

**Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization and Local Political Associations in Rural
Punjab**

A Case Study of Sialkot District



By:

Asad Ur Rehman

10/M.Phil.-DS/PIDE/2012

Supervisor:

Dr. Sajid Amin Javed

**Department of Development Studies
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
Islamabad, Pakistan**

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Abstract</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Chapter 1</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>1. Background</i>	<i>1</i>
1.1. Decentralized governance and Local Governments in Pakistan	4
<i>1.2. Problem Statement</i>	<i>7</i>
1.2.1. Objectives of the Study.....	8
<i>1.3. Significance and Scope of the Study</i>	<i>8</i>
1.4. Summary and Structure of the Thesis:-	10
<i>Chapter 2</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>Review Literature</i>	<i>11</i>
2.1. Introduction	11
<i>2.2. Nature of political associations in post-colonial countries</i>	<i>11</i>
2.2.1. What is clientelism.....	13
2.2.2. Genealogy of Clientelism	13
2.2.3. Structure of Patron-client relations	16
2.2.4. Wider influences of clientelism	18
2.3. Political associations in Pakistan	19
2.4. De-centralized Centralization and Pakistan	23
2.5. Summary	25
<i>Chapter 3</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Research Design and Methodology</i>	<i>27</i>
3.1. Introduction	27
3.2. Conceptual Framework	28
3.2.1. Explanation of Pictorial diagram.....	34
3.3. Methodology	35
3.4. Locale	36
3.4.1. Why Punjab?.....	37
3.4.2. Why Sialkot:-	37

3.5. Sampling and Data collection instruments:-	38
3.5.1. Quantitative instruments:-	42
3.6. Summary:-	42
Chapter 4	44
Results and Discussion	44
4.1. Introduction	44
4.2. Legal structure of Union Council	44
4.3. Description of Data	46
4.4. Social Change and its manifestations	49
4.5. Determinants of Political associations in village	53
4.5.1. Associations in non-candidate based Village	57
4.5.2. Association in Candidate based village	60
4.6. Measuring Middle Class through a Composite Index	63
4.6.1. Index Construction	64
4.6.2. Rural Middle Class and Politics in Punjab	65
4.7. Political perceptions about local governments and Candidates	73
4.8. Participation- A sign of Increasing Democratization?	76
4.6. Summary	81
Chapter-5	83
Conclusions and Policy Lessons	83
5.1. Conclusion	83
5.2. Policy Implications	86
References	89
Appendix-I	97
Bio-data of Key Informants;.....	97
Appendix-II	98
Political basis of Economic Corruption:-.....	98
Appendix- III	100
Household Questionnaire	100
Appendix-IV	112
Village Questionnaire	112

List of Figures

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework-----	33
Figure 2: Multistage Sampling-----	39
Figure 3: Composition of Village Union Council:- -----	45
Figure 4: Provision of utilities and Pacca houses-----	55
Figure 5: Non-Candidate based Village-----	58
Figure 6: Political Association in Candidate Based Village-----	61
Figure 7: Perception about Local governments and candidates-----	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Figure 8: Informal regulatory political institutions-----	77

List of Tables:

Table 1: Description of Data.....	47
Table 2: Kinship Groups in Our Data Set	49
Table 3: Employment.....	51
Table 4: Villages at Glance.....	54
Table 5:Index Construction.....	64
Table 6: Middle class layers and their respective score on multiple indices.....	68
Table 7: Middle class and its functional disaggregation into political categories.....	69

Acknowledgements

This dissertation almost took two complete years and it will be very difficult to say thanks to all those persons who helped me during these eventful years. Quality research in Pakistan is a herculean task and demands extra bit of everything from patience, finances, and good connections, from any researcher. My patience and resolve got weaker at times but my Supervisor Dr. Sajid Amin Javed always induced the spirit of quality work in me to keep me on track. His incisive comments always provided me new venues of looking at same things with and from new standpoints.

Then there is my friend and comrade Naveed Gorci who provided me roof, food and arranged everything required to make this study possible. Abid and Fayez Cheema spared their precious time and spent a complete week with me in field, as I was very unfamiliar with few of the villages and anticipating a hostile behavior from residents. Muhammad Haroon, Ghulam Mustapha Sipra, Asad Shuaib, Ahsan Bhatti and Yasmeen Jamal, all my friends and fellows , I am thankful to you all for bearing my incessant discussion about my topic of research and Ahsan especially your help in conceptualizing and designing my questionnaire and data collection techniques was rare. Rana Salman without you Gojra village could not be covered as smoothly it has happened. I am also thankful to both Higher education commission of Pakistan and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for providing funding without which covering even a small sample of six villages would not possible. Lastly, I am thankful to all residents of my study area councils and villages who welcomed us to their village, provided us with their time and bear with our incessant questions with great patience. I hope that I would be able to contribute to their lives through this research.

Abstract

Democratic decentralization is the transfer of power to lower tiers of government and bringing state closer to people through representative governments. What modes of democratic decentralization are required in increasingly modernizing rural Pakistan? In addition, how citizens perceive it as well as use their political agency and participation in local government politics? These questions are explored by using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods by using a primary data set of 240 households in six rural union councils of Sialkot District in Punjab province.

Findings of this study states that parameters effecting local government elections are qualitatively different from other forms of elections. With the transformation of economic relations, new forms of clientelistic political association, at micro level, have taken roots. We have found that both principal and agents are engaged in pragmatic political calculation that undermines horizontal political relations. Increase in spread of informal economy directly associated with informal political adjustments that use traditional social structures for redistribution of economic surplus. This study also counter the argument about progressive role of middle class in furthering democratic politics. Majority of our respondents were belonged to middle class, engaged and contributed to the consolidation of different forms of clientelistic politics.

Underdeveloped economic structures underlie the clientelistic political associations. The voters and politicians participate in political field for particularistic and materialist reasons. Collective action suffer in presence of several social, economic and psychological cleavages along which

communities are divided. All participants engaged in transactional politics for structural reasons and thus, we argue, awareness campaigns will not suffice to meet democratization goals.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. Background:-

State has remained very central to the development discourse throughout 20th century. Until sixties, seventies, and late eighties coalition of third world modernizers and their technical advisers were in favor of a strong state that directs and leads the efforts of economic development. It is until very recently that, decentralization, in its neo-liberal condition, have become one of the key policy prescription given to developing countries to meet the rising challenges of good governance, deepening democracy, making state responsive and provision of social utilities¹.

It is over the last couple of decades the extant literature documents emergence of a consensus on democratic decentralization both as policy option and means of democratization the world over (Manor & Bank, 1999)². Underlying reasons behind this emergent discourse are motivated by both political and technocratic concerns while later being more persuasive (Patnaik, 2004). Representative governments at grass root level is one of the defining aspect of democratic decentralization (Ahmad & Talib, 2013). This aspect is of crucial significance for developing countries facing transition from centralized to localized governance through representative, decentralized or deconcentrated bodies. Therefore, studying the composition of local government legislations, local constituencies, local elections and nature of micro political relations becomes important for reasons of good governance, participation and citizen-centric development.

¹ We are thankful to UNDP for financing this study.

² Decentralization means transfer of representative government to third tier. More common term for such process is devolution. However, we prefer decentralization as local government bills purpose limited authority and fiscal control to local governments.

Developing countries, contemporarily in transition phase, grapple with task of distribution of functions among different tiers of state(Sujarwoto, 2013). Snags effecting negatively this task are multiple and ranges from institutional continuity of centralized governance, underdevelopment of economy (thus revenue sources) and various social factors(Khan, 1995, 1998, 2012). Transfer of powers from higher to lower tiers in developing countries is highly political and context specific that eventually shape the outcome of such efforts(Graziano, 1976; Heller, 2001; Hicken, 2011; Mohmand, 2011; Zaidi, 2014).

Facing the localization dilemma, Pakistan historically has remained averse to go along the path of democracy(Javid, 2011; Mohmand, 2011). Authoritarian regimes have hampered the development of independent political actors through building a patronage based dependent political system (Waseem, 1997). Politics in Pakistan was used as a mean to access the state oligarchy and its power for personalized economic and social gains(Ahmad, 1981). This personalized form of politics have developed an apparent apathy among middle and lower classes towards democracy and authoritarian regimes have successfully exploited this negligence of politicians to further their own grip over reins of power(Waseem, 1994).

Pakistan under regime of General Mushrraf wholeheartedly implemented one of the most extraordinary devolution programme of its history(Cheema, Khwaja, & Qadir, 2006). Military regimes has always shown a readily support for local governments while ignoring democracy at higher tiers of state(Cheema et al., 2006; Zaidi, 2005). This knack of delivering democracy at local level become problematic when analyzed through political economy perspective and indicate political opportunism that such devolution infest into political system.

District governments have remained the primary source around which clientelistic relation between local patrons and state was constructed under military regimes(Cheema et al., 2006). All

three dictatorial regimes have instituted grand schemes of local governments bypassing provincial and national tiers(Cheema et al., 2006; Inayatullah, 1964; Zaidi, 2005). Contrary to empowering the masses at grass root level, underlying reason for decentralization was to build new layers of beneficiaries that provided a semblance of legitimacy to such regimes(Waseem, 1994). Accordingly, such new stalwarts through there personalized means of politics built clientelistic machines that actually transform the role and objectives of decentralization(Zaidi, 2005).

The changes in structure of political economy because of state-led industrialization, under Ayub, altered the class structure of Pakistan(Burki, 1972; Rahman, 2012; Sayeed, 2002). New layers of urban and rural middle classes demanded share in power and when denied agitated against Ayub regime. Same mix of classes dissatisfied with Bhutto regime agitated against Bhutto and paved way for another round of military dictatorship(Hasan, 2002). It was Zia then realizing the power of these classes given them political share through instituting local governments (Sayeed, 1980). Equilibrium of power and flow of tax revenues under Zia regime tilted towards urban areas contrary to ages old tradition of preferring rural areas for political considerations in Punjab. These shifts in power and economic relation paved the way for emergence of middle class political entrepreneurs in Punjab helping the emergence of new narrative and methods of politicking.

We have made attempt, in this study, to understand how these social and economic changes influenced the political relations at micro level. Political associations in Pakistan are just a part of public space, produced and reproduced , restricted and regulated by cultural norms and social mores of patriarchal structures(Gazdar, 2003) . These underlying rules of patriarchy erects barrier that regulate participation in political sphere and deny freedom of association, a pre

requisite for democratic order³. Moreover, we argue that it is the nest of political relation among citizen, different tiers of state and between state and citizen, largely embedded within an underdeveloped economy, consequently determine the failure or success of democratic decentralization and local governments. Through developing, an integrated framework, a mixed methodology approach and using primary data this study highlighted the nature of grass root political associations and their impact on current attempts of decentralization in Punjab⁴.

Before we dwell into details, it seems imperative to provide the reader with historical context of the term “decentralization” or “decentralized governance”. The section next serves the job.

1.1. Decentralized governance and Local Governments in Pakistan:-

Decentralization conveys different meanings to people while looking at it through different standpoints. This contestation over the conceptualization eventually strip it from its explanatory power wrote Mancur Olson (1982) poignantly. Deconcentration, delegation, devolution and decentralization, though used interchangeably, carry different meanings and resultantly different approaches to achieve desired policy goals(UNDP, 1999). Same Report explicitly states that “*It (decentralization) per se an innovative approach of governance... which provides expanded responsibilities to local governments in order to provide public services for all*”(UNDP, 1999)⁵. Actually, decentralization and governance both are deeply political and cannot be understood overlooking the political arena especially in underdeveloped countries(Heller, 2001).

Scholars like Huntington provided the conceptual grounds and policy prescriptions to sustain a centralized, autocratic political system in developing countries to avoid chaos that would emerge

³ Women at local level are completely not free to exercise their political right as our key informants have told.

⁴ Given the resource constraint, and the ToRs with the donor, the sample is drawn selected union councils of Sialkot district. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Pakistan, fund the study.

⁵ In this study, we use decentralization as devolution in true spirit is neither adopted nor implemented to this day in Pakistan.

from economic modernization(Huntington,1965;Randall& Theobald, 1998). Decentralization⁶was neither advocated nor have any demand in any section of local, national or global stakeholders.

However, with a significant failure on the part of modernizing elites in Asia, Latin America and Africa, political chaos and conflict erupted in several countries. Which then exacerbated by increasing rates of corruption, falling growth rates, authoritarian systems of power and high population growth. To deal with great impending crisis of political authority and legitimacy decentralization was considered and advised to developing world, as a one shot answer to all these ills and dilemmas(Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Manor & Bank, 1999).

This has led to an increased appreciation of the decentralization in all global policy circles and autocratic governments realizing the efficacy of it jumped into bandwagon. Indonesia has decentralized power to districts tier bypassing provincial levels and same was the case within Pakistan(Cheema et al., 2006; Hadiz, 2004; Sujarwoto, 2013).

The debate on context, intention and success of these set of policies is still not settled. Few believed that the existing policy design of decentralization leads to increase incidence of elite capture(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2002) while other say it increases clientelism(Szwarcberg, 2013). Some also looked it as a tool of depoliticizing the local politics(Mohmand, 2008). The consensus is actually building towards finding the root causes of failure of decentralization policies.

The results emerging from the decentralization attempts at best remained tenuous and could not help in achieving any of the desired goals(Hadiz, 2004; Hasnain, 2008; Mohmand & Cheema,

⁶ Decentralization here is referred as transfer of power, authority, and autonomy to third tier of government/state. Provincial level is not part of our discussion here.

2007; Stoker, 2011; Sujarwoto, 2013). The reasons for such failures are multiple ranging from bad design(Hadiz, 2004), elite capture(Philip Keefer, Narayan, & Vishwanath, 2003) to social inequality and exclusion(Keefer, 2009).

Pakistan have received multiple rounds of decentralization historically. Attempts for decentralization were made in very different contexts for reasons of political expediency(Cheema et al., 2006). Excessively used argument in favor of decentralization in contemporary debate is to link it with efficiency and strengthening grass root level of democracy(Manor & Bank, 1999). However, this conceptual explanation stood in contrast to the reasons for which decentralization has been used in Pakistan. Ayub decentralized authority (to local bureaucrats) for the purpose of consolidating his grip on the reign of central power and acquiring legitimacy for his presidential system of democracy sans parties(Inayatullah, 1964). Zia has used it for the obfuscation of democratic forces and to crop up a new layer of political players who have shared interests with the dictatorial regime. Mushrraf, while designing local governments strategy, also bypassed the national and provincial tiers to weakened the political authority of rival political elites(ICG, 2004). The underlying objective may be to grasp a direct control disguised by façade of deepening democracy at grass root levels. It is interesting to note that the dictatorial regimes always proceed towards local governments while elected governments remained inclined towards bureaucratic model of governance in Pakistan(Cheema et al., 2006;Zaidi, 2005)⁷.

Currently, even constitutional obligations were warded off since last five years by provincial governments constituted by different political parties.⁸ This dialectics of over-fondness and

⁷ Political economy of elections and political associations help us in comprehending these opposite standings and practices

⁸ Local government is now a Provincial subject after 18th amendment.

reluctance on the part of non-elective and elective regimes respectively could be comprehended by viewing the operationality of legitimacy principle that worked differently for both regimes. Elected governments get to the mantle through popular vote while non-elective regime needs to legitimize its capture of power, thus it directly goes to third tier circumventing the national and provincial elite.

Punjab⁹, since the days of Raj, is famous for its fields and recruits (Gilmartin, 1988). After partition Punjab inherited the largest share in the form of institutional and military capital (Saif, 2010). Institutional legacy and political necessities of the time has put Punjab in charge of the newly emerged state. Then Punjab again benefitted most both from early industrialization and agricultural modernization (Akhtar, 2008; Zaidi, 2005). This centrality of Punjab has made it important for any ruling configuration to control popular opinion here through duplicitous policies of coercion and consent, another legacy of colonial state (Akhtar, 2008; Javid, 2011; Mohmand, 2011)¹⁰. The section that follows briefs the reader on the context of decentralization in Punjab.

1.2. Problem Statement:-

Democratic decentralization has seen as the best available governance mechanism that establish a representative and efficient democracy. Decentralization of political power to lower tiers of representative government is an important part of it. How this power is decentralized and how local elections are contested are mainstay of any decentralization reforms. Pakistan is once again experimenting with decentralization, but it is yet to be seen that whether decentralization design is in agreement with changed socio-economic configuration of Punjab. Most populous and

⁹The province Punjab and Sialkot district of it is selected for the study. The rationale for Selection is provided in Methodology.

¹⁰ All three dictatorial regimes have on set that decentralization programme to either appease or crush their supporters and opponents in Punjab.

politically important province of Pakistan. This study starts by problematizing common held belief , in policy advocacies circles, about the theoretical and ideological superiority of local governments in a society where rule of law is absent, state is corrupt, political parties are weak and dynastic and inequalities of status, power and income are rampant. Such conditions could not be helpful in generating any meaningful collective action, *sin qua non* for any partially successful decentralization.

1.2.1. Objectives of the Study:-

This study is an attempt to understand the confluence of overlapping formal and informal institutional factors that structure the political association at local level. Specifically this study intends to pursue

- Mapping of the Political association and voting practices at village level.
- Investigating the nature of participation emerging middle classes made in Local bodies Politics.
- Evaluating Impacts of these political associations on the proposed reforms of democratic decentralization

1.3. Significance and Scope of the Study:-

The legacy of over-developed state institutions in Pakistan has given a peculiar trajectory to political and social development in Pakistan. Clinging to the binary of democracy and dictatorship does not justify any meaningful analysis of the real politics in Pakistan. The system of power, that affects the citizen under democracy of dictatorship remain almost identical(Ahmad, 1980). One can hardly find any difference at policy level between dictatorial regime of general Musharraf and democratic dispensing of last two elected governments in

Pakistan. The social exclusion, marginalization and idioms of political contestation are remained very similar.

This call for an empirical study investigating the functioning of power and the way it influences the political space at grass root level. This study adds to literature a microscopic analysis of informal bonds of political association for local bodies' elections in rural Punjab. This study is also significant in delineating the interactive socio-economic factors, contextual to power relations, shaping the voting patterns, based on which the reformulation, refinement of the decentralized policies in the country can be undertaken. Findings of this study shall also help understand the motives and methods for which candidates contest in election and voters cast them their votes. This is imperative and important to understand as the gains of decentralization can only be realized if the any such criterion hovers around the collective gain and not the personal immediate benefits/interests.

Furthermore, size and scale of local government elections give decentralization a different tenor from national/provincial political exercise. The size of constituency becomes smaller that heightens the tension within community. The role of social structure in political sphere increases manifold. The face-to-face interaction among voters, brokers, supporters and candidates make the political campaign more passionate and effectively split the people into competing blocs. The emotions run high and violence erupts even among opposing parties related by blood¹¹, which in many cases may sustain at higher levels of elections.

The scale of local elections also enhanced the difficulties of regulatory institutions in maintaining transparency and powerful usually in collusion with local authorities take full

¹¹ Violence in recent KP elections is testimony of our speculation about violence.

advantage of these over-stretched circumstances. We believe that the forms and nature of these associations differ for local bodies' elections for multiple reasons of size and scale.

