punjabi, the people of Quetta may vote for someone who is a Quettatie and so on.

On the other hand, the **symbolic representation** is a way for standing up or representing a social group such that the representative denotes this group in symbolic terms. This can be seen in the way than an emperor represents his kingdom. This representation is based on the strength of the belief that people have in a symbol.

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<sup>i</sup> Veblen introduced the term "conspicuous consumption" to describe his observations of how people can use goods to indicate social position.

<sup>ii</sup> Positional goods are goods and services that people value of because their limited supply, and because they convey a high relative standing within society.

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