

**WHY YOUTH JOINS MILITANCY? THE CASE OF  
MOHMAND AGENCY (FATA)**



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## List of Abbreviations

AI	Ansar ul Islam
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Awami National Party
APA	Additional Political Agent
APA	Assistant Political Agent
APMIA	All Pakistan Marble Industries Association
ASSP	Anjuman Sipha-i-Sahaba Pakistan
ASW	Ahli Sunnat Wal Jamat
CR	Collective Responsibility
CRC	Collective Responsibility Clause
DDR	Dis-armment, De-mobilization, Re-integration
Durand Line	The border line between Pakistan and Afghanistan
EFA	Education For All
FATA	Federally Administrated Tribal Area
FC	Frontier Corps
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
ISCS	Institute of Social and Cultural Studies
JUI	Jamiat Ulama i Islam
JUI-F	Jamiat Ulama i Islam-Fazal-Ur-Rehman
JUP	Jamiat I Ulama i Pakistan (Barelvi school of thought)
LeJ	Lashkar e Jhangvi
LeT	Lashkar e Tayyeba
LI	Lashkar I Islam
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Former NWFP)
MAF	Million acre feet
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal
MQM	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO	Muttahida Qoumi Movement
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PA	Political Agent
PAC	Per Capita Income
PCI	People's Aman Committee
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehrik I Insaf
PU	University of Punjab
ROZ	Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
FRs	Frontier Regions
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAFRON	Ministry of States and Frontier Regions
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Science

SSP  
ST  
TTA  
TTP  
UNO  
UNO  
USA

Sipah I Sahaba Pakistan  
Sunni Tehrik  
Tehrik I Taliban Afghanistan  
Tehrik I Taliban Pakistan  
United Nation Organization  
University of Nibraska Omaha  
United States of America

## **ABSTRACT**

This study assesses various factors responsible for pushing youth towards militancy in Mohmand Agency. Moreover, impact of collective responsibility (arrest, fine) on tribal youth was also assessed. To this end, primary data was used and a sample of 268 respondents was taken. Primary data was taken through questionnaire covering demographic information, educational background, literature, family, area & social background and legal system of FATA. According to the perceptions of the respondents, 92 percent of the respondents reported that lack of education is playing vital role in pushing militancy. About 68 percent responded that militancy was boosted by school closure and 87 percent responded that there is religious influence. However, 25 percent were of the view that militancy was boosted by religious education. Furthermore, 71 percent responded that militancy increased due to tense class relation while 87 percent thinks that militancy was contributed more by unemployment. More than 88percent were not satisfied with arrest under collective responsibility and 90 percent responded that fine imposed under collective responsibility is unfair. About 75 percent were of the view that local join militant due to injustice under collective responsibility and 72 percent were in favor of constitution's extension rather having FCR. Overall illiteracy was ranked high for increased militancy. Based on the results of this study, it is recommended that the local people should be educated to reduce the increasing trend of youth towards militancy. Government also needs to regulate both religious and non-religious literature to have more balanced and pluralistic society. FATA can't be handle with current poor governance and especially under the outdated laws like FCR. There is strong demand from local people for the extension of parliament legislation to FATA.



## Chapter-1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1: Background of the Study

One noticeable feature of recent armed conflicts is that many of the soldiers are youth. Youth defined under international law (UNESCO) as the ages of 15 and 24 years, while in some states its ranging from 15-35 (African Youth Charter). Hindustan Times (HT) reported that India is now facing an internal uprising in Kashmir rather former uprising that were backed by Pakistan, and termed it as homegrown militants. HT also tried to find out the causes of the local youth uprising that include poorly managed rehabilitation policy of the Indian government, attitude of Indian police and forces towards already surrendered militants and wide scale harassment of common masses (Haq, 2014). Humiliation (of religious emotions) and disgraced attitude are often considered main reason for the uprising among Kashmiris youth. “People generally feel pushed to the wall here, ‘said Khurram Parvez, an activist with rights group in Jammu & Kashmir whose grandfather was shot dead by security forces at a protest(Daniel