1.4. Summary and Structure of the Thesis:-

. The associational structure of local politics, surrounded by traditional structures of kinship ensuing petty rivalries, intimacies of personal and tribal nature and coercion both disclosed and hidden directly influence the voting choice of its members. The key theoretical and normative agenda of democratic decentralization is to empower people, make state more responsible and sustainable development. However, these formal objectives are to be implemented in a social environment that is riddled with informality, inequality and irregularities. Bulging size of population is creating new social, environmental and physical hazards in Punjab. To meet the increasing desires and demands of population new methods of governance and electing governments are required. Representative local government is the primary unit of effective governance and the process of its composition depends over the associational structure of village level informal political institutions. Any successful attempt of decentralization reform must acknowledge these ground realities for accomplishing positive gains. This study is an attempt towards identifying those realities.

Thesis will be divided into following chapters, First chapter introduce the subject. In second chapter, comprehensive review of literature will be conducted while discussion regarding research design and methodology will be provided in third chapter. Fourth and fifth chapters discuss the results and provide policy implications recommendations respectively.

Chapter 2

Review Literature

2.1. Introduction:-

Overall paucity of research in Social science coupled with quality concerns have made it very difficult to study transient and changing societal phenomenon in Pakistan (Gardezi, 1994). The only rescue is the rich empirical and theoretical data available across the globe for sharpening methodologies to study conditions within the host country. Concept of clientelism, Patronage, patron-client relations, particularistic model of political participation treated differently by researcher working in diverse disciplines of Social Science (Graziano, 1976).

Elusiveness of the concept and its cross-disciplinary use made it very hard to capture any meaningful analytical purpose (Hicken, 2011). The illusive nature of this concept present further quandaries when it is used for comparative studies that spans across the boundaries of countries and disciplines. The other limit is to identify and locate the nature and functioning of clientelistic association with reference to democratic decentralization. Therefore, keeping in focus abovementioned constraints, this chapter will try to build a synthesis from literature over clientelism¹², its properties, consequences and implication for democratic decentralization.

2.2. Nature of political associations in post-colonial countries:-

Micro political associations among different individuals and groups reciprocally determine the nature of political system that distribute political power within the system (Almond, 1989)¹³. Importantly, it is again the type of these associations that determine the nature and extent of citizen participation in political process, a corner stone of representative democracy. And again

¹² Clientelism directly affects the voting choices and indirectly the nature of governance and composition of elected bodies. As in clientelistic politic exchanges, clients (common people) exchange their vote for any social or economic compulsions.

¹³ Effective causality acts both way. System determines the association and vice versa.

very nature of these association shapes different set of policies designed by representative governments and states. Then that policy design is again influenced by social relations during its period of implementation. The redistribution of surplus among different classes and sections, addressing inequalities between regions, ethnicities and genders, as well as other civic needs of citizen one-way or the other depends on political associations.

Almond (1989) has argued that formation of any political culture depends upon the presence of three elements deference, authority and acknowledgment regarding inferiority and superiority. These features shape the nature of participation by citizen in a democracy. However, this simplified categorization easily ignored the systems of power that has been shaped historically by outside colonial interventions¹⁴. World system theorists have argued that new mode of production (capitalism) directly influence the social formations of peripheral regions by molding its social structures, economic relations and symbolic systems for the benefit of center (Amin, 1976). Underdevelopment of economy, it is argued, and siphoning off surplus by center creates an artificial scarcity and feeds insecurity that eventually effect political behaviors. Scholars belonging to comparative school, such as Lyon (2000) and Niaz (2012), have given centrality to the culture in shaping the political system based on egalitarian ethos or social hierarchy. While functionalists like Barth (1956), studying Pathans of Swat, has given primacy to the different internal functions of system shaping associations among different groups and individuals.

However, all these divergent standpoints converge to one consensus that political associations in post-colonial societies are different from its European ideal type. The relative fragility of representative politics in these countries is enhanced by fractured relationship between state-government and citizens. Most of the scholars have conceded this feeds political clientelism that

¹⁴ Ahmad (1980) has presented a generalized account of power systems in post-colonial world that argued system of power is not linear in any culture.

is inherently undemocratic and inefficient(Hicken, 2011; Roniger, 1983). Both on normative and positive grounds, it is argued that clientelistic associations are bad so must be replaced with better alternative forms. Thus before getting into further debate first it is necessary to comprehend the core of clientelism.

2.2.1. What is clientelism:-

Increasingly accumulating evidence suggest that clientelism could exist in all socio-cultural settings, political systems (democratic or authoritarian) and at different levels of economic development (Hicken, 2011).It is present in highly developed economies and even flourishing in the old democracies of America, Europe and Asia(Boix & Stokes, 2007;Roniger, 2004). Relish high incidence in the urban alleys of South America(Auyero, 2000). Perfectly function well through-out the great expanse of Africa(Berman, 1974),and present in its myriad forms in Asia stretching from Arab world to the urban communities of Taiwan (Scott, 1972; Lande, 2002). However, such broad generalization has its limitations, as forms, functioning and settings of these relations differ in their scope and functionality. For locating these inside differences, underlying structuring principles and the evolution of related forms of clientelism requires a spadework into the evolution of concept itself.

2.2.2. Genealogy of Clientelism:-

Two primary players in clientelistic modes of associations are Patrons and Clients. The relationship between them could be dyadic and personal or through third party intermediation and thus impersonal(Hicken, 2011). Patron , as the word itself represents, must be a man of some authority and influence compared with the client(Hall, 1974; Scott, 1972). Although the clients are/could be large in numbers but the relationship is skewed in favor of patron for reasons of asymmetry in social status and economic power. Social and economic inequality underlies the

emergence of patron-client relations(Roniger, 2004). Centrality of social and economic status explains that anyone with effective source of prestige, wealth, power or mix of all these could naturally become a patron¹⁵. While economically deprived, socially marginalized and culturally institutionalized groups, individuals or even nations have a strong tendency for becoming client(Lyon, 2002; Scott, 1972). The reasons for entering into such bonds are a) Reduce uncertainty b) satisfaction of culturally induced habitus c) security. Endurance of patron-client relations itself inform about the flexibility and ease with which these associations tie themselves with socio-cultural norms like reciprocity (Finan & Schechter, 2012; Lawson & Greene, 2011). However, the evolution of clientelistic relations is dually attached with transformation in mode of productions.

Patron-client relationships historically emerged out of agrarian relationships of rural areas(Hall, 1974; Scott, 1972). Feudal land tenures have given rise to them, as ownership in land, source of wealth, prestige and power, was highly unequal¹⁶. These feudal tenure arrangements were introduced by British in India that conjoin modern economic relations , production from metropole, with repressive political institutions(Ali, 1988; S Amin, 1976). Religious ideologies of pre-modern era has also helped in reinforcing such relations through preaching helplessness of humankind vis-à-vis exigencies of nature(Hall, 1974). Emergence of cult-politicians in peripheral countries represents this collusion of theological establishment with elite classes and political establishment at the cost of common people.

Although it is hard to categorize different kind of patron-client relations, for issues of specificity, however its three kinds could be ascertained a) Patrimonial, more infused with paternalistic

¹⁵ The presence of Pir politicians in Punjab represents this hybridity. Where a pir by virtue of his/her ecumenical status enjoyed deference, receive wealth and power from land. In addition, these all factors help them in accumulating political power.

¹⁶ Political participation of clients in feudal settings and following few centuries was marginal.

feelings. b) Coercive, classically present in remote rural hinterland. c) Modern/organizational, political parties or ethnic/regional appeals of politicians to their constituents. Again, these all forms can coexist within single political system with different intensities. Deepening of capitalistic relations in social formation of post-colonial countries has brought structural changes in society and economy with serious implications for political associations(A. S. Akhtar, 2008). Kinship systems, tribal solidarities, extended family structures, and related social and individual behaviors have seen a complete change. New nations states were forced to provide universal suffrage to its citizen in the pursuit of modernization ideals (Myrdal, 1968). The modernization ideals was usurped by entrenched social and economic interests for whom new political system provided new opportunities of power consolidation(Mushtaq Khan, 2002). This state of affairs has led few researchers to pin clientelism with underlying economic system (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). Specific kind of clientelism, it is argued, is attached with particular system i.e. Feudal, Patrimonial, and Industrial.

Social mobilization, differentiation/inequality within system, penetration of state and distribution of surplus within system are the intervening variables that structure the form of political clientelism(Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). Modernization has effectively changed the scope of all intervening variables. Modernization technologies through mechanization of farmland increase urban migration and increase population pressures by reducing child mortality. In retrospect, although it has failed to increase social mobility and distribution of dividends remained much skewed. These fallouts have deep implications for development of political systems in developing part of the world.

2.2.3. Structure of Patron-client relations:-

Clientelism as a concept has been used by different social scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, to emphasize different forms and functioning of patron-client relations(Hopkin, 2006; Roniger, 1983). In political science, at micro level, scholars approach this concept differently. Political scientists study such relations to understand the mechanism of vote exchanges between politician and voters(BRUSO, Nazareno, & STOKES, 2001). The causal relations between democracy, development, state building and clientelism , who determines what, is still not clear and this makes it imperative to understand the political economy of development and decentralization.

Scott (1972) defined traditional patron-client relations as dyadic in nature only existing between two persons of unequal socio-economic status. Agrarian areas with skewed land ownership fits in this explanation but rapid changes in demography and institutional matrix has changed the composition of these relations. Hitchens (2011) has added three more elements for structurally delineating the concept of clientelism for analytical means, namely *Contingency, hierarchy and iteration*¹⁷. Simultaneous exchange of different resources, particularistic diffusion , absence of horizontal solidarity and hierarchy are few fundamental characteristics of patron-client relations(Eisenstaedt & Roniger, 1984). The nature of exchange in such relations is particularistic but arranged in packaged deals which means strings are attached with all such exchanges.

Informal exchange is also another salient feature of patron-client relations(Eisenstaedt & Lemarchand, 1981; Muno, 2010). Loyalty and reciprocity provide stability to such relations , as

¹⁷ Contingency means the reciprocity of exchange that inherent in clientelism as both parties pragmatically reap benefits from exchange. Social or economic difference in status of patron and client is also fundamental to clientelism and lastly the time and again interaction between both parties push them to use clientelistic relations for securing benefits.

without its informality cannot withstand the demands of political system (Eisenstaedt & Roniger, 1984; Lawson & Greene, 2011). Traditional cultural values, social mores and ethical norms oiled the wheels of patron-client relations in different social formations. Vertical association, another feature of patron-client relations, plays a double role both positive and negative. First it links different social classes and regions and helps in redistribution (Legg, 1972; Owen, 2011). While secondly it perpetuates control of the elite on economic and policy resources at the cost of horizontal solidarity of lower classes (Hopkin, 2006).

Change in the nature of political systems increases the precariousness and multiplicity of patron-client relations (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972; Roniger, 1983). The movement of political systems in the developing world from traditional to modern state and political systems has changed the nature of both patrons and clients (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). The personalized exchanges of erstwhile clientelistic relations are displaced by modern forms of machine clientelism, where incumbency is used by parties to win elections (BRUSO et al., 2001). This transformation in economic and political relations has serious repercussions for political democracy in the developing world.

Political brokers are another intermediary that have now emerged in India that link citizens with politicians (Chandra, 2007; Munro, 2010). Networks of specialized brokers now link peripheral rural areas to the center (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). A micro perspective on clientelism now informs that old patrons at the local level attach themselves with different political parties, mostly incumbents. Political parties in developing countries banked either on personal charisma of the leader or a calculated mix of clientelism and policy-oriented politics (Chandra, 2007; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Mohmand, 2011). Traditional patron-client networks are co-opted by these

new developments as now access or closeness to political office guarantee delivery of basic social and personal utilities(Mohmand & Cheema, 2007).

2.2.4. Wider influences of clientelism:-

Clientelism have wide range influences on economic development, democratization and its consolidation in developing world(Owen, 2011). Clientelism condition the political participation to informal rules that debar politics from its actual content(Lyne, 2007; Roniger, 2004). It cause corruption and bad governance and reduce scope for accountability(Beekers & Gool, 2012; Khan, 1998; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Shah, 1998). It put barriers to political filed, regulate political participation, cause social exclusion, re-erect patriarchal structures, block national and social integration and subverts social transformation required for a stable polity and society(Gazdar, 2003; Hopkin, 2006; Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007; Owen, 2011).

There is a new emergent debate in post-colonial theory about clientelism and its implications for subaltern classes. Chatterjee (2013) has endorsed a powerful thesis about the progressive role of political clientelism in Indian slums and provincial politics of Adivasi and untouchables. He asserted that political society (slum dwellers) through patron-client modes of association use their political power against civil/legal society and post-colonial state. The emphasis on the progressive nature of patronage comes at the cost of avoiding to look at its dark sides(Martin, 2014). Patronage even if provide political power to communities but also entrench and extend the power of either a class or brokers(Duncan, 1990; Flynn, 1974; Martin, 2014). Both are not good omens for a functional democracy.

Increasing informalization of economy in developing world is feeding the informalization of political associations. Informal economy is mostly unregistered and therefore regulated by

localized versions of socio-cultural norms although in an instrumentalized way(Akhtar, 2011). Informal economic transactions, without any protection for contract enforcement, reduce scope for consolidation of horizontal solidarities. Collective action, cherished objective of democratization, cannot possible in a vertically driven political system. Collective action in the presence of social cleavages is not possible and skewed power relations mostly act against the interests of less privileged; the clients

2.3. Political associations in Pakistan

Political participation in Pakistan is factional wherein the factions are formed around personal loyalties(Lyon, 2002)¹⁸. Individuals allied to these alliances prefer short-term benefits and perquisite while the nature of loyalty is instrumental/contractual rather than affectional. Instrumental between clients and patrons while *contractual* among patrons (Barth, 1959). These relations are by default based on exchange therefore could be categorized as clientelistic relations.

Exchanges made in economic sphere would demand reciprocity in political sphere. Graziano (1979) has bifurcated the benefits accrued from any social exchange into a) *intrinsic benefits* b) *extrinsic benefits*. Most of the clientelistic exchanges made between clients have an intrinsic benefits attached to it and thus structure an internal dependency of client over patron. Blau, (1964) has also asserted that the two basic functions of social exchange are to a) create bonds of friendship b) Super-ordination. In any social formation dotted with inequality of opportunity, access to state and economic empowerment, the later function of social exchange takes the upper hand. The less privileged section of society, for developing consensus, were manipulated and

¹⁸ Politics in Pakistan has historically remained only men game. The role of women is usually of passive obedience to their male members. The reason behind this exclusion from political filed is largely because of patriarchal social structures(Gazdar, 2003).

coerced to exchange their “power of vote” for material inducements (Javid, 2011; Mohmand, 2011). The lack of any direct connection between state and people has forced them to look for other means of intermediation that could provide security (Lyon, 2002).

The continuous meddling with democratic process in Pakistan has reduced any scope for consolidation of horizontal solidarities at local level (Akhtar, 2008). On the contrary, dictatorial regimes have instrumentalized the use of vote for gaining legitimacy (Alavi, 1972; Mohmand, 2011; Mohmand, 2008). Ayub had tried to counter the hegemony of landed elite through aligning middle-class farmers of canal colonies with regime (sayeed, 2002). Zia and Musharraf regimes treaded the same path of patronizing new political entrepreneurs who banked over clientelistic political associations to secure their seats¹⁹.

This atomization of individual, refusal of state for provision of any security and dwindling opportunities for social mobility had serious consequences and increased the propensity of individual to depend more on patrimonial and localized networks to gain at least a semblance of security and psychological stability (Niaz, 2013 and Gunes-Ayata, 1994). Different studies by local scholars have found significant presence of inequality, poverty and skewed opportunities for social mobility in Pakistan (Amin & Irfan, 2014; Gazdar, 1999). These all studies indicate a highly stratified society with inequalities in economic resources, social status, access to state and information: a perfect breeding ground for clientelistic politics to prevail.

Reciprocity is a key feature of all pre-industrial social formations. Changes in economic sphere do not correspond to other changes in nature of social interaction attributed to modernization in Pakistan. This difference is termed as cultural lag (Qadeer, 1999). These old values and norms of

¹⁹Qadeer (2006) has pinpointed the subsiding role of kinship as an organizing principle of social life in Pakistan. However, its importance in political arena is actually increasing.

reciprocity mediated through lineage and kinship also used by politicians and political brokers for enacting patron-client relations (Lawson & Greene, 2011). It is an interesting perspective because every day needs at local level are usually fulfilled by a new type of patrons, who are not coercive and foolhardy (Shami, 2010). The stagnation of economy, corruption, red tapism and rising cost of living have forced people to get into these kinds of social exchanges that could only be sustained by reciprocity of the clients in political sphere. However, the unequal distribution of wealth, resources and status are the underlying structures without which such personal exchanges would not be possible (Mohmand, 2011; Shami, 2010).

The ongoing discussion has serious bearing upon political system. Patron-client relations have deep implication for political development as noted by Huntington (1965) that key element of political development is participation or mobilization. Modernization usually awoke social forces that in pursuit for their share of economic pie and social power gradually politicized the whole structure of governance (Niaz, 2010 and Khan, 2002). New political alliances are forged and elites use this increasing participation rate for their own intra-elite struggles (Keefer, 2009). This kind of participation and mobilization could not lead to any mature, concrete and progressive collective action that would challenge the exclusive and exploitive political/economic institutions grafted by colonial powers in most of developing countries (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

Modernization although provide impetus to democratization through expanding political franchise, but social structures and cultural also play an effective role in shaping these developments (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Qadeer, 2006). Therefore, process of social modernization is as much necessary as its economic variant for development of any political system. However, other than few cosmetic changes in LGA 2000 that provide representation to

women, no serious efforts at policy level have been made to crack social conservatism of society by policy makers.

When formal rules are tedious, conservatism prevails and programmatic organization (political parties) are absent informal rules become an instrument which mediates political associations (Cheema et al., 2006; Lyon, 2002; Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007; Mohmand, 2008). Informal institutions although exist in all social formations but in an underdeveloped economy like Pakistan it merge contradictory elements. Modern economic relations embedded within customary modes of social action influence the behavior of individuals and groups.

The penetration of market exchange in social formation of Pakistan do has changed the class structure of Pakistan (Rahman, 2012). Nayab (2011) has estimated that 61 million of population in Pakistan is now enjoying middle-class life styles. Do the middle-class political associations, worldviews, cultural norms and social practices have seen any change in Pakistan? If yes what is the nature of this change? Unfortunately, very little we can say with the present state of information available on the issue for the country.

However, generally a tacit consensus is present over the importance of middle classes as an agent of sustainable economic development (Easterly, 2003). Stable political system (Collier, 1999; Leventoğlu, 2005), Economic growth (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007) and deepening of democracy Birdsall (2000). Theorist of south Asian political economy have highlighted a very different role that middle class played in the post-colonial history of these countries (Akhtar, 2008; Alavi, 2002; Khan, 1999; Sayeed, 2002). This class by aligning itself with ruling bloc has popularized a peculiar idiom of politics that strengthen patronage based political system. There is huge gape in literature that could help, by zooming-in at micro-level, to understand the actual political

practices of middle classes in Pakistan. Generally, there is a consensus that middle classes in Pakistan welcome autocratic regimes and work as a patron of upper classes to downplay the building of any resistance movement (Arif, 2002 and Akhtar, 2008). It must be evident from the preceding discussion, that unluckily the transitions toward decentralization was nothing more than a Wi-Fi empowering of the remotes in which the main power switch remained with the center always; decentralized centralization or centralized decentralization.

2.4.De-centralized Centralization and Pakistan

The disenchantment with centralized and Bureaucratic state has lost its developmental fervor and charm globally and democratic decentralization has emerged as a newborn faith (Heller, 2001). The voodoo of democratic decentralization is so much intoxicating that its proponents have forgotten that most of the developing countries have historically ruled by colonial power through decentralized modes of governance(Mamdani, 1996).

Kenny (2013) purposed an analytical framework to understand the uneasy relationship between centralization and decentralization by locating the state formation in the social framework of centripetal and centrifugal forces in developing countries. Oligarchy in Pakistan remained occupied with actual or imagined threats since very first day and thence the colonial model of governance with few cosmetic changes has remained intact (Waseem, 1997). The internal dissent against over-centralization was curtailed through employing a dual logic of coercion and consent²⁰. In the wake of external and internal threats of aggression and disintegration the central state have relented to a political arrangement, which in the absence of any useful description could be said *de-centralized centralization*.

²⁰Threat of ouster from state provided resources was used to harness consent of masses while relatively ideological dissenters were received brute state force.

The dissent of reluctant regional elites, professional middle classes, and disgruntled elements were ignored and diluted by using controlled de-centralized centralization. Cheema et al., (2005) have decried the use of local governments by dictatorial regimes to build clientelistic networks that at the cost of ideological and programmatic politics. Waseem (1997, 2011 and 2012) has identified that increasing importance of particularistic and parochial tendencies in political system is because of authoritarian tinkering. These practices of dictatorial regimes have shaped political attitudes, behaviors and practices. Absence of freedom of association dwarfed the rise of political rationalization towards more instrumental use of political entitlements like vote. Ironically, it has led to de-politicization of politics and rendered socially marginalized groups unable to build horizontal solidarities.

Hicken (2011) has argued that with modernization of economy the importance of information has increased manifold to find employment in modern sectors of the economy. In India crisis in agriculture and inelastic demand of labor in it, because of increase in mechanization, have pushed pressure on urban centers(Gupta, 2005). Villages in Pakistan are not much different from there Indian counterparts and same crisis also lurked here. Commuting for work from village to town is increasing and with little jobs, opportunity in formal sector informal sector absorbs most of the labor supply. Alienated from their soil, dislocated, uncertain these workers, entrepreneurs naturally depend on their particularistic ties of village, kinship or ethnicity to find a place for themselves(Güneş-Ayata & Roniger, 1994). The access to source of livelihood is achieved through a patron and it is here political and economic markets encounter each other in Pakistan although in an informal setting(Hasan & Raza, 2011; Shami, 2010).

Belau's (1969) social exchange framework has noted the importance of social environment that facilitates exchange²¹. The norms of reciprocity demand from the beneficiary of any favor²² to return these favors through voting to get the supply of these goods intact. Men of influence regulate access to both local state and market. Thus it becomes imperative, to protect the real kernel of democratic decentralization, to disentangle the confluence of these political and economic markets at local level(Khan, 2006).

Therefore, there is a need to look at successful decentralization attempts that actually decentralize more power to local communities. Heller (2001) in his comparative study of three states has drawn few conclusions that demands attention from all stakeholders in Pakistan. He argued that success of decentralization in Kerala, Port Algere and South Africa has stood upon a) High incidence of political mobilization of people b) Programmatic and ideologically cohesive political parties that have support of local volunteers c) Vibrant civil society. While in Pakistan the civil society is weak, political parties are dynastic and ideological debate is absent opting for clientelistic politics is more rewarding for both politicians and voters.

2.5.Summary:-

The literature on decentralization is multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary. As the main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the political aspect of decentralization, we have reviewed only such studies explaining the nature of political actions-, mobilization, association and exchange. Political scientist has argued that clientelism is present across the expanse of developing world. Anthropological studies provided the required insight that cultural norms,

²¹ Individuals exchange gifts, favors, and goods in their lifetime. These exchanges are usually regulated by norms and values in social while laws in economic field of modern life. In social life, favor given is inherently tied with a reciprocal act of similar magnitude but could be different in kind. It is called norm of reciprocity.

²² Favor is not limited only in finding a job but to opening an account, approaching any local administrator includes into it.

social structures and history of colonial rules are factors behind the recalcitrant presence and growth of clientelism. Alongside, Ethnographers and urban planners have argued that with the advent of modernization in developing world patron-client relations has shifted its forms but kept its roots intact. Political economists and public policy theorists, on the other side, accorded the incidence of inequality in assets and status as the key reason behind the successful metamorphosis of patronage based clientelistic model of association in politics. Presence of clientelism, literature concluded, impedes the deepening of democracy, causes an internal dependency and increases economic corruption. Pakistan have not provided any serious effort in delineating informality associated with political system and different factors that shape its contours. In next chapters, we will deal with this question by employing a mix of different research methods.

Chapter 3

Research Design and Methodology

3.1. Introduction:-

Theoretical framework anchors the itinerary of any investigation in its scientific mold. While the research design and methodology help and direct the process of data collection and later its analysis. Any question could be approached from different angles and nature of objectives that shapes choice of methodology. The dearth of studies investigating local informal institutions and political associations pushed us to choose a mixed research design and methodology. The objective of this study is to understand a micro level of political relation that is dependent on different but related spheres of economy and social life. Patrons and clients are themselves economic agents, political players and social actor who are not mere pawns of socio-economic forces but actually use their agencies to shape and mold structures to their advantage.

How this interaction between agencies and structures could be comprehended? Anthropologists and political scientist have used different qualitative techniques for that purpose and there is rich ethnographic literature available to understand clientelism(Auyero, 2000; Verkaaik, 2001). Our research objectives pushed us towards a nested methodology divided into distinct phases. Qualitative information is the first step towards knowing any research locale and its population. It helps in understanding the complex interaction of different factors and then delineating the key factors shaping these interactions. Although these qualitative insights could stand by themselves but to generalize any findings it is required to test these findings methodically in a larger geographical area. Here arises the need for more structured forms of data instruments that could actually measure the size and rate of changes in socio-economic spheres and political domain.

Thus, this chapter will discuss the choice of research design, methodology, data collection and sampling techniques and rationalize their use for this study.

3.2. Conceptual Framework:-

Research objective of this study is to explicitly explain the interaction between three abstract phenomenon, a) Political Economy b) Democratization c) Decentralization and political associations at local level. To fulfill these objectives a theoretical framework was required that pinned down these all aspects into an understandable organic whole. Therefore, different elements have been borrowed from different schools and disciplines²³. So, this conceptual framework attempts to develop an indigenous understanding of political system that interact with hypothetically changed social and political context.

Political conditions of developing countries at present could not be comprehended without locating the development of political system in historical perspective (Maddison, 2013; Mamdani, 1996; Niaz, 2011). The objective of political system classically remained to acquire and legitimize power. Which is cumulative product of institutional structures that are shaped by material forces working in history(Wolf, 1999)²⁴. History shapes the social structure of any society through a cumulative influence of geography, political system and economic organization.

Village in India has remained the primary unit of production that generated surplus value for the consumption of ruling elites (Gupta, 2001). Contrary to the popular depiction of social harmony, historically Indian village has remained a socially differentiated location filled with parochial

²³ Merging, redefining and appropriating of different concepts and constructs is highly problematic. But inter-disciplinarity also has its advantages especially in post-colonial context. As most of the theoretical constructs are European therefore not completely applicable to local context. So, developing composite frameworks helped in reducing the mismatch.

²⁴ Marx proposed the idea that economic needs precedes other social, cultural and spiritual requirements.

localism (Ambedkar, 1948). That social differentiation legitimized through religious ideology of different Varna²⁵. The dynastic changes at upper level usually do not directly influence these local socio-ideological structures(Amin, 1976). The patterns of ownership were mostly communal and right of extracting rent was subject to change with change in the structure of dynasty at center(Habib, 1975).

The colonial system of power (state at its center) ambivalently both change and ossify this localized socio-economic structure and linked it modern (Anglo-Saxon) regime of rights(Ahmad, 1980; Ali, 1988; Maddison, 2013; Niaz, 2011). Through Synchronization of customary with *legal* ,colonial regime has created new institutions of governance that were highly differentiated along social and economic hierarchies²⁶(Cheema et al.2009).These new institutions were made responsible for resolving internal conflict and helping state to keep its social control intact. Colonial social engineering in Punjab has stunted its social evolution and political development by grafting modern state institutions and legal regime on traditional social structure(Ali, 1988). The perseverance of customary and patriarchal social structures played an important political role later when representative political institutions were introduced in Punjab(Gazdar, 2003; Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007). The customary identities of kinship, tribe and later religion capture the political space and become *raison d'etre* of political mobilization and association²⁷. The post-colonial phase see an adoption of similar strategies by state and ruling classes of instrumentalizing customary association in political field. The neo-liberal emphasis on getting state out of public sphere directly favors the consolidation of this process.

²⁵ This ideology has replicated itself in Islamic fold through biradri categories i.e. Zamindar and Kammi

²⁶ This village level governing bodies were named as Village Proprietary bodies (VPB). The inclusion into these bodies has determined by Land ownership and caste category.

²⁷ For details about underlying reasons in rural areas of Punjab during Pakistan Movement see (Gilmartin, 1988).

The social segregation along customary identities, introduction of private property and different right regimes, linking the idea of authority with land ownership and instituting two different legal regimes for personal and public domains are factors that directly or indirectly influence the evolution of political system in Punjab(Cheema et al., 2009; Niaz, 2011; Rehman, Din, & Sadaf, 2014)²⁸. The social and economic inequality, legally constituted because of these interventions, provided favorable ground for the emergence of modern patron-client relations.

These customary governing bodies, with the passage of time, have lost their effective juridical and moral authority in maintaining peace through effective conflict resolution²⁹. Increasingly, the trend reflect that most of the disputes are settled through Police and court of law which put high premium on access to these institutions through local patrons/ brokers and politicians³⁰(Bodemann, 1982). This competition for political power has also deeply influenced by economic modernization; new sources of economic prosperity have attracted fresh competitors from non-agrarian sectors who vie for power to increase their personal riches and social standing³¹. Some commentators argued that politics itself have become one of the most profitable economic venue in Pakistan^{32,33}. However, few have argued that reduction in economic inequality was still not able to cut social inequality in villages of Northern Punjab(Mohmand & Gazdar,

²⁸ For a relation between Honor, Women and Law please see <http://www.laaltain.com/%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%8C-%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86/>

²⁹Not all of the studied villages had any functioning *Panchayat* and if some of its vestiges were present, their effectiveness was questionable. Mostly, parties dissatisfied from informal justice mechanism use formal legal channels.

³⁰ Another notable trend is the emergence of Lawyer as a new intermediary that advocate on the behalf of its client. The lawyer movement has improved the social and economic status of lawyer who is more aggressively defending/favoring his clients vis-à-vis other state institutions (rightly or wrongly). Recent violent incidents in Daska are reflecting a growing tension between state and civil society.

³¹ Fifty Percent of the respondents in this study have still attached to factions that lead by Agriculturalist while 48% are associated with patrons who are in service/ retail sectors. The landowners themselves expand their enterprise to other sectors but still land is source of prestige for them, although its economic viability have relatively reduced.

³² During survey 38% of the respondents stated that candidates contest elections for self-enrichment while only 3% have stated serving people as the key reason.

³³ For details, see Annexure1 in Khan (2009).

2007). This inequality of status is because of *Biradri*, a patrilineal division of social structure. Mohmand (2011) in her dissertation also highlighted the importance of kinship networks in making political association.


While capitalist economic relations are increasingly penetrated into the social formation of Punjab, its political system is also witnessing changes, which are unprecedented. The penetration of state and market into village life is complete. Increase in population is another factor that is shaping the spatial and institutional structures of its rural areas(Qadeer, 1999). As the Weberian ideals of protestant ethics and rational state has failed to realize boundaries between public and private spheres remain blurred, the social influence of customary norms on political field is immense(Niaz, 2011).

In nut shell, the hybridity reigns social formation at the moment. The role of institutions and individuals reflect a hybridity. The habitus of individual and structure that underwrote institutions is constituted by composite forms of rationalizations. These rationalizations we argue are rooted in the structure of political economy of the region and evolution of state and its relationship with larger social formation. Secondly, the formal political space is structured by two contradicting notions a) Legitimacy b) Control. Post-colonial state has inherited its paternalistic function from colonialism. Political elite at national/provincial level use this function to construct patronage networks. Dictatorial regimes used local bodies to construct new loyalties while political dispensation particularly remained averse to devolution. The reasons could be multiple but, we argue, central is to avoid the clash between different layers of patron-client at provincial and local. Halfhearted legislation with no real devolution is a proof of it.

Thus to understand the relation between micro and macro political and economic process demands a composite method of analyzing these crosscutting phenomena. The evolution of

social formation, state and political system with their cumulative impact on the attributes, opinions and choices of individuals (habitus) and groups, through both formal and informal channels, could be captured through mixed research design. Next section will deal with issues of design and methodology.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



3.2.1. Explanation of Pictorial diagram:-

Formal and informal factors directly affect the constitution of local governments as displayed in fig-1. Provincial government wants to get hold of the third tier thus giving far less powers to elected representatives below than even military regimes³⁴. Delimitation process, size of constituency and type of competition all are legal bound and constituted by provincial government. While the informal institutions from below, shaped by history, geography and social structure (See fig-1) also influence and structure the political competition. Both top-down and bottom up or legal and informal collude together to structure the political competition. In a history of personalized politics, kinship, wealth, access to state and influence also determine the outcome of political competition. Therefore, a holistic framework anchored in local history and power relations is used to understand the impact of all these different factors on shaping the political competition that would determine the performance of current decentralization reforms in Pakistan.

3.3. Research Design and Methodology:-

The approach of research that attempt to investigate an evolving, transitory and chaotic social reality should be eclectic (Qadeer, 2006), iterative (Mohmand, 2010) and mixed (Lieberman, 2005). As the phenomenon under study is layered and possesses micro, meso and macro interlinkages therefore we adopted an experimental research design to meet the research objectives. It was need of this study that to meet its objective a mixed methods should be carved for fitting in. The trajectory of modernity, its social and political implications and its juridical forms and institutional structure differed substantially from Europe(Kaviraj, 2005). The political integration preceded social integration and the role of state increased manifold in offsetting the

³⁴ In all military regimes more development resources and discretion was given to lower ranks of government.

drastic impacts of socio-economic transformations (Chatterjee, 2011). The role of tradition, indigenous social structures and modes of production in Sub-continent remained completely at odds with western experience (Rehman, 2012; Kaviraj, 2000). Then there was emergence of communal question along with minority concerns which gave a peculiar twist to politics in India, an alien state was access, contested, despised and adored³⁵. Post-colonial states in sub-continent inherited same systems of power and political system.

Modernization ironically re-invented tradition in both these countries which is evident in the consolidation of political Islam/Hindutva, politicization of caste and emergence of Biradri as an instrument of political mobilization(Nasr, 1996; Niaz, 2006). Qadeer (2006) has called it as grafting of modern on traditional/customary and instrumentalization of kinship identities to create a social power for political ends. Therefore it is greatly debated that economic modernization does not give way to the social and political modernization as modernization theories purposed (Qadeer, 2006). Studying these intertwined phenomena demands exploratory research design that could satisfy the nature of questions we are interested to answer.

3.3.Methodology:-

Different research paradigms³⁶ use different set of methodological techniques to inquire social reality (Neuman, 2006). Purists on each side has argued about the suitability and rigor of their own research techniques (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Given the nature of inquiry, this study used experimental research design to meet the objectives. Then to triangulate and compare the validity of different observations and results mixed research methods were adopted.

³⁵ Indian politics passed through all these phases of collaboration to outright radical political activism like quit India movement.

³⁶Neuman (2006) has discussed about three different research paradigms 1) Positivistic, that use natural science methodology 2) Interpretive , more inclined to use ideographic methodological techniques 3) Critical Social Science, Use reflexive ontology to criticize both subject and content.

Triangulation becomes a necessary technique, especially while investigating a case where the responses could show biasness or completely wrong, value bound and infest with endogeneity (Jick, 1979).

Especially the political associations mostly have layered meanings for both the patron and client. Respondents feel uneasy about telling the exact nature and extent of their association. Therefore, building a rapport is a foremost requirement for getting the actual knowledge about the overlapping entanglement of political, social and economic spheres of life at grass root. For that purpose, we have stayed within local community for an extended period of three months. Daily life interactions with villagers of every caste/ class and denomination have enabled us to get firsthand knowledge of the locality, community and its associations.

Mapping the political context was the central objective of the study. The fulfilling of this objective requires answer to a series of questions as if *what are social categories people are divided into (classes/castes). How power has been distributed among these social categories? What social, economic, historical and general characteristics affect political settlements?* These questions, by very construct, needed a qualitative framework for identifying the dimensions and variables that could be operationalized.

3.4.Locale:-

Setting of the locale is central task in achieving the required objectives. The choice of locale if on one hand is directed by the nature of hypothesis and objectives while time, and resource constraints have their share in such determinacy. The province opted for this study was Punjab and the district selected was Sialkot.

3.4.1. Why Punjab?

Foremost, Punjab is the biggest province of Pakistan and is very important in the equation of power. Secondly, The rural Punjab has attained a very high population density that now demands new institutional framework to mitigate its emergent problems of governance, sanitation and civic association(Qadeer, 1999). Thirdly, the modernization of the economy has gone at largest length in here and it has greatly influence the context of social association. Fourthly, the limit of resources on our disposal forced us to choose a familiar terrain with cultural acquaintance so that the process of rapport building remains easy.

Fifthly, and lastly, Therefore, this study spatially limit itself only to one district of Punjab with main thrust of investigating the nature, forms and extent of political participation and association in rural Punjab. Ralioke village in Khrolian Union council was central to the operationalization of our research. Our extended stay of one month twice has helped us in developing understanding of the research locale and research methodologies necessary to collect required data. Even covering the whole Punjab is a stupendous task and its ethnic, social, economic and social variabilities are hard to be accolated in one study given the resource constraints. Therefore, next stage of narrowing down was required. Out of 30 plus districts of Punjab Sialkot was selected to conduct this study.

3.4.2. Why Sialkot:-

Sialkot is one of the oldest settled district of Punjab and according to District Gazetteer (1895) populated since at least a thousand years. Even during the reign of great Mughals city was famous for its production of swords and paper for Mughal court, Mohalla Loharan reminds the long lineage of its first inhabitants; blacksmiths. In the scheme of Alavi (1973), Sialkot district is an old-settled rich district requiring no canal irrigation. Richness of its soil, availability of quality

water throughout the year and geographical endowments have differentiated it from other regions of Punjab (Alavi, 1973; Khawaja, 2012).

Higher level of skill base opened another avenue for labor force here, immigration towards gulf and Europe. Remittance-income then helped in poverty reduction, improving wage-rates and positively influence domestic commerce through increased conspicuous consumption socio-culturally linked with increasing urbanism in Pakistan³⁷.

Sialkot because of its economic development suits better without objectives of study. It is not poor but one of the richest district in Pakistan and modernization theory assert that economic development empowers middle class which then institutionalize modern politics. Secondly, rural areas have lost their physical isolation and thus traditional patron-client relations attached with agrarian economic relations should have either ended completely or transformed. Lastly, the population density in this district is highest and needs for modern and impersonal governance institutions becomes imperative for its rural areas. These hypotheses could be tested only in more developed districts of Punjab and Sialkot was the most accessible to us.


3.5. Sampling and Data collection instruments:-

Population density of District Sialkot is second highest in Punjab after Lahore according to 1998 census³⁸. Multi-stage cluster sampling was used to infer a representative sample size; Fig-2 demonstrates the rationale and method of sample selection.

³⁷ Interviews with key informants.

³⁸ Since 1998 no census has held in Pakistan.

Figure 2: Multistage Sampling



While Adopting survey methodology in developing countries certain caveats have to be made, foremost is selection of Primary Sample Unit (PSU)³⁹(Yansaneh, 2005). This unit must have a consistent geographical boundary, homogeneity in socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In Pakistan village is officially used as such basic unit for enumeration, identification and taxation in rural areas. Therefore we have taken village as our primary sampling unit. Then there was another concern about the choice of villages that would be

³⁹Union council boundaries are subject to changes in population size, political regime and needs of local influential. Out of 24 rural union councils (according to 1998 census), six were selected. Two union councils were selected from each category of Daska Municipal committee distribution. The rural union councils mostly lied in these three zones 1) Mirza Goraya 2) Budha Goraya 3) Wadla Sindhyan.

systematic inclusive and encompassing of socio-economic and political heterogeneity. To meet the demands of study we have chosen villages in all four corners of the Tehsil headquarter.

Choosing one village from each union council is also made liable to a distinction of candidate and non-candidate categories⁴⁰. Ghoinkey, Gojra, and Jindo Sahi all three villages were selected from three respective union councils, as they were candidate based villages. While other three villages Ralioke, Badoke and Lodikay belonged to other category. Total sampling size of 240 households then equally distributed across the villages. Our earlier fieldwork provided information that most of the village is divided into different blocks and each is inhabited by different castes. Thus representation of each block of village was ensured⁴¹. Both qualitative and quantitative instruments for gathering data were used, below are mentioned the details of these instruments.

Qualitative Instruments:-

To collect qualitative data two instruments were used:

a) In-depth interviews with key informants

Overall 12 interviews with key informants were conducted, two from each village⁴². The choice of key informants was straightforwardly made on two lines 1) Knowledge about local condition 2) Participation in local affairs. First annexure explains the key feature of our key respondents and their respective villages.

b) Focus Group Discussions

⁴⁰ Our fieldwork observations and insights from literature highlighted that presence of candidate in village influence the structure of political associations.

⁴¹

⁴². It was noted during our initial stay that mostly villages were divided in two hostile political camps therefore inclusion of different perspective was made necessary for the reasons of validity

The purpose of conducting FGD's was to validate qualitative data gathered through key informants and participant observations made during fieldwork. The central questions asked from participants were about their perceptions and reflections about a) Changes in lifestyles b) occupational structures and c) local government politics. Three FDGs' were conducted in total. One group was consisted of representative from different villages of our sampling framework⁴³.

Other two, discussions were conducted in village Chopal⁴⁴ of Ralioke and union council office of Ghoinkey. The criteria for participants was active political participation and participants are either vote-block leaders or supporters of any particular candidate, The key objective of conducting this qualitative exercise was to familiarize ourselves with local conditions and develop a firsthand knowledge about different ways of politics is practiced in our sampled villages, in short mapping the local political context.

Participant Observation:-

FGD's were further supplemented by participant observation in all villages during and before data collection process. Overall, six participant observation meetings were held. Three each for candidate and non-candidate based villages. Contrary to the current practice of FGD's wherein the people asked about their perceptions and behaviors , we were , given the nature of study, more interested in observing the people in terms of their behaviors and perceptions without directly asking them the same. TO be acquainted with basic social settings we have lived with the community in Ralioke village for three months that may also serve as a long term participant observations. First stay of one month was during the first month of year 2014. January was the

⁴³ The members of first group were key informants who were interviewed previously. The purpose was again to add into the understanding of political behaviors of political actors. Most of the participants were active political players in their respective constituencies.

⁴⁴ A traditional gathering in Punjabi village at evening times.

election month for local bodies which were then postponed. However, that stay has helped us tremendously in knowing the local political culture as being part of it.

3.5.1. Quantitative instruments:-

Based on FGD's and key informant interviews a structured questionnaire was designed to collect survey data. After completing the first phase of data collection, we have taken a break from fieldwork and concentrated building new instruments for next phase. The central focus of our efforts to capture the dynamic relationship that socio-economic changes have on political action. Two types of instruments were developed for that purpose:

- a) Village Questionnaire
- b) Household Questionnaire.

The purpose of village questionnaire was to get basic information regarding a) population size, b) distance from city, c) composition of kinship structures, and d) social level of development and nature of political association. Household questionnaire was used to collect information about the social, political, economic, and demographic aspects of the households- the ultimate voters. Then with the help of a team including local representatives, 'quantitative data were collected from all six villages. The analysis of the data is provided in next chapter.

3.6.Summary:-

This chapter discussed in detail the theoretical foundation of this study. Theories actually helped in arranging arguments and building interlinkages between different aspects of social reality. Our conceptual framework has demonstrated that in a post-colonial society like Pakistan politics is differentiated along many local realities. Cultural norms, process of state formation and dependent economic development have caused an internal social dependency that run throughout

the state formation. This process is more evident in Punjab and especially in its central districts for their earlier, close and expansive exposure to state and its policies.

In order to understand the confluence of all these factors on the nature of political associations we used a nested methodology and mixed research design. Participant observation, Key informant interviews, and FGD's were conducted to develop a firsthand anthropological account of the locale and then structured questionnaires were used to collect data of required social, economic, and political variables of sampling population. Multi-stage sampling technique was used to draw out a representative sample for the second stage of study. In next chapter now, we will discuss results of our investigation.

Chapter 4

Results and Discussion

4.1. Introduction:-


This chapter is divided into three parts. In first we develop, a village based political itinerary of household-candidate associations. Banking on the fieldwork and qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews/ participation observation and focus group discussions, we divide villages into two categories a) Candidate based villages b) Non candidate based villages. This classification has helped in meeting the first objective of mapping political context of our area of studies.

Second section discusses the changes in economic organization and class structure of rural social formation. This objective was achieved by construction of a composite index of middle class. While in third and final section, by using original household data set, we have evaluated the perceptions, practices, and knowledge of respondents' vis-à-vis current decentralization reforms. All three sections are organically linked with each other and objectives of the study. Structural variables of political contestation (presence or absence of candidate) affect the political association, other things remained constant. Middle class has increased in our area of study that reflect socio-economic changes and discrepancies in knowledge and practices of respondents regarding their voting behavior reflected presence of patron-client relations that sounds bad for ongoing efforts of democratic decentralization.

4.2. Legal structure of Union Council:-

Fig-3, explains the structure of an elected union council officials. Chairman/vice-chairman and, general councilors will be elected directly while others indirectly.

Figure 3: Composition of Village Union Council:-



Professional categories and women representatives in each union council will be nominated and secure representation with respect to their party position. This whole structure of political competition and election is highly prone to manipulation by different stakeholders. The indirect

nominations will be used as a source of dispensing patronage. Election of high numbers of representatives for such small constituency actually creates confusion and problematize representative exercise⁴⁵. This large number of available seats also increases the incidence of violence as the idea of honor trickles into the election competition⁴⁶.

A survey of all previous local bodies' legislation informs about a blind following of some Western models of local governments. In Punjab and Pakistan where patrimonial associations and identities still carries a lot of respect and weight and patronage is embedded in cultural rationalization (Lyon, 2002), an indigenous model of local governments would be more fruitful.

4.3. Description of Data:-

Salient features of the data set are provided into table-1. It clearly reflects the nature of transformation that occurred in economic sphere in sampling villages. Most of the households now employed in non-farm sector of the economy. Share of professional and managers is about 22 % and it reflects the increasing shifts in patterns of employment and corresponding effect on politics. Most of the household enjoy basic social utilities and live in their own Pacca houses. Availability of tapped water and electricity is universal but centralized sewerage system is absent. Dependency ratio is high but male to female ratio is relatively low; under reporting could be one of the reason. However, the absence of females from social, economic and political life, at large, indicates social conservatism. Education attainment on average is lower bound while unskilled labor ratio is quite high.

⁴⁵ One of the key respondent problematized this election and nomination process and highlighted negative implications for whole process of representative democratic decentralization.

⁴⁶ High incidence of violence in local KP election was the result of such electoral structuring that evoked the latent rivalries along clannish and tribal lines.

Table 1: Description of Data

Household Numbers	238	Average education years	7	Mean age	26.75
Average Household size	8	Dependency Ratio	34%	Average Size of Landholding (Acre)	2.13
Non-Farm employment	86%	Males to Female Ratio	56:44	Households Receiving remittances	22%
Pacca houses	100%	Average Number of Rooms	3	Availability of Electricity	100%
House ownership	99.8%	Casual employed workers	34%	Votes through Blocks	62%
Piped Water	100%	Low interest in Politics	69%	Against Introduction of Political parties	61%

Second table explains the social distribution of different kinship categories in sample. Alavi (1973) has argued that primordial loyalties mostly count in small to medium size peasants. Historically in Tehsil Daska, because of various waves of migration, land distribution has remained relatively egalitarian⁴⁷. The population pressures on land forced the search for other avenues of economic enterprise. Mechanization of agriculture also released surplus labor from agrarian economic relations. Who were then found employment in modern industrial and services sector boomed during 1950s' and 60s'.

Changes in economic structures directly influence the nature and forms of social and political associations. Penetration of capitalist economic relation increasingly reduce the importance of extended family. Nuclear family increasingly consolidate itself as primary social institution. Incursion of wealth destabilized older principles of regulating social organization such as Vartan

⁴⁷ Average size of land ownership in our sample is 2.13 acre (approximately a hectare)

Bhanji. Dealing relations, gifts and favors has become more costly and emergent inequalities has made continuous renewal of *Vartan* difficult. Therefore, the institution of *Vartan* becomes a tool in the hands of patrons and politicians. Favors granted to friends, neighbors or fellow villagers could be sustained through reciprocal favors in political field, during elections.

Pragmatic Political associations in such conditions of increased economic and social freedom, replaced older coercive forms. This pragmatism in absence of any structured platform induced personalized forms of political outlook. Nevertheless, older world views still retain their stronghold on minds of the people. This situation is popularly known as cultural lag.

The shift in economic configuration in Pakistan do not correspond to shift in social and cultural rationalization (Qadeer, 2006). Older social habits and loyalties still played an important role in political sphere. The agricultural castes although lost their lands, changed their occupations and attained higher education but their social sensibilities and political associations remained doped in older ways.

Biradri/Kinship although lost its primary occupational and economic importance, but increased its prominence in political field. A relatively freer and economically improved individual required newer identities to correspond with new socio-political realities. The idea of citizen or being a part of nation in Europe fulfilled such needs. Labor movements, later in 19th and 20th century extended these ideas to whole society across classes. However, In Pakistan the failure of elite in developing a comprehensive nationalism, failure of labor movements in strengthening class solidarities left spaces open for different kind of influences. Identification of individual with a larger category, such as Kinship/Biradri in political field is the outcome of this failure. Primordial identities, in modern life settings, play an important political role of galvanizing, moderating and regulating political competition.

Table 2: Kinship Groups in Our Data Set:-

Biradri/Kinship	Frequency	Percent
Gujjar	9	3.8
Jatt	77	32.4
Rajput	36	15.1
Syed	1	0.4
Kashmiri	8	3.4
Arian	10	4.2
Sheikh	2	0.8
Malik	7	2.9
Occupational castes	68	28.6
Christian ⁴⁸	20	8.4
Total	238	100

4.4. Social Change and its manifestations:-

Usually it has been the practice in Pakistan that village is studied as a unit, a whole in itself (Eglar, 2010; Tarar, 2003). Functionalist approaches ruled the roost in village studies and essentialist understanding of village life, institutions, culture, rituals and social practices remained central. This approach has ignored two key factors while studying rural life 1) Internal social and economic stratification 2) Presence of hybrid cultural systems in Indus valley (Alavi, 1972; Lyon, 2002). The theoretical framework used by these studies was peasant society.

Later researchers, inspired by Marxist analytics, conducted studies to highlight internal stratification of village society. They argued against the notion of a harmonious integrated society and pinpoint reasons of divergence and conflict. Emergence of populist politics and its

⁴⁸ In Punjabi villages for in political parlance Christian also treated as separate biradri.

great reception by masses provided the stimulus to these researchers in introducing class as an important socio-political category.

Biradri in West Punjab was considered as the basic institution of kinship (Alavi, 1972). It was argued, the gift exchange system of Vartan Bhanji regulate cooperation and conflict in village life. It was endogamous and the reasons were related to Land. Patriarchal social structures and patrilineal descent limit social exposure and participation of women into certain spheres.

All these concepts employed to understand rural areas and its life now demands revision. In our study area, the role of biradri in social and political life has completely changed. This change could be attributed to the transformation of economic relation through introduction of modernization, industrialization and globalization. Village is now attached to different outside influences getting in through migration, commuting and media. Population pressures and continuous division parceled land into such small plots that cultivation do not remain profitable. Modern sector of economy and immigration provided two most important venues for surplus labor not employed in agriculture market⁴⁹.

The integration of village into national economy and polity has strong implications for local social and political associations. In peasant societies usually social dependency was based on access to land. Social status of an individual, household and caste/class is also determined by land ownership. However, with the emergence of nation state and modern political institutions provide equal rights of citizenship. This equality in citizenship and formal politics undermined severely in presence of social and economic inequality. Rural politics that initially revolved

⁴⁹ Employment in modern sectors is so rewarding that labor for agriculture is not available Daska. Usually, such labor requirements are fulfilled by importing from southern districts.

around dependency created by land inequality and solidarities of kinship, adjusted itself against larger societal changes.

Table 3: Employment

	Employment Type	Occupational Distribution						Total
		Village Name						
		Badoke	Ghoinkey	Gojra	Lodikay	Khrolian	Jindo Sahi	
Main occupation	Agriculture(skilled worker)	24	8	3	9	6	16	66
	Professionals	9	7	9	19	23	1	68
	Managers	12	23	21	5	1	1	63
	Crafts related occupations	11	14	15	23	21	20	91
	Unskilled/Manual labor	17	12	19	17	50	51	166
	Plant/Machine operators	10	13	6	4	6	5	44
Total		83	77	73	73	82	89	498

As discussed earlier the integration of village in national and global economy has eroded its earlier centrality of basic unit of production. This process is a cumulative product of modernization policies that foresee a transition from agriculture based production to industry. Table-3 statistically confirm this transition. Very small minority in Sialkot is now associated with agriculture, while majority work in modern private or public sectors. High numbers of manual laborers indicates increased ‘Proletarianization’ and dominating role of services sector in employing these labor sellers. This loss of agricultural primacy have important social, political, economic and legal impacts on rural life at large.

Public sphere in rural life now is adjudicated by formal state law, thus customary system of conflict resolution has lost its primacy. High social mobility and increase in population made it

difficult to maintain older systems of social cooperation. Vartan Bhanji was an informal system of gift exchange and reciprocity fundamental for the reproduction of a peasant society. As the economic bases transformed resultant adjustments in social relations are bound to be made.

Therefore, informality or customary rules pushed back to political field in rural areas. New acquired wealth consumed in purchasing commodities that fulfill basic needs of mobility, education, health, safety and entertainment of the family. Therefore increase in income potentially supported the consolidation of nuclear family at the cost of kinship. Families increasingly become independent about their decisions. This freedom in social sphere did not correspond to political sphere. As discussed above that failure of nationalism, underdevelopment of economy and refusal of state to provide basic necessities universally has opened political field to certain negative influences; clientelism is one of them.

Although biradri is displaced from social sphere but its important in political field and formation of identity has increased manifold(Niaz, 2014; Qadeer, 2006). Absence of any plate form i.e. functioning political party, made kinship/biradri and neighborhood easily accessible platform for political solidarity. But another qualifications has to be made in understanding utility of biradri in Politics. We have observed that rivalry within internal lineages of a biradri cause fragmentation. This rivalry is either for reasons of chivalry or symbolic representation of society that attach social significance to political contestation.

Modernization has radically altered the roots of dependency. Earlier economy dependency was between peasant and landlord but now it is emerged into many forms. Any individual or household is dependent for their jobs, admissions, documentations and business with state on

numerous institutions⁵⁰. Thus new inequalities of information, education, and access to state and job market also create new dependencies. Therefore, we see that patronage as a system re-create itself according to new needs of political system and biradri has an important role to play in it.

4.5. Determinants of Political associations in village:-

Political associations are neither work in vacuum nor isolation from other social, economic and geographical factors. Studies of voting patterns, patron- client relations, political economy and social transformation have highlighted the importance of certain variables that affect the nature of politics in Pakistan(Akhtar, 2008; Hassan, 2002; Martin, 2014; Mohmand, 2011; Rashiduzzaman, 1966). Distant from cities, land tenure systems and land distribution were treated as factors that determine nature and kind of political associations across villages(Mohmand, 2011; Shami, 2010). It has argued that villages far from cities and with high concentration of land ownership show relatively higher ratio of clientelism.

Rural areas in Pakistan are studied as embedded in peasant economy. This has changed very much with the advent of modernization(Qadeer, 1999). Population density, non-farm employment, daily commuting, connectivity, social utilities and media communications are now equally available in cities and villages in Sialkot district. Therefore factors used in literature that cause and determine variation across villages is not applicable to our study area.

Nevertheless we notice differences in freedom of association, political culture, incidence of violence and rate of participation was different across villages. Like if one candidate belonged to same village and opposite candidate from other village a relative unity at village level prevails.

On the other hand, if both candidates belong to same village competition becomes more rough

⁵⁰ All state and market institutions has imbibed the logic of patrimonialism. The incapacity of these institutions in meeting the demands of population has led to consolidation of these influences. In this we disagree with modernization-revisionists and consider underdevelopment of economy as the root cause of patrimonialism.

and antagonistic. If village is small and do not produce a candidate then very personal, clannish rivalries infest political competition. It also provides extra bit of freedom to households in their choice of vote with increased opportunity for candidates to make direct contacts with these households. Resultantly this process allows the emergence of a new category of political brokers and agents who work for outsiders (See figure-5). Thus in order to understand the variations in forms we have developed a model for understanding village level political associations i.e. Candidate⁵¹ and non-candidate based villages.

Table 4: Villages at Glance


Village	Candidate Based						Non-Candidate based						
	Voters	Non-farm	Political dominance	Gas	City distance	commuters	voters	Non-farm	Political dominance	Gas	City distance	Commuter	Village
Ghoinke	4000	75%	Jatt	No	12km	75%	800	60%	Gujjar	Yes	15km	60%	Khrolian
Gojra	9000	50%	Jatt	No	10Km	50%	5000	40%	Jatt	Yes	7Km	60%	Badoke
Jinddo Sahi	2500	60%	Jatt	No	7km	50%	550	95%	Jatt	Yes	8km	70%	Lodikay

Cheema & Mohmand, (2006) has used a different proxy to understand the usefulness of bringing democracy to door step in two villages of Faisalabad. Their target variable was delivery of social utilities in candidate-based and non-candidate based villages. We have employed the same categorization for investigating the structure of political relations that directly affect the voting behavior of people. We argue that this classification provides help in locating the different forms that informal political associations take across villages. We also assert that political field is

⁵¹ Candidate in this study means Chairman Union Council.

defined, structured and reinforced, to a certain extent by mutual interaction between formal (electoral laws, demarcation of constituency) and forms of informal institutions (see Figure-2&3 above).

Figure 4: Provision of utilities and Pacca houses



Agriculture in all villages had lost its primary function of providing livelihood and employment and large number of villagers commute daily to city for employment reasons. This replacement of agriculture with market-oriented employment sources have enhanced the reach of the villagers and introduced them with new worldviews. Because of commuting demands, metaled roads linked every village to nearby city bypass. The streets are mostly laden with soling and even concrete also used to line streets. In previously discussed traits, both categories of village approximately score equally.

However, the divergence seeps in when demographic factors and nature of political dynamics comes into analysis. Size of population and presence of candidates in same village both affects the form of political association in a qualitatively different way from other category of villages. Our discussion with one of the key informant belonging to Jindo Sahi informed that intensity of

competition between factions in a candidate-based village is more personalized and sometime cause violence⁵². These passions pushed the limits of competition to literally far ends and every legal/illegal or ethical/unethical means is adopted and deployed by both sides. The sense of prestige and owner (izzat) guide the actions of both parties and the acrimonious campaigns usually rely on violent means to secure a win. These passionate political ramblings allied itself traditional customary solidarities, vote-buying, clientelistic relations with just one purpose, to secure a win. Such high-pitched politics required a huge amount of spending by the candidates, resultantly, the financial demands of such extravagant politics precipitates into economic corruption and bad governance, a low point both for democracy and for politicians. The difference of form in association among all villages should not mask the similarities in nature of association. The structure of association could be different but not its functions or character.

Several players in local village level power structure perform functions to sustain it. Candidates in local elections mostly belong to upper stratum of middle class. Vote block leaders (VBL) belonged to more or less similar level of socio-economic status but lacked useful connections and liquid money required to meet the challenges of a political competition. Households with more fledgling resource base but effective relational ties form strong horizontal ties by using medium of kinship. While Households with poor socio-economic conditions and belonging to low status group depends for their social and economic needs on their patron-friends who help them mostly by using his connections in local offices or provide small (interest less) loans to meet the demands of monthly budget. These acts of one person locked the other in an exchange that must be returned albeit in different currency. From here begun the cycle of patron-client relations.

⁵² Candidates based villages are usually divided into two block either of same or different clan. The concept of honor attached with win or loss is more intimately associated with candidate-based village then vice versa.

4.5.1. Associations in non-candidate based Village:-

Ralioke is a non-candidate-based village inhabited and dominated by *Gujjar*⁵³ Biradri. The structure of political association is relatively amorphous and dispersed in contrast to candidate-based village. Relative affluence and equality of social status also leads to further fragmentation of community as competition among different power brokers catches in. Villagers discuss candidly about candidates and radiate a freer attitude with an air of confidence. The fragmentation of village social life has reached very high levels and *Dera* has mostly lost its vigor and utility in social life. Intimidation, harassment and coercion despised by everyone in strong words. At face value, every individual evoke high moral standards in explaining their political inclinations and associations. While when the same question triangulated answers, become quite different and sometime even opposite. For example, when we asked about the qualities in ideal type of politician/candidate the answer usually was laden with higher principles of justice, cooperation and non-discrimination. While in real life the same person could be active participant in one of the competing vote blocks. The reasons for this dissonance in thinking and praxis are structural and indicate a relative repugnance that people feel from existing state of politics.

Biradri as a prime facie of political activity dominate local government political assessments and alignments⁵⁴. However, there is an increasing fragmentation within Biradris along internal lineages (Sub- Biradris) that act as an important factor of political organization⁵⁵. The reasons for


⁵³ One of the biradri dominated every village and there is no association found between candidate/non-candidate based classifications in dominance of any kinship network.

⁵⁴ We have taken the definition of Biradri same as Alavi (1976). 'Horizontal fraternal ties between contemporaries'.

⁵⁵ Internal fissures within Biradris are associated with both acquired wealth and social status by different households working in modern sectors.

block formation, supporting one or the other candidate, therefore become very personalized in

Figure 5: Non-Candidate based Village



The structure of political association in this village is constituted by multiple vote-blocks. For local politics, different blocks inside village, developed around individuals who act as their representative to the politician. Basic principle around which vote-block is organized could be Biradri, Neighborhood or intersection of mutual benefits of members. Vote-blocks are not permanent and mostly last only for election. The reasons behind formation of such vote-blocks is to develop a pressure group that could extract benefits in future.

The village is divided into five unstable vote-blocks. Most of the households usually manifest their formal attachment with politics just by voting. While few participate in political field with higher frequency and for them, differentiation between social, political, and economic fields disappear. Along the continuum of participation following categories could describe the intensity of political participation a) Voter b) Supporter c) Broker d) Candidate. Voters have limited concern for formal politics other than casting vote, while supporters and brokers show long-term interest in politics for various reasons⁵⁶.

The relationship between VBL and its associates is both horizontal and vertical and VB comprise of two type of membership a) Permanent/core b) Seasonal. The relationship between cores of vote-block is usually horizontal as it provides the strategic power to the leader and seasonal membership come whenever their interest is aligned with them.

All vote block leaders belonged to high social status groups⁵⁷, although agriculture is not their source of political authority and wealth anymore. Two of them are employed in public sectors and draw political power through using their office for patronage distribution. Third, one ran a successful business enterprise and earned enough with effective market links to provide small-scale loans and employment to villagers. Fourth leader have had the financial support of influential brothers working in multinationals corporations. Last vote-block is formed of Malik biradri, who felt despised by other Gujjar households and act as a political brokers of an influential political family of the region.

⁵⁶ The reasons could be Personal, social and economic. Brokers usually get attach with any bigwig and establish a parasitic relationship that connects politicians with voters. Supporters are friends or family (extended) members who increase their status or future material opportunities by supporting a candidate.

⁵⁷ Agricultural Castes.

The associational structure of village politics is graphically explained above. These informal institutions of vote block perform an important function of regulating power within village⁵⁸. All factions struggle for dominance, to earn respect and prestige vis-à-vis other rivals. The differences usually among them are petty and very personal in nature. Every household is free to join one or another block by making an astute cost benefit analysis. The physical coercion is negligible but monetary and threats of job loss are usually deployed to maintain loyalty. One of the most important and self-sustaining element of reproduction of this associational structure is the instrumentalization of traditional norm of reciprocity. The inequality in physical endowments, educational attainment and differential access to scarce public and market resources increases the importance of intermediate brokers. The villagers with their lesser interaction to outside world and cultural inhibitions feel comfortable to rely on their biradri or village fellows for daily life issues. Moreover, in the face of shocks, most of households become vulnerable and in absence of any safety nets, the very same people rescue them. This has led to cementing a relation of reciprocity constructed around exchange. The broker/patron expects that his noble act of generosity should be paid albeit in different currency, by casting a vote on his recommendation. Thus a subtle form of association emerges out that has developed new more fancy tools of curbing and limiting the popular function of participation by manipulating affectional ties and human instincts.


4.5.2. Association in Candidate based village:-

Jindo Sahi is a candidate-based village and the associational structure for local politics is very traditional. Physical Infrastructure related to sanitation, education and communication in this village was relatively poor condition from other studied villages. The population size was large

⁵⁸ Vote-blocks use both as guard against excessive power by low status kinship groups and for welding power by others.

and poverty was much more evident. The social structure was also more pluralistic as between Jatt and Rajput biradri a large portion of Christian and Rawal biradri part of village community. The tension between rival vote-blocks was visible and geography of village settlements itself speak about that. The Jatt and Rajput households were neatly separated by large settlements of Christian and Rawal households. The politics was regarded as a sensitive issue and the freedom of association and easy attitude towards politics was mostly missing in this village.

Figure 6: Political Association in Candidate Based Village



Jindo Sahi (candidate based) village pronounced a neat division into two competing factions formed around primordial identities of caste and represent all social categories inhabiting the village space. Rajput family heads one of the vote-block whose core made up of few households belonging to *Gujjar* and Kashmiri Biradri. Rajput are relatively large landowners and migrants

from Gurdaspur Tehsil. The other block is composed of Jatt Biradri and earns good fortunes via employment in Public sector jobs. They are Locals (Muqammi) and use this identity to cement their internal group solidarity. There are also present about 35 households of Christian community, which mostly employed in low-scale government jobs. Rawal Biradri made the majority of this village, who are relatively poor and mostly self-employed in small scale vending jobs. This village lacks any sanitation facility, no high school for boys or girls and without the provision of Gas. Most of the households lament that all surrounding villages enjoy cheap fuel but due to intra-village factionalism around petty issues, their village denied the supply of gas fuel.

Due to the presence of strong vote-blocks⁵⁹ with strong outside linkages through their association with political parties use their access to coercive forces of state to further their own agendas. The choice available to the households is limited because they have either to vote one block or other. To get the support of the Rawal or Christian Biradri use of intimidation is common from both sides. The low-income status of majority populations, lack of alternatives forced them to enter into clientelistic relations with either of the blocks. Most of the spoils offered by patterns remain intrinsically personal garnish by emotive appeals to any gift exchange in recent or distant past⁶⁰. Even the presence of political allegiance with national parties do not improve the bargaining power of junior partners of vote-blocks vis-à-vis leaders of their respective vote-blocks. The extent, intensity, and dependency that clientelism produces is found to be higher than non-candidate village.

⁵⁹ Who are strategically aligned with two factions of Pakistan Muslim League

⁶⁰ One of the key informants has narrated an incident that how during one of the election campaigns one of the vote-block leader (VBL) went to a household asking for votes for a particular candidate. The timing of the visit was after midnight when all household members were sleeping. The reason behind this audacity was that some ten years back the VBL has helped in securing public job for one of the son. Naturally, he was expecting some kind of reciprocity for that his act of generosity.

Both village receive almost similar level of development projects, are at similar distance from city centers, linked with towns through metaled roads and majority of population is employed in non-farm sector. Then why difference in associational structure of politics? The most reasonable explanation could be the emergence of hostility around kinship identity, its politicization and the bearings of direct competition between candidates based in same village. The structure of competition directly influence the structure of association. The freedom and of choice got limited and that certainly disturb the development of social forces in qualitatively different way the other category village. This example also highlights the still abundant influence of social structures on political association in Pakistan in spite a lot of economic transformation. The social transformation, a noble objective of politics, is still not in sight.

4.6.Measuring Middle Class through a Composite Index:

In order to fulfill the second objective of the study we have first developed a composite index. For measuring the socio-economic status of households in the data set, a composite index had developed that indicate the extent of social transformation that has happened in study area. This composite index is built by combining five different indexes measuring different characteristic of households(Nayab, 2011). The scaling and quantification of the index is given below ⁶¹(Table-5). The task of measuring middle class fulfills two important function a) it depict the social and economic changes in explicit and meaningful statistic b) it provides an insight into the nature of political associations that emerging middle class (including all its layers) play to ensure their interests.

⁶¹ This measuring methodology is being taken from (Nayab, 2011)

Table 5: Index Construction

Index	Quantification
Education Index	At least one person in the household with College Education=1 , otherwise=0
Income Index	Household Double The poverty line=1, Below Poverty line=0
Housing Index	Ownership of the house=0.3,otherwise=0 number of persons per room- 1= 0.4, 2= 0.3, 3= 0.2, 4= 0.1, >4= 0; availability of electricity= 0.1, otherwise= 0 (iv) availability of tapped water in the house= 0.1, otherwise= 0 (v) Availability of gas= 0.1, otherwise= 0. Maximum value by adding all sub-components=1 and minimum=0
Life Style Index	Each durable item owned=0.435 Maximum=1 minimum=0
Occupational Index	Occupation of the Household Head is non-manual=1, otherwise=0

4.6.1. Index Construction:-

The core purpose for building index to capture the heterogeneity of the factors that influence inclusion into social category of middle class. It is noted and observed that a) Ownership of the house b) Annual Income c) Lifestyle d) Education e) Occupation, influence the class position. Status, as famously explained by Weber, is an important marker of class. While Karl Marx emphasized the importance of relation with means of production as a criterion for identifying class structure. Two of our sub-indices. Lifestyle and occupation are directly related to status component while house ownership, income, and education directly reflect the economic standing of household. Thus by merging status and economic performance of household , we concur, class boundaries could be better explained in a status-based society like Pakistan(Akhtar, 2008; Nayab, 2011).

After building five indexes, the sub-indices weighted through PCA and their scores added up to get total score for each household. Relative score of each household in composite index and its standing on individual index calibrate her standing in social ladder. The results of index helped us in delineating the effect of socio-economic status of household on their political role, function and association.

4.6.2. Rural Middle Class and Politics in Punjab:-

Emergence, consolidation and politicization of middle class have attracted a lot of attention recently with reference to democratization. Middle classes are known for their independence, employment in modern sectors, social and geographical mobility and a disposition for institutionalized good governance((Birdsall, 2015; Leventoğlu, 2005). However, as (Nayab, 2011) has argued that measuring middle class is a very tedious job. It is a class that lies in between the super-rich and poor or Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. It is not a well-structured and easily identified phenomenon rather middle class is a continuum between super rich and poor. It enjoys better life chances, opportunities of upward mobility and increased levels of higher education attainment. Specifically regarding to Indo-Pak the formation of class structure remained distinct and the political mobilization, especially among Muslims, was caused by *Salariat*; class attached to state jobs(Alavi, 2002). Its access to state, urban life style and knowledge of modern political action has given it tremendous political influence. After partition the forces of modernization, expansion of state services, emergence of new employment and business opportunities have seriously alter the traditional modes of life(Hassan, 2002). This unplanned revolution has offered new opportunities of social mobility for marginalized groups, has broken old social hierarchies and alter the occupational structures, employment patterns and consumption behaviors. More and more population is now attaching it with wage-labor outside

the agriculture sector and share of service sector in GDP is become highest (Economic Survey, 2014-15). The increase in consumption of durable goods indicate a shift in life styles. (Zaidi, 2005) has called it *urban life-style*, which could be seen these days, even in rural areas. Increase in the sale of durable goods is an indicator of relative prosperity, increase in purchasing power and rise of middle class(Krishna & Bajpai, 2015).

Pakistan has witnessed many political mobilizations in its little history. From the election in pre-partition India (1946) to anti-Ayub movement (1968-69), PNA movement (1977), Lawyers movement (2007-8) and now anti-rigging movement (2014). Middle class has played the anchoring role in all these mobilizations (Akhtar, 2008; Khan, 1999; Niaz, 2014). The role of middle classes in creating, maintaining and dispensing hegemony and clientelistic political order is important (Akhtar, 2011). Through estimation of middle class in rural areas we will look, at the, the position and function of different middle class stratas play in maintaining political order at village level.

Middle classes are considered those segments of society that do not directly face the threat of poverty. Unlike the Marxian notion of class category, we have used five different aspects of social life, wealth and asset ownership to distinguish different sub-categories of middle class. The sub-indices generated by PCA divided into six categories by dividing value of composite index (5) with 0.75⁶². Primary values of indices demonstrate the differential of weightage different sub-components apply on composite index. Education has the highest value (1.30) and validate the general observation that access to higher education is equated with socio-economic status of parents(Amin & Irfan, 2014). Life style sub-indices represent ownership in range of

⁶² We have borrowed this measuring technique from Nayab (2011).

durables of a household. Its value also increase as the range of commodities increases while occupation score the least as most of the labor force is unskilled and involved in manual work.

Scores of all these indices against class categories display respective scores in each category in (Table-6). Lower lower class scored very low on all indices while upper middle class stood high on all these. Another trend still can be discerned and that is related with the movement of income category along class lines. As the income increases all other indices, also show a positive growth and it again substantiate the importance of available liquidity for social mobility.

Results shows that high score on income, education, lifestyle and housing indices are common indicators of being into middle class. And the percentage of this class is increasing in more developed centers of Pakistan. However, the social and political implications of this rise are yet to be passed through a scrutiny. Because middle class is neither a unified/organic social category nor it politically show any unified attempt to lead politics in Punjab.

Table 6: Middle class layers and their Respective score on multiple indices:-

Indices						
	Income	Education	Housing	Occupation	Lifestyle	Total
	1.15	1.30	1.05	0.30	1.20	5.00*
Class						
Lower	0.000	0.000	0.51	0.000	0.26	0.77
Lower						
Middle	0.020	0.032	0.72	0.0142	0.32	1.234
lower						
Upper	0.35	0.22	0.75	0.29	0.34	1.95
Lower						
Lower	0.95	0.16	0.79	0.11	0.36	2.37
Middle						
Middle	0.97	0.51	0.84	0.26	0.40	2.98
Middle						
Upper	1.00	0.91	0.87	0.50	0.47	3.75
Middle						

- To avoid large decimals and easy comprehension the weights were multiplied by 5.

Durable goods, with the availability of cheap credit get into the access of all social groups. The difference between classes exclusively counted in terms of ownership of vehicle. Krishna & Bajpai (2015) used means of transportation as a proxy for measuring middle classes in a globalizing society. In our study, it is found that only 7% households own a car and this rate corroborate the overall vehicle ownership patterns in Pakistan. In addition, it is these 7% households, which pull the strings in their respective villages⁶³. Increasing availability of motorcycles on credit is making motorbike the favorite means of transportation for lower middle class groups. Especially in Punjab, the increasing use of bike could be noted through an hour drive on any road. Mobility , reach and access all depends on the nature of transport any

⁶³ Roughly, 1% population from each village correspond to this category. These facts uncannily correlate to the slogan of Occupy Wall Street Movement 'we are 99%'.

household own and in absence of any quality public transport system it really determine the socio economic standing of any household in the continuum of middle class.

Table 7: Middle class Layers and their Functional Political Categories

Classification of Middle Class ⁶⁴			Percentage	Political classification ⁶⁵
lower -lower class	Vulnerable	Working class	5.49	Clients
Middle -lower class	Aspirants		20.25	Clients
Upper- lower class	Climbers		7.17	clients
Lower- middle class Fledgling middle class			48.95	Broker-clients
Middle- Middle class Hard core Middle Class			14.77	Patrons/Core-vote Block
Upper- Middle Class Elite Middle Class			3.37	candidates

Socio economic hierarchy (class structure) directly influences the political role of respective stratum. In overall clientelistic framework of political association the role of clients, brokers and candidates are structurally determined. Social and economic structures highly determine the nature of political association and even the modernizing market forces do not help in effectively altering the contours of these structures.

Unlike other parts of Punjab, the settled tenancy was never dominated agrarian relations of district Sialkot. Small size of land holding has compensated by fertility of land and availability of abundant fresh water for irrigation purposes⁶⁶. As it has never irrigated through canals the burden of tax on cultivator has remained historically low. The introduction of mechanical farming technologies during Ayub era has increasingly reduce the role of physical labor on farm with

⁶⁴ This classification system is used by (Nayab, 2011).

⁶⁵ This classification is adapted from the discussion and insight of (Hicken, 2011; Muno, 2010).

⁶⁶ In Daska three crop annually is common while some cultivators even grow four crops annually.

machine power. The efficiency and cost effectiveness of mechanical power yielded serious consequences for traditional social, political and economic organization of village life. The artisans (occupational castes) now found, with the increase of machine power and high germination seed varieties, better opportunities of putting their entrepreneurial faculties to multiple business, small-scale industry and services sector. *Nayi*(Barber) now start operating Hair Saloon, *Mochi*(Cobbler) start working in leather and shoe industry, *Tarkhan* (Carpenter) opened up furniture shops and *Lohar*(Black Smith) ventured into new automobile workshops that provide repairing services to now increasing numbers of agro-instruments. It is these *Kammi* class which has now graduated from economic dependency but not achieved any social status. Therefore, their social positions is still quite precarious.

These steady modifications of economic relations have deeply impact the social, cultural and political relations. The march of modernization in this region was qualitatively different from other parts as traditional system of association and politics exploded to its core⁶⁷. Foremost economic opportunities in cities attract *Kammis'* and large number of them has left villages⁶⁸. Therefore, it is zamindar biradri that dominate population, politics, business and market of rural areas. The conflict, competition, rivalry, dependency and rapture mostly appear within these biradri and therefore class brackets (inside middle class) appropriately explains the socio-political situation in these areas.

Muslim middle classes historically has emerged around state , in colonial era, and purpose of political organization and mobilization was ostensibly to capture favors from state(Alavi, 2002). After the demise of direct colonialism the logic of doing politics at local level remained same

⁶⁷ Not a Single MNA or MPA of District Sialkot is traditional feudalistic Landlord. Most of them are industrialists, traders or belonged to service sector.

⁶⁸ We estimated that about 28 households out of every 100 belongs to occupational castes.

and it is even true for this day. Power politics, as it is commonly said, inherently create, develop and destroy loyalties with objective to access state and its resources. New middle class political politicians, patrons and supporter use local conditions to accumulate political capital that could provide them direct or indirect access to state.

Punjab in Pakistan considered as the most economically developed, densely populated and politically important province. Those who believe that increase in size of middle class will help in consolidating politics of rights misunderstood the logic of political mobilization of middle classes. Middle class, as we have seen, is not an organic whole and internal divisions block any collective action. Secondly the world view of this middle class is very parochial and a mixture of both bade elements of modernity and tradition⁶⁹. Institutional legacy of colonialism, material insecurities arising from an underdeveloped economy that is excessively informalized, and threats of coercion creates social dependencies. And suitable ground for patron-client relations to persist.

If the results (Table: 6) incorporated into the framework of political association a different understanding emerged (Table: 7). First three categories, consisting of households employed in casual employments. The households who do not own any land, work in low-paid jobs scored low in education attainment and therefore could not find time for doing politics. Availability of time for voting, participation in campaigns and chance of attending any corner meetings for these people is very low. Therefore, probability of exchanging their votes increases for these lower stratas of middle class category.

On the other hand, fledgling middle class (Lower middle class) who because of increase in inflation and stagnation of economy feel more vulnerable and find it hard to keep itself afloat,

⁶⁹ To further understand psychological perspective over this issue see(Nandy, 1983)

participate more actively in village politics. Members from these households enjoy close bindings with both upper and lower strata of social hierarchy. These lower middle class members define the terms of voting and political alignment in each turn of elections by using their kinship and neighborhood ties for political ends. They map the political situation, assess the environment and relative strengths of competing candidates and then ‘persuade’ people below them to follow them. All candidates at least try to negotiate with all different vote-blocks but it is vote-block leaders that have the last say. Friendship, biradri, closeness of interest all play important role in this scenario. In nut shell pragmatic calculations dominates ideological affiliations.

Upper middle class (candidates) through the *hybridity* of prestige, tradition, and status create and maintain their power in political sphere. Culture and tradition usually evoked to veil the power processes and block any meaningful attempt of horizontal solidarities⁷⁰ that could challenge these asymmetries. Middle class is a consolidated neither whole nor well-knit class in classical Marxian sense. Its internal cohesiveness has weakened by socially constructed meanings of status and difference in physical/economic endowments in peripheral societies⁷¹. This internal differentiation within this group gives way to the emergence and sustenance of vertical political associations⁷². These internal contradictions within middle class problematize its transformative role so assiduously discussed by democratization and decentralization theorists. Vertical associations give different meanings to collective action and have grave implications for accountability, development and democratic decentralization.

⁷⁰ Solidarity that exists between persons of similar level of socio-economic stature.

⁷¹ I have used peripheral as it is used by Amin(1976) and Alavi (1972)


⁷² Associations that exists between unequal persons.

4.7. Political perceptions about local governments and Candidates:-

It is important to understand the perceptions of people about any phenomenon as perception provide implication for attitudes and practices. It also inform about the level of awareness respondents have regarding any subject understudy.

Respondents overwhelmingly supported democratic decentralization, as it will increase efficiency in the provision of public goods. This positive response is very much in agreement with decentralization proponents who suggest that representative governments is the only way local demands of the people could be satisfied. However, the democratization literature also emphasized the importance of accountable executives to their principals. Without this accountability, the excesses of power (For which bureaucratic system is notorious for) could also affect the democratic decentralization. To make an executive accountable it is important to develop political institutions that decrease prospects for moral hazards.

Figure 7: Perceptions about Participation



Therefore, to unravel the crisscross of representation the key is to find out the ways, methods and underlying reasons that guide candidature at local level. Responses of households in this regard tend to diverge all theoretical assumptions that policy makers so often propound to support the supposed democratic dividends of decentralization. When asked about the reasons for which candidates contest elections the responses were negative, bordering cynicism. Majority of the voters have lamented that reasons for candidates getting into election competition are usually to acquire, sustain power or self-enrichment (Fig; 8). This imply a strong divergence between the desires of the *ideal* and unfolding of the *real* that is influenced by the presence of inequalities inherent in local structures(Vries, 2007). The people at gross level actually want empowerment and more say in managing their social life but the real conditions and constraints pushed them to mend their ways accordingly.

Influence is an important barometer that voters use for measuring the efficacy of any candidate (FIG: 8). In local parlance *Influence* have different meanings for different people. Fieldwork observations⁷³ have highlighted that for voters understand influence of the candidate with respect to a) Their access to state agencies b) Private enterprises in market i.e. Financial and industrial sector c) Muscle to protect their supporters from any intimidations of other political players. This access gives them the political and moral authority to contest elections. Why these kinds of qualities are required in any candidate? One of the explanations could be that only a person with such qualities could do politics of spoils and protect its voters from any kind of reprisals of opponents. As the saying goes “Politics is not a job of decent man⁷⁴ in Pakistan”, only a powerful man with high stocks of contacts and influence over *Thana* and *Katcheri* could afford doing politics. During our stay at one of the village, we have observed police, through increasing police patrols, intimidation as an election strategy to manage dissent⁷⁵.

With the decreasing efficacy of extra-legal (Thuggish⁷⁶) channels of coercion/intimidation have gone down new forms of legal coercions have developed through using state agencies to meet political ends. In one of the sample village the last LG election (that held in 2005) were also rigged as the ruling party connived with local administration in favor of one of the candidate⁷⁷. These divergences in perceptions about political decentralization and then what the voters actually want to see in their representatives give way to different practices that are in conflict with the demands of democratic participation.

⁷³ Interviews with different elements of local politics during mapping exercise have provided us with differential meanings different respondents attach with the term *influence*.

⁷⁴ *Siyast Sharif Aadmi ka kam nahin ha.*

⁷⁵ That candidate is Nephew of an Incumbent MNA of Ruling party. The intimidation is very much part of political culture in Pakistan.

⁷⁶ The patrons to retain their social control in Punjab relied heavily on thuggish elements called *Rasa Geer* in local parlance.

⁷⁷ Village Six in our sample and then ruling Party was PML (Q).

All responses indicate an underlying cynicism about the nature and form of politics. Nevertheless, in real life respondents find no other options than to vote the repeatedly tried whom they perceive not as their well-wishers. They have to join the political arena and cast their vote but on terms which are not determined by them? Why this is the case? We have discussed the structural imperatives of participation and its ideological undertakings in previous section and now move to the forms of participation and representation at grass root levels.


4.8. Participation- A sign of Increasing Democratization?

Participation rate in local elections is remained lackluster recently⁷⁸. Party-pull in local election factors very low and voter turnout explicitly depends upon the efficacy of political machine that a candidate managed to create on Election Day⁷⁹. This machine consists of his supporters, vote-blocks that he managed to pin with him and independent voters who exchange their vote for any promised/given benefits. Therefore, even if the voter-turn out increases in some constituencies the terms and limitation of such participations must be examined keenly for considerate comprehension of the phenomenon.

⁷⁸ <http://www.Tribune/story/876025/low-turnout-mars-lg-in-cantonment-boards>.

⁷⁹ One usually heard a lot this one saying about election "Half election has fought before election day and other half on election day.

Figure 8: Informal regulatory political institutions



As most of the households interviewed have shown a keenness towards making their contribution in political process, about 90% of the households vote regularly in elections, but the inspiration for such participation does not come from any abstract notions of *Participative Democracy* or *collective action* but for immediate, contingent and emotive reasons⁸⁰. The village as a unit of production hit very badly due to the crisis in Agriculture. The erstwhile principle of social organization that knit a village into one little communitarian unit has lost its vitality,

⁸⁰ Yes, response from any household head does not mean that all members of that household would participate with similar enthusiasm. As the participation of women is usually very low for social reasons. In addition, emotive elements play important role especially in the making of core vote-block groups.

Anthropologists has called that system as *Vartan Bhanji* (Alavi, 1972; Eglar, 2010). This informal system, which was rooted in affective ties earlier, have given rise to other forms of informalization that pivot around instrumental relations. In addition, that instrumentalization is evident from the actual voting preferences that respondents have made during political deliberations⁸¹.

The informal political institutions of vote-block⁸² are present in each studied village. The constitution of vote-blocks vary in candidate and non- candidate villages. The candidate villages usually divided more neatly in cohorts and freedom of choice is limited as well as the bargain power for any household. Non-candidate villagers enjoy relatively greater freedom for political association with higher bargaining power. Our findings are tend to diverge from (Mohmand, 2011) as 30% of the respondents do not agree that they vote as being part of any faction. This reflects that historical variables i.e. land tenure system, migration; state-led modernization and climate have a differential impact on the formation of political associations in Old settled districts of Punjab. There are also certain similarities as the sway of kinship idiom on the alignment of political associations is significantly present. (Fig: 4) illustrate that Biradri and Neighborhood still holds important position with reference to the formation of political association. However, while interpreting these responses little restraint are to apply 1) both categories are not exclusive, as same Biradri groups inhabit most of the neighborhoods. 2) Vote-blocks membership is not permanent and changes by every election 3). Schism within Biradri is abundant and same Biradri could be divided into many antagonistic vote-blocks 4). Occupational

⁸¹ Although local government elections are yet to be hold in Punjab but before the postponement of elections in 2014 all election practices were took place in 2014.

⁸² We will use vote-blocks/ factions interchangeably for this study.

castes usually vote independently from Biradri vote-blocks⁸³ 5). The independence of voter from traditional bondage do not provide any substantial awareness about how to use this freedom 6). Inequality in status, access to job market, credit market, information and state agencies push voters to depend on personal networks to access these scarce goods⁸⁴. Most of the households participate and vote for very personalized reasons. Any candidate who could deal with such fragmented population increase his chances in elections. However, the terms he will offer to these rival blocks would depend upon the organizational capacity and electoral size of these blocks. Meeting the contingent demands for club goods, private favors, provision of loans and buying of votes are strategies that now candidates use in local elections⁸⁵.

With low development funds, available, low level of social expenditure and informational skewness at market place means scarce resource most likely would captured by those having greater access and power. Household in our data set are neither ignorant nor economically dependent for their livelihood. Therefore, they use their vote as an instrument, a token of investment to even if in distant future. It is in this context we argue; the vote for an individual does not carry the same meaning or purposefulness as it for an American or European citizen.

The above-mentioned household responses about their political practices are although only reflections of personal opinions but point towards certain trends those other scholars have also found in other parts of the country. All these responses echo the presence of a clientelistic relation between Principal (Citizen) and Agent (Politician) banded through affective ties of

⁸³. Occupational castes have usually considered as marginalized segments of village community. However, larger part of occupational caste populations have migrated to cities (both small and large) and remaining enjoy relatively more prosper life However, the agriculturalist are not happy with this state of affairs as they complain about the changed attitudes of *Kammis*'.

⁸⁴ These observations have made during our extended stay at field locations in 2014 and 2015.

⁸⁵ While interviewing different political brokers, ex-union council Nazim and Potential candidates for new elections we have come through another insight. One of the ex-Nazim from UC 1 has claimed that local elections are the most expensive elections as the role of money has increased manifold in these elections.

kinship and sustained through norms of exchange-reciprocity. So much dispersed and inherently weak principal divided along multiple cleavages provide greater strategic advantage to candidate in this political game. But for candidate to actually have the upper hand few things are necessary a) Good name b) His personal networks c) Good amount of fortune d) Access to the state institutions. These highly prized attributes provide an edge to candidate against his opponents⁸⁶. Then once again, it left with the ingenuity of candidate to play his card intelligently to secure a win⁸⁷ why such influence is important for evaluating a candidate? It has lot to do with the overall insecurity and patriarchal norms of society and other veils of oppression existing in Pakistani society(Gazdar, 2007). This section has discussed with the help of household data about the political perceptions and practices of households in local union council level politics. The trends emerged out of data reflect that households a cynical disposition towards politics but at same time positively hope that democratic decentralization will improve the provision of social utilities. Then most of them vote regularly but their motives/causes behind voting are completely at odds with agreed universal practices of vote casting. At the very local level of village where there is contingent face-to-face interaction, affectional ties, envies and rivalries goes hand in hand with inequalities of social and economic status voting is not an impersonal , rule bound activity that is governed by the legal structures of constitution or laws of Election Commission. The modernization has greatly altered the economic organization of the rural society but inequalities of social status and modes of cultural affinities are still present. Due to the incidence of inequality of access to scarce public resources and information, vertical political associations dominate the sphere of political association. Horizontal, rules and norm base impersonal ties are just present among core groups of vote-blocks who always belong to higher social status groups

⁸⁶ Thana and Kitchehri played very important role in local elections and having good influence over these Institutions increase winning chances for a candidate.

⁸⁷ Interview with toqeer himself a vote-bloc leader at village 1.

and mostly fall in high-income brackets too. Their internal solidarity and access to information increase their power of organization and political mobilization in election times. Through holding this access to stock of resources, they induce a political culture of patronage. And common voter/household have no choice but to get into an exchange-relationship either with one of the vote-blocs or directly with candidate himself, who is himself also heads one of the vote-bloc. In the absence of any programmatic political party, which can provide an alternative way of political organization, these informal ways of politicking would undermine all efforts of political development through grass root democratization.

4.6. Summary

This chapter analyzed the empirics collected through different instruments. Principally, it discussed about mapping of the social, political and economic context of rural areas and life. We have discussed the socio-economic changes and its sources that effect political associations specifically for local elections. We also discussed the variations in forms of political associations through developing an ideal type of candidate and non-candidate based villages.

Social structure of village and presence or absence of candidate influences the nature of political associations. Non-candidate based villages find more freedom of choice in casting their vote and bargain from better position. The clientelistic associations present across all sample and people cast votes to only those whom they believed influential. The participation into politics is curtailed and regulated by local informal political institutions of vote-blocks. Voters cast vote to candidates not individually but being the part of a collective. Another tendency we have found that independent households are also emerging, mostly in non-candidate based village who directly bargain with the candidate. Lastly, this informality in political association could be made weaker through strengthening political parties but half of the respondents were not in favor of

introducing political parties at local level. This perception coincides with the insistence of provincial governments who are already against the idea of non-party based elections.

Therefore, it can be said that all stakeholders in this equation from top to bottom are acting rationally to maximize their benefit. The ultimate loser are the more vulnerable sections of middle class and poor. Nevertheless, having no other alternative they are forced to participate in vertical chain of political relations dominated by more affluent sections of middle class and local elite. Middle class consolidation is not translating into emergence of more transformational forms of politics. How to subdue these trends present at grass root? Next chapter take up the job of answering this question.

Chapter-5

Conclusions and Policy Lessons

5.1. Conclusion:-

In this section, we will discuss about the type of impacts clientelistic political associations would have on Democratic Decentralization. The idea of taking state close to society is actually about cutting the distance between executives and their principal (voters) and empowering the latter to have check on the activities of former. However, to exercise the monitoring of local representatives, a politically aware and socially harmonized civil society is a pre-requisite for success of any policy. Most of the respondents in our data set have shown a great deal of understanding about the duplicitous role of politicians and shows an apathy towards the general idea of politics. Therefore, it can be asserted that awareness is not a sufficient condition for realizing the tangible benefits that democratic decentralization could convey. Social harmony, absence of social inequality, is required to construct collective action that could direct political association and function as a keystone to accountability mechanism. Nevertheless, the presence of social cleavages, economic disparities and cliquish rivalries fragment the principal into numerous blocs that disorient the political action towards personalized ends and reinforce a cycle of internal dependency. Democratization is dependent just not on participation but, we stress, on the *agency of Participation* and conditions imposed on this agency. People usually vote, participate, and get into political action while being part of collectivities. These collectivities bind the agency of individual and groups to the extant social hierarchies without their consent. They must have to act strategically by weighing all possibilities and consequences of their actions. The threat of exclusion from any possible intrinsic benefit valued very high and directly

influence the decision made by individual or group. This politics of common sense is void of any specific long-term objectives and reduce the political exercise to the formalization of existing social and economic inequalities. The collective action becomes the victim of these social and political cleavages and replaced by different moral hazards i.e. vote exchange and vote buying. When the constraints on participation are ubiquitous, the function of vote becomes limited to exchange in an *imperfectly competitive* political market. The mixed results of democratic decentralization around the globe is a testimony to this one very elementary logic , democratization sans social/political development remained problematic ((Manor & Bank, 1999).

Bad governance is inevitably a result of bad politics⁸⁸. A clientelistic political system developed to access, through different intermediaries reduces the efficacy of democratic political parties. The local bosses are well aware of the situation well and therefore carry the advantage of playing shots effectively. The clientelistic machine could not withstand the credit crunch that is required for a) Election fanfare 2) sustain clients in long term. Contrary to the practices in consolidated democracies, political parties do not run election fund campaigns in Pakistan. The stalwarts themselves arrange the election funds and both implicit and explicit expenditure of election campaign directly influence the rate of corruption and bad governance. Putting a ban on conspicuous expenditure by election commission during election could not solve the problem. The political system demands reform and by finding solution to this problem will certainly help in enhancing the accountability of executive and achieving the target of good governance.

Humans are not just Homo-economics neither development is just economic development but have its social and political dimensions. Social development essentially reduce social inequalities

⁸⁸ Bad politics means exclusivist politics preferring short term and personal benefits over long term and collective benefits.

through transforming social structures. The Eurocentric ideas of democratization have accepted in Pakistan without problematizing the sequential itinerary of modernity in Global South. The economic modernization did not accompany political reconstruction and political elites only contested for getting hold over the colonial state apparatus, although by bending its core ethics of governance. This process of centralization of power had pulled off certain opportunities of social integration and left vacuum, which then filled by traditional, cultural and customary forms of integration and classification⁸⁹. The introduction of universal suffrage at the very earlier stages of de-colonization has only helped the cause of elites to use existing social hierarchies for their own advantage(Khan, 1999). A small break came during Bhutto era when the idiom of class and horizontal solidarity was achieved prominence(Akhtar, 2008; Mohmand, 2011). However, the consolidation of this idiom was required a continuous series of elections that was blocked by military coup in 1979. Since then state has used local politics to create a bulwark against emergence of any political challenge(Zaidi, 2005). The non-party based elections consolidated the idiom of *Influential candidates*, which has also rectified by respondents in our data set. This influence-ridden politics has its roots in social inequality, uneven economic development and refusal of state to provide basic social utilities universally. Notwithstanding, the transformation in economic base, life styles, education and social hierarchies the clientelistic politics has still retained its hold over popular imagination and action. Few things have changed to a greater degree but other have remained unchanged. The upper districts of Punjab have achieved better living standards and modern ways of living but positioning of role that informal political exchanges play is still dominant.

⁸⁹ The social integration is to this day remained a problem as the parochial identities and an air of mistrust between communities is still very much present. The failed project of assimilating different ethnic groups into one Muslim nationhood has failed miserably.

The political development historically depends over social movements and political parties that provide alternative options to common folks. The success of decentralization programmes in Kerala and West Bengal is the result of ideologically driven political parties. The negative social capital is abundantly present in local neighborhoods; a fresh outside perspective could be the only way through which these customary and instrumental social stratifications aligned with vertical political associations is transgressed. The one to achieve this objective is through strengthening independent, cohesive, accountable political parties that provide leadership and vision for highly required social development and transformation.

5.2.Policy Implications:-

The introduction of political parties at local level is a welcoming decision⁹⁰. However local government election results in cantonment areas and KP province clearly shows some disturbing trends for the overall process of decentralization and the ends it serve. Election results reflect following trends for other provinces as, 1) Incumbent party at national/provincial level will lead the local elections 2) Independent candidates will remain in second position.

Firstly, as our conceptual framework clearly explicates that incumbent political government at higher tiers would influence the outcome of local elections through legislative procedures, bureaucracy and their local incumbents. Thus, the provincial governments tried their best to avoid any opponent party to come into power. Secondly, the political parties' have ridden with factions locally and it would be then organize party based elections at village level⁹¹. The local government law explicitly states that chairman/vice-chairman of village council would be contesting jointly. This would create problems for both candidates and parties. Parties would be

⁹⁰ Village councils have elected on non-party bases in KP.

⁹¹KP government however has experimented with non-party elections for village councils

inviting intra-factional tensions at local level while candidates would find it too difficult to put joint candidates. Therefore, non-party based elections would be the most appropriate policy option provincial government would consider appropriate.

Nudging away the village council, the recent election results have shown that either siding with incumbent party or independent is the safest option for any candidate. Parties because of their meddlesome internal affairs have still to develop a free and fair internal mechanism to award tickets, money, access to party leaders or influence at local level are standards for distribution of nomination tickets. All parties in Pakistan are without any internal democracy and dynastic machines of dispensing patronage(UNDP, 2013). Party organizations are dubious and internal elections are out of agenda. Rather than giving any ideologically cohesive programme these parties rely on power politics and distribute nomination tickets to those who has his/her own personal following. This means that candidate has to finance his whole election campaign himself and party would not share any of the burden. This financial cost paved the way for politically induced economic corruption that is used for both self-enrichment and patronage extension(M. H. Khan, 1998). The way local political associations have created and managed means the candidate will neither be accountable to voters nor its party bosses.

Secondly, independent candidates would themselves feel free to join or make alliance any of the party after elections, and most probably, it would be the incumbent party. The huge success of independents indicate two trends 1) Voters still feel happy to negotiate with local patrons whom they know personally 2) The trust on political parties, with reference to local elections, is very low. This is because political parties in Pakistan are political machines and political bosses are not answerable to their supporters. The irony is that voters depends on these local (independent or party based) political patrons to access to scarce public resources. Although it is hard to

extract any meaningful change in existing order of things, following steps could help to direct decentralization process towards better outcome:

- Constitutional amendment for ensuring internal elections/democracy in political parties.
- Developing a universal formula for disbursement of development funds.
- Developing a more nuanced structure of village council with smaller number of candidates
- Introducing good pay scales for elected representative and putting ban on their indulgence in any other business enterprise during incumbency period.

References:-

- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power*. Crown Business, New York.
- Ahmad, E. (1980). Post-Colonial Systems of Power. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 2(Fall 1980), 350–363.
- Ahmad, I. (1981). Pakistan: class and state formation, 22(3), 239–256.
<http://doi.org/10.1177/030639688102200302>
- Ahmad, M., & Talib, N. A. (2013). Local Government Systems and Decentralization: Evidence from Pakistan's Devolution Plan. *Contemporary Economics*, 7(1), 33–44.
- Akhtar, A. (2011). Patronage and class in urban Pakistan: modes of labor control in the contractor economy. *Critical Asian Studies*, 43(2), 159–184.
- Akhtar, A. S. (2008). *The Overdeveloping State: The politics of common sense in Pakistan, 1971-2007*. University of London.
- Alavi, H. (1972). The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. *New Left Review*, 74(1), 59–81.
- Alavi, H. (1973). Elite farmer strategy and regional disparities in the agricultural development of Pakistan. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 173–210. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4362483>
- Alavi, H. (1973). Peasant classes and primordial loyalties. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1(1), 23–62.
- Alavi, H. (2002). Misreading partition road signs. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37(44), 15–23. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4412807>
- Alavi, H. A. (1972). Kinship in west Punjab villages. *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 6(1), 1–27.
- Ali, I. (1988). *The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885-1947*. Princeton.
- Almond, G. (1989). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Sage.
- Amin, S. (1976). *Unequal Development An essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism* (First). The Harvester Press.
- Amin, S. (1976). *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of. Peripheral Capitalism*.
- Amin, S. Javed, & Irfan, M. (2014). Intergenerational Mobility: Evidence from Pakistan Panel Household Survey. *Pakistan Development Review*, 1(53), 105–103.

- Auyero, J. (2000). The logic of clientelism in Argentina: an ethnographic account. *Latin American Research Review*, 35(3), 55–81.
- Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2002). Relative capture of local and central governments: An essay in the political economy of decentralization.
- Beekers, D., & Gool, B. (2012). *From patronage to neopatrimonialism: postcolonial governance in Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond* (No. 101). Retrieved from <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/19547>
- Berman, B. J. (1974). Clientelism and neocolonialism: center-periphery relations and political development in African states. *Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)*, 9(2), 3–25.
- Birdsall, N. (2015). Does the Rise of the Middle Class Lock in Good Government in the Developing World? *European Journal of Development ...*, 27(2), 217–229.
- Blau, P. (1964). *Power and exchange in social life*. New York: J Wiley & Sons.
- Bodemann, Y. (1982). Class rule as patronage: Kinship, local ruling cliques and the state in rural sardinia 1. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 2(9), 147–175. Retrieved from <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066158208438160>
- Boix, C., & Stokes, S. (2007). The Oxford handbook of comparative politics. Retrieved from https://scholar.google.com.pk/scholar?q=THE+OXFORD+HANDBOOK+OF+COMPARATIVE+POLITICS&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5#0
- BRUSO, V., Nazareno, M., & STOKES, S. (2001). Clientelism and Democracy: An Analysis of Ecological Data from Argentina. *Annual Meeting of American Political Science ...*. Retrieved from https://scholar.google.com.pk/scholar?q=Clientelism+and+Democracy++An+Analysis+of+Ecological+Data+from+Argent&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5#0
- Burki, S. (1972). Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation. *Asian Survey*, 12(3), 201–212. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642873>
- Chandra, K. (2007). Counting heads: A theory of voter and elite behavior in patronage democracies. In *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition* (pp. 84–109). Cambridge University Press.
- Cheema, A., Khwaja, A. I., & Qadir, A. (2006). Local government reforms in Pakistan: context, content and causes. *Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective*, 257–284.
- Cheema, A., & Mohmand, S. K. (2006). Bringing electoral politics to the doorstep: Who gains who loses. *Lahore University of Management Sciences. (Mimeographed)*.
- Cheema, A., Mohmand, S., & Patnam, M. (2009). Colonial proprietary elites and institutions: The persistence of de facto political dominance. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/256003434_Colonial_Proprietary_Elites_and_Institutions_The_Persistence_of_De_Facto_Political_Dominance
- Cheema, S. G., & Rondinelli, D. A. (2007). From Government Decentralization to Decentralized

- Governance. In S. G. Cheema & D. A. Rondinelli (Eds.), *Decentralizing Governance Emerging Concepts and Practices* (1st). Ash institute for democratic governance and innovation harvard university.
- Collier, R. (1999). *Paths toward democracy: The working class and elites in Western Europe and South America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Duncan, E. (1990). *Breaking the Curfew: a political journey through Pakistan*. Arrow.
- Easterly, W. (2003). *The political economy of growth without development. ... Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*.
- Eglar, Z. (2010). *A Punjabi Village in Pakistan Perspectives on Community, Land. And Economy* (First). Oxford University Press.
- Eisenstadt, S., & Lemarchand, R. (Eds.). (1981). *Political clientelism: Patronage and development*. Sage Publications. Retrieved from https://scholar.google.com.pk/scholar?hl=en&q=patron+client+and+friends&btnG=&as_sdt=1%2C5&as_sdt=0
- Eisenstadt, S., & Roniger, L. (1984). *Patrons, clients and friends: Interpersonal relations and the structure of trust in society*. Cambridge University Press.
- Finan, F., & Schechter, L. (2012). Vote-Buying and Reciprocity. *Econometrica*, 80(2), 863–881.
- Flynn, P. (1974). Class, clientelism, and coercion: some mechanisms of internal dependency and control. *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 12(2), 133–156.
- Gardezi, H. (2002). Contemporary Sociology in Pakistan. In S. A. Zaidi (Ed.), *Social Science in Pakistan in the 1990s*. Pakistan Study Centre.
- Gazdar, H. (1999). Poverty in Pakistan: A review. In *Shahrukh Rafi Khan (eds)*. Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad.
- Gazdar, H. (2003). *Gendering Space: Patriarchy and Socio-Economic Stagnation in Pakistan* (No. 5). Islamabad.
- Gazdar, H. (2007). Class, caste or race: veils over social oppression in Pakistan. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 86–88.
- Gilmartin, D. (1988). *EMPIRE and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Graziano, L. (1976). A conceptual framework for the study of clientelistic behavior. *European Journal of Political Research*, 4(2), 149–174.
- Güneş-Ayata, A., & Roniger, L. (1994). *Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society*. Rienner.
- Gupta, D. (2005). Whither the Indian village: culture and agriculture in 'rural'India. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 751–758.
- Habib, I. (1975). Colonization of Indian Economy. *The Social Scientist*, 3(March, 1975), pp. 23–53.
- Hadiz, V. (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-

- Institutionalist Perspectives. *Development and Change*, 35(4), 697–718.
- Hall, A. (1974). Patron-client relations. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1(4), 506–509.
- Hasan, A. (2002). Roots of Elite Alienation. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 37(Nov. 2-15), 4550–4553.
- Hasan, A., & Raza, M. (2011). *Migartion And SMALL TOWN IN PAKISTAN* (First). Oxford University Press.
- Hasnain, Z. (2008). The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentives for Patronage, 1988-1999. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 47(2), 129–151.
- Hassan, A. (2002). *The Unplanned Revolution: Observations on the Process of Socio-Economic Changes in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Heller, P. (2001). Moving the state: the politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre. *Politics and Society*, 29(1), 131–163.
- Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14, 289–310.
- Hopkin, J. (2006). Conceptualizing political clientelism: Political exchange and democratic theory. In *APSA annual meeting, Philadelphia* (Vol. 31, pp. 18–46).
- Huntington, S. P. (1965). Political development and political decay. *World Politics*, 17(03), 386–430.
- ICG. (2004). *DEVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: REFORM OR REGRESSION?*
- Inayatullah. (1964). *Basic Democracies District Administration and Development*. Pakistan Academy for Rural Development Peshawar.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review*, 65(1), 19–51.
- Javid, H. (2011). Class, power, and patronage: landowners and politics in Punjab. *History and Anthropology*, 22(3), 337–369.
- Johnson, R., & Onwuegbuzie, A. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. *Educational Researcher*, 33(7), 14–26.
- Kaviraj, S. (2005). An outline of a revisionist theory of modernity. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 497–526.
- Keefer, P. (2009). Inequality, collective action, and democratization. *PS: Political Science & Politics*.
- Keefer, P., Narayan, A., & Vishwanath, T. (2003). The political economy of decentralization in Pakistan. *Development Research Group, World Bank, Washington, DC Processed*.
- Khan, M. (1998). The role of civil society and patron-client networks in the analysis of corruption.
- Khan, M. (1999). The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Pakistan 1947-1971.
- Khan, M. (2002). Fundamental Tensions in the Democratic Compromise. *New Political*

- Economy*, 7(2), 275–277.
- Khan, M. H. (1995). Class, Clientelism and communal politics in contemporary Bangladesh. In *The Making of History: Essays Presented to Irfan Habib* (pp. 572–606).
- Khan, M. H. (1998). Patron-Client networks and the economic effects of corruption in Asia. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 10(1), 15–39.
- Khan, M. H. (2012). Governance during Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa. *New Political Economy*, 17(5), 667–675.
- Khan, S. R. (2006). Using Theatre as a Research Tool: Troubleshooting and Benchmarking Pakistan's Devolution Plan. Shahrukh Rafi Khan and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar. *Lahore Journal of Economics*, 7(1), 48.
- Khawaja, I. (2012). Development, Disparity, and Colonial Shocks: Do Endowments Matter? Retrieved from <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0ck918nv.pdf>
- Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. (2007). Citizen-politician linkages: an introduction. In H. Kitschelt & S. Wilkinson (Eds.), *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition* (pp. 1–49).
- Krishna, A., & Bajpai, D. (2015). Layers in Globalising society and the New Middle Class in India. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 5(January 31, 2015).
- Lawson, C., & Greene, K. (2011). Self-enforcing clientelism. *Mss. Http://courses. Cit. Cornell.edu/patel/psac/Greene_PSAC_5_4. Docx.*
- Legg, K. (1972). Interpersonal relationships and comparative politics: Political Clientelism in industrial society. *Politics*, 7(1), 1–11. Retrieved from <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00323267208401266>
- Lemarchand, R., & Legg, K. (1972). Political clientelism and development: a preliminary analysis. *Comparative Politics*, 149–178.
- Leventoğlu, B. (2005). Social mobility and political transitions. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.
- Lyne, M. M. (2007). Rethinking economics and institutions: the voter's dilemma and democratic accountability. *Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, 159–181.
- Lyon, S. (2002). *Power and patronage in Pakistan*. Retrieved from http://dro.dur.ac.uk/183/1/Lyon_thesis.pdf
- Maddison, A. (2013). *Class structure and economic growth: India and Pakistan since the Moghuls*. Routledge.
- Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism.
- Manor, J., & Bank, W. (1999). The political economy of democratic decentralization.
- Martin, N. (2014). The Dark Side of Political Society: Patronage and the Reproduction of Social Inequality. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 14(3), 419–434.

- Mohmand, S. (2008). Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Strengthening Social Capital or Rolling Back the State? In Krishna H. David Gellner (Ed.), *Local Democracy in South Asia: Microprocesses of Democratization in Nepal and Its Neighbours*, (pp. 380–415). Sage Publications.
- Mohmand, S. (2011). *Patrons, brothers and landlords: Competing for the vote in Rural Pakistan*. Retrieved from <http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/4905>
- Mohmand, S., & Gazdar, H. (2007). Social structures in rural Pakistan. *Thematic Paper Prepared under TA4319, Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction and ADB's Contribution in Rural Pakistan*. ADB, Islamabad.
- Mohmand, S. K. (2011). *Patrons, brothers and landlords: Competing for the vote in Rural Pakistan*. University of Sussex.
- Mohmand, S. K., & Cheema, A. (2007). Accountability failures and the decentralisation of service delivery in Pakistan. *IDS Bulletin*, 38(1), 45–59.
- Muno, W. (2010). Conceptualizing and measuring clientelism. In *Paper to be presented at the workshop on Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg*. [Links].
- Myrdal, G. (1968). *ASAIN DRAMA An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations Volume I (Third)*. New York: PANTHEON.
- Nandy, A. (1983). *The Intimate Enemy Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (1st ed.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nasr, S. (1996). Pakistan: State, agrarian reform and Islamization. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 10(2), 249–272.
- Nayab, D.-. (2011). *Estimating The Middle Class in Pakistan* (No. 77).
- Neuman, W. (2006). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches.
- NIAZ, I. (2006). A Survey of Proprietorship, Continental Bureaucratic Empires, and the Culture of Power, in South Asian History. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 45 : 3(Autumn 2003), 327–339.
- Niaz, I. (2011). *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan, 1947-2008*. Oxford University Press.
- Niaz, I. (2014). Corruption and the Bureaucratic Elite in Pakistan: The 1960s and 1970s Revisited. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Third Series)*, 24(01), 97–113.
- Owen, D. A. (2011). *Mass Political Participation in Developing Democracies: A Study of Political Clientelism in THAI Provinces (Doctoral Dissertation)*. Southern Illinois University Carbondale.
- Patnaik, P. (2004). A Theoretical Note on Kerala-style Decentralized Planning. *The Marxist*, 20(1), 1–15. Retrieved from <http://dev.cpim.org/marxist/200401-marxist-kerala-decentralisedplan.pdf>
- Qadeer, M. A. (1999). “Urbanisation of everybody”, institutional imperatives, and social

- transformation in Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 38(4), pp. 1193–1210.
- Qadeer, M. A. (2006). *Pakistan Social and cultural transformations in a Muslim nation*. Routledge.
- Rahman, T. (2012). *Class Structure of Pakistan*. Oxford University Press.
- Randall, V., & Theobald, R. (1998). *Political change and underdevelopment. A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics*. Duke University Press.
- Rashiduzzaman, M. (1966). Election politics in Pakistan villages. *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 4(3), 191–200.
- rehman, A., Shamas ul, deen, & Sadaf, farooq. (2014). Political and Economic History of Personal Law in Pakistan. *International Journal of Innovation and Applied Studies*, 9(2), 523–533.
- Roniger, L. (1983). Modern patron-client relations and historical clientelism. Some clues from ancient Republican Rome. *European Journal of Sociology*, 24(1), 63–95. Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003975600003969
- Roniger, L. (2004). Political clientelism, democracy, and market economy. *Comparative Politics*, 353–375.
- Saif, L. (2010). *Authoritarianism and Underdevelopment in Pakistan 1947- 1958: The Role of Punjab*. Oxford University Press.
- Sayeed, A. (2002). State-society Conjunctions And Disjunctions: Pakistan's Manufacturing Performance. In *The post colonial-State and Social Tranformation in Ijdia and Pakistan* (pp. 203–244).
- Sayeed, K. Bin. (1980). *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*. Preager Publisher.
- Scott, J. C. (1972). Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. *American Political Science Review*, 66(01), 91–113.
- Shah, A. (1998). *Balance, accountability, and responsiveness: Lessons about decentralization*. World Bank Washington, DC.
- Shami, M. (2010). *The road to development: market access and varieties of clientelism in rural Punjab, Pakistan*. The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
- Stoker, G. (2011). Was local governance such a good idea? A global comparative perspective. *Public Administration*, 89(1), 15–31.
- Sujarwoto, S. (2013). Essays on decentralisation, public services and well-being in Indonesia.
- Szwarcberg, M. (2013). Building a Following: Local Candidates' Political Careers and Clientelism in Argentine Municipalities. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 55(3), 1–18.
- Tarar, nadeem omar. (2003). Anthropology in Pakistan: The State of the Disciplian. In C. of S. S. in Pakistan (Ed.), *State of Social Siences and Humanities in Pakistan*. Islamabad. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/728794/Anthropology_in_Pakistan_The_State_of_Discipline_

- UNDP. (1999). *DECENTRALIZATION: A SAMPLING OF DEFINITIONS*.
- UNDP, & Jaffar Hassan, Amjad Bhatti, M. W. (2013). *Pakistani Federalism and Decentralization: Course for Universities*.
- Verkaaik, O. (2001). The Captive State: Corruption, intelligence agencies, and ethnicity in Pakistan. In T. Hansen & F. Stepputat (Eds.), *States of imagination: ethnographic explorations of Postcolonial state (Politics, History, and Culture* (pp. 345–364). Duke University Press.
- Vries, P. De. (2007). Don't compromise your desire for development! A Lacanian/Deleuzian rethinking of the anti-politics machine. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(1), 25–43.
- Waseem, M. (1994). *The 1993 elections in Pakistan*. Vanguard Books Ltd.
- Waseem, M. (1997). Political Development and Conflict Resolution in Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 36(4), 715–742. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41260066>
- Wolf, E. (1999). *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis* (1st ed.). California: University of California Press.
- Yansaneh, I. S. (2005). Overview of sample design issues for household surveys in developing and transition countries. In *Household Sample Surveys in Developing and Transition Countries* (pp. 11–15). United Nation, New York.
- Zaidi, S. (2005a). *Issues in Pakistan Economy*. Oxford University Press.
- Zaidi, S. (2005b). The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Pakistan. In S. A. Zaidi (Ed.), *Military, Civil Society and Democracy in Pakistan* (pp. 120–171). Vanguard Books Ltd.
- Zaidi, S. (2014). Rethinking Pakistan's Political Economy: Class, State, Power and Transition. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 49(5), 47–57.

Appendix-I

Bio-data of Key Informants;

⁹² Name	Age	Occupation	Political role	Village
Hameed Gorci	45	Farmer	Vote block leader	Ralioke
Naseem Cheema	40	Principal	Observer	Lodikay
Master Rehman	40	Government Teacher	Political broker	Khrolian
Jameel jutt	38	Farmer	Candidate	Badoke Cheema
Salman cheema	37	self-employed	active participant	Lodikay
Shakeel ahmad	42	Union council Secretary	observer	Ghoinkey
Rana Zeeshan	28	Farm manager	Active participant	Gojra
Chudry Manzoor	65	Manager	Vote block leader	Ralioke
Rana Irfan	65	farmer	Vote block leader	Jindo Sahi
Ahmad warriach	36	manager	Vote block leader	Ghoinkey
wali ahmad	39	self-employed	ex-councilor	Khrolian
rana aftab	43	Advocate	active participant	Gojra

⁹² Names of the respondents have changed for the purpose of secrecy.

Appendix-II

Political basis of Economic Corruption:-

The debate on corruption in Pakistan has become a household issue in Pakistan. Even the dictatorial regimes always legitimize their coups for restoring order and curbing corruption in Pakistan. Nevertheless, at the same time, not all these regimes (except Ayub) could survive without the inclusion of these middle classes into their folds. The economic corruption that one witness, documented by many independent observers, has strong links with political corruption clearly furthered by all regimes(Khan, 1998). Weak political parties and election commission vis-à-vis electoral heavyweights, who deploy ingenious political and electoral strategies of multiple types, only for maintaining their political muscle through investing in their constituencies both in private and club goods⁹³. No one could invest their personal resources for too long and the use of political office to generate economic resources (as well as personal benefits) for political purposes induce a vicious circle of corruption that increasingly become more ruthless as different contenders enter into political arena. If more contenders at political field it means spending greater sums of wealth directly leads to higher economic corruption as the costs for next political elections could only be recovered by abusing political office. These structural problems of political competition produce grave implications for accountability, governance and democratization. The increasing folds of nouveau riche and expanding size of middle class has made politics competitive and unscrupulous at the same time. Politicians switch loyalties with parties and ideologies with only purpose of winning an office. Unprincipled informality in politics could partially be explained by informality in economy, formal procedures have neither respite nor efficacy in both places. The chaos of market place entails insecurity that could only be ratified through being in shadow of a resourceful person. The squandered public

⁹³ Public goods i.e. schools, hospital, roads lost their public character as opposing blocs could be devoid of their provision.

wealth frivolously exchange through favors to make the poor believe in the legitimacy of existing social order. The crumbs of charity, personalized material exchanges of personal and club goods with favors of all sort travel down the stream demanding one thing in return; docile political obedience. The patrons comes and then become obsolete and leave the podium for new fortune seekers, players change but not the rule of game; clientelism remained safe and untouched.

Appendix- III

Household Questionnaire

Interview Form

Political Economy of Social Transformation in Rural Punjab

Village Name

Religion of Household

Union Council

Sect of the Household

Respondent Name

Name of The household head

Contact no

Questionnaire Number:-

Note: - This data is collected for the purpose of M. Phil Development Studies thesis titled “Political Economy of Social Transformation in Rural Punjab: A Case Study of Sialkot District” and will not be used for any other purpose. The responses will be kept confidential.

یہ ڈیٹا ایم فل کے تھیسس کی خاطر جمع کیا جا رہا ہے اور دنیے گئے جوابات کو مکمل طور پر صیغہ راز میں رکھا جائے گا

Codes For Section 1

Q 3- 1) Job 2) Student 3) Business 4) Others (specify)

Q5- 1) Head 2) Spouse 3) son/ Daughter 4) Grandson 5) Father/Mother 6) Brother/sister 7) Niece/ Nephew 8) Son/Daughter in law 9) Brother/Sister in law 10) Father/Mother in law 11) Servants 12) other specify

Q7- 1) Currently married 2) Unmarried/Never married 3) Nikah 4) Divorced 5) Engaged

Q10- 1) Islam 2) Christian 3) Hindu 4) Ahmadiat 5) Others (specify)

Q11- 1) Barelvi/Sunni 2) Deobandi 3) Wahhabi/Salfi 4) Shia 5) Catholic 6) Protestant 7) Other specify

Q12- 01. No formal Education 02. Below Primary 03) Primary 04) Middle 05) Matric 06) Intermediate 07) Graduation 08) M.phil 09) Phd

<p>Q1- Employed 2) Unemployed 3) Not looking for work</p> <p>Q 2-01. Regular paid employee 4) Underemployed with fixed wage</p> <p>02 Casual paid employee</p> <p>03. Paid worker by piece rate or work performed</p> <p>04. Paid non-family apprentice</p> <p>05. Employer</p> <p>06. Own account worker</p> <p>07. Owner cultivator</p> <p>08. Share cropper</p> <p>09. Contract cultivator</p> <p>10. Unpaid family worker</p> <p>11. Other,</p> <p>Q3- 1) Agriculture (skilled workers) 2) Professionals 3) Manager 4) Crafts related occupations 5) Unskilled manual labor 6) Plant/ Machine operators</p> <p>Q5- 1) Defense 2) education 3) Revenue 4) Provincial administration 5) Municipal 6) Finance 7) Health 8) Social Security 9) Other (specify)</p> <p>Q6- 1) Transport 2) Manufacturing 3) Textile 4) Real state 4) Health 5) Marketing 6) Education 7)Telecom 8) Construction 9)Law 10)Finance 11) Other (specify)</p>	<p>Q7- 1) Rickshaw 2) Manual labor 3) Taxi 4) Artisan 5) Tuitions 6) Other (specify)</p> <p>Q8- 1) Arahat 2) Shop keeping 3) Service Delivery 4) Education 5) Real state 6) Trader 7) Retailer 8) Others (Specify)</p>
--	--

E1- What is the main source of Income of Household?

- 1- Agriculture 2 Commerce 3 wages/labor 4 Self-employment 5- Remittances 6 Other

E2- Is remittances makes important part of your household income?

- 1) Yes 2) No

E3- In which country the family member emigrated?

- 1) states 2) Canada 3) Gulf 4) Scandinavia 5) North Europe 6) Africa 7) other

E4- What Kind of employment he has had there?

- 1) Labour 2) Professional 3) Government Deputation 4) Business 5) Other.....

E5 – In your opinion the employment patterns have seen changes in your family since last 15 years?

- 1) Yes 2) No

If yes then what is the most important reason?

- 1) Increase in wages at city 2) Increased connectivity 3) Increase in education attainment 4) other.....

Section 3- Dwelling details of Household.

1. What is the dwelling type?
Independent house / compound = 1 Apartment / flat = 2
Part of the large unit = 3 Part of a compound = 4 Other (specify.....) = 5

2. What is your present occupancy status?
Owner occupied (not self-hired) = 1 Owner occupied (self-hired) = 2 On rent = 3
Subsidized rent = 4 Rent free = 5

3. How many rooms does your household occupy, include bed rooms and living rooms?
(Do not count storage rooms, bath rooms, toilets, kitchen or rooms for business)

4. Does your household have? Yes =1 Yes, extension = 2 No = 3
A. Electricity connection . Gas connection Telephone connection

5. What is the main source of drinking water for the household?
Piped water = 1 Hand pump =2 Motorized pumping / Tube well =3 Open well = 4
Closed well = 5 Pond/Canal / River / Stream = 6 Spring = 7 Mineral water=8
Tanker /Truck/water bearer=9 Filtration Plant =10 Others (specify-----) = 11

Section 4(a) Durable Goods

Item	1) Yes 2) No	Quantity (model)	Market value of the owned good
1- Refrigerator			
2- Freezer			
3-Air conditioner			
4- Air cooler			
5- Fan (Ceiling, Table, Pedestal, Exhaust)			
6- Geyser (Gas, Electric)			
7- Washing machine/dryer			
8- Camera (Still)			
9- Camera (Movie)			
10- Cooking stove			
11- Cooking Range, Microwave oven			
12- Heater			
13- Bicycle			
14- Car / Vehicle			
15- Motorcycle/scooter			
16- TV			
17- VCR, VCP, Receiver, De-coder			
18- Radio / cassette player			
19- Compact disk player			
20- Vacuum cleaner			
21- Sewing/Knitting Machine			
22- Personal Computer			
23- Mobile			
24-Other			
Total			

Section 4 (b) Commercial/ Agriculture Property/assets

Type	Quantity	Taken on Rent/Lease (for last 6-12)	Market value (Rs)
Agriculture land			
Houses			
Shops			
Other commercial property			
Total			

Section 4© Income;-

Source	Income (Rupees)
Agriculture	
Livestock	
Shop	
Business (other than shop)	
Employment in GOV Sector	
Employment in Private Sector	
Rents	
Gifts/Remittances	
Sale of Property	
Total	

Section 5 a) Participation of Household in Voluntary organization

P1- Please respond to the question and pick the right choice that describe your participation most appropriately

Organization	Name of the organization	Active Member (2)	Inactive member(1)	Not member(0)
Political				
Social				
Religious/Charity				
Professional				

Section 5(b) Perception about social status of the household

P1- What is the caste of Household?

- 1) Gujjar 2) Jatt 3) Rajput 4) Syed 5) Kashmiri 6) Arian 7) Sheikh 8) Malik 9) Occupational castes 10) Others

P2- Are marriages in your family, generally, held in same caste?

- 1) Yes 2) No
If Yes Reason.....
If no Reason.....

P3- Is your household native or settled/migrated to this village?

- 1) Native 2) settler pre-partition (Kashmiris) 3) Settler post partition 4) Migrated from villages 5) Migrated from urban centers 6) Others (specify)
If migrated then name the district/village from where the household migrated

 ...

P4- Has the occupational structure of household members seen changes since last 15 years?

- 1) Yes 2) No
If yes then elaborate following (change) 1) Nature..... 2) Direction (R/U).....

P5- Do you see yourself better off socially now then last 15 years?

- 1) Yes 2) Slightly 3) Worse off 4) Remained same

P6- Do you see improvement in living standards of your household?

- 1) Slightly 2) Significantly 3) Living standards fell 4) No change

P7- Are you satisfied with your present living condition?

- 1) Completely satisfied 2) Significantly Satisfied 3) Marginally satisfied 4) Not satisfied

P8- Have your level of income increased since last 15 years?

- 1) Yes 2) No

If yes, do you feel yourself better-off now from then?

- 1) Yes 2) No

Reasons (If answer of last question is no.....
.....

Section 7 (a) Political Participation

PP-1 What is the level of Political participation of your Household?

- 1) High 2) Medium 3) Low 4) Low Participation

PP-2 Is your household remained political active round the year or in peculiar times?

- 1) Whole year 2) During elections 3) during the time of feud 4) Never

PP-3 Does your household vote regularly in elections?

- 1) Yes 2) yes but not regularly 3) No

PP-4 Who take decisions in voting matters in your household?

- 1) Family head 2) Independent 3) any other

PP-5 On what grounds usually in elections you vote?

- 1) Party 2) Dhara 3) Candidate 4) Ideology 5) Personal Interest 6) Other.....

(If the answer of last question is Dhara then ask) **What is the primary base around which dhara is formed?**

- 1) Biradri 2) Neighborhood 2) Class 3) Religion 4) Interest 5) Other

What is the primary reason of the formation of Dhara?

- 1) Rivalry 2) Prestige 3) Tradition 4) Fear 5) competition 6) Securing patronage 7) other.....

PP-6 Is faction only formed for elections or keep intact afterwards?

- 1) Active only during elections 2) Around the year 3) Infrequent

PP-7 Who is the head of your Faction in the village?

.....

PP-8. What is the economic background of the head of your faction?

- 1) Agriculture/Land 2) Government professional (salarial) 3) Business 4) other.....

PP-9. what is your relation with the head?

- 1) Equals 2) Subordinate 3) Other.....

PP-10. What are the pre-requisite characteristics for being a head of a faction

- 1) Higher social status 2) Wealth 3) Large family 4) Education 5) Good connections 6) Other

PP-11. How many factions are there in your village?

.....

PP-12. You have joined the faction because of/ for?

- 1) Security 2) Fear 3) interest 4) friendship 5) Rivalry 6) other.....

PP-13. the voting as you have practiced in local bodies for last 15 years

Elections	1. Did you vote?	3 Primary motives/reasons of voting to the candidate 1) Biradri 5) Other 2) Personal Interest 3) Neighborhood 4) Fear	Reasons for changing the vote (If vote has been changed) 1) Bad performance 2) Differences with local candidate 3) Other
2001			
2006			

PP-14 Are the voting practices for local and national level are same?

- 1) Yes 2) No

PP-15 Does the rival vote-blocks (factions) work the similar way in both elections?

- 1) Yes 2) No

(If no is the answer then ask) **What are the differences?**

.....1).....2).....

3).....4).....

Section 8 Democratic decentralization and local body elections (LBE) (forthcoming)

D-1. Do you believe that democratic decentralization will improve the delivery of social utilities?

- 1) Yes 2) No 3) Do not Know

D2. Will the local- bodies election would be competed in factional rivalry?

- 1) Yes 2) No 3) Do not Know (If yes Then ask next questions 2-5))

D3. What could be the foundation of factions (voting-blocks) in local elections?

- 1) Political Party 2) Biradri 3) Rivalry between different influential (UC level) 4) Religion 5) Other

D4-could be the basis of rivalry among different factions?

- 1) Political Party 2) Biradri 3) conflict of interest 4) former disputes 5) Other

D5-Factions (voting- blocks) would be formed? Three foremost reasons

- 1) Political Party 2) Biradri 3) Religion 4) influential 5) candidate 6) Safety from rivals 7) Prestige 8) show of power 9)
 1) 2) 3)

D-6 Who filed nomination as a candidate in a local election in your village?

- 1) Village influential 2) local functionary of a party 3) Relative of an MPA 4) Relative of MNA 5) Biradri head 6) Educated 7) Any wealthy 8) Other

D-7. What is source of income of the candidate?

- 1) Land lord 2) Business 3) Industrialist 4) Professional 5) Other

D-8 .What is the level of education of candidate?

- 1) Matric 2) Graduate 3) Masters and above

D-9.In your opinion why the candidates stand local in elections

- 1) To serve 2) Self-enrichment 3) to increase their clout 4) to sustain their power 5) to patronize their relatives 6) to take revenge for old rivalries 7) Other

D-10. In general how a candidate is evaluated by voters?

- 1) education 2) Integrity 3) wealth 4) influence 5) Biradri 6) Sect 7) religion 8) other

D-11. On what grounds candidates ask for votes?

- 1) Biradri 2) Religion 3) Performance 4) Political Party 5) any other

D-12. Are you satisfied with the recent demarcation of Union councils?

- 1) Yes 2) No

D-14 (If no) Then why?.....

D-13 .The factional struggle would impact the collective action?

- 1) Yes 2) No

D-14. If yes). Then would could be consequences?

- 1) clientelism would increase 2) distribution of funds would be biased 3) Political retribution 4) Increased rivalry 5) More fragmentation of village community 6) Other

D-15. In your opinion local bodies elections are the need of time?

- 1) Yes 2) No 3) Do not know

D-16 .The recent introduction of political parties in local elections is

- 1) Good 2) progressive 3) will help in reducing factional struggles 4) will not change anything 5) other

D-17. How this system can be improved?
.....

Appendix-IV

Village Questionnaire

Village

Union Council

Name of Respondent

Designation/occupation

	Part A Village Details	
1)	Population of the Village	
2)	Number of Households	
3)	Number of Voters	
4)	The population of village since last 15 years has decreased or increased	
5)	Three basic sources of livelihood in village (rank)	
6)	Approximately what is the share of household in village have off-farm primary source of income	
	About how much of the children in your village do not go to school (percentage/numbers)	

	How much far are these facilities from Village <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Bus stop b) Primary school c) Secondary School d) Basic health care Unit/Hospital e) Post Office f) Internet connectivity g) Gas h) Cable i) Police Station j) Doctor k) Market l) City 	Km
--	---	-----------

Social Structure

No	Caste	Sub caste	No of Households	Land owned	⁹⁴⁹⁵ Political Role
1)	Gujjar				
2)	Jatt				
3)	Kashmiri				
4)	Rajput				
5)	Syed				
6)	Malik				
7)	Other				

⁹⁴ 1) Dominant 2) Intermediate 3) Low

Section 3: History of political action

The results of Last three national elections						
	Provincial			National		
	Winner Party and caste	Runner up Party and caste	Margin	Winner Party and caste	Runner up Party and caste	Margin
2002						
2008						
2013						

Local
bodies
elections
social
and
political

statistics

Winner	Runner up
---------------	------------------

Elect ion	Cas te	Educa tion	Social status/ class	Inhabi tant of this village	Hold/belong to family any informal/official office e.g Numberdar/zaildar /Panchayat head	Tot al gain ed vot es	Cas te	Educa tion	Social status/ class	Inhabi tant of this village	Hold/belong to family any informal/official office e.g Numberdar/zaildar /Panchayat head	Vot es
2001												
2006												

Miscellaneous Questions

- 1- Since when this village is inhabited?
.....
- 2- Is this village dominated by migrants or locals?
.....
- 3- What are the reasons of domination?
.....
.....
- 4- Is migrant /local conflict present?
.....
- 5- Does it influence political action?
.....
- 6- If yes,How?
.....
.....
- 7- Does religion play any role in politics here?
.....
- 8- If yes then how?
.....
.....
- 9- In your opinion overall the living standards of people in your village has improved?
.....
- 10- If yes then in what respect?
.....
If no then why?
.....
- 11- Has occupational structure seen changes?
.....

If yes then reasons?

.....

12- Is still land is a source of power and prestige?

.....

13- How many of the working age individuals commute to other cities daily (percentage/numbers)

.....

14- How many of the working age individuals have emigrated from your village but still are sending money to home?

.....

.....

15- Are the ratio of inter-caste marriages has increased for last 15 years?

.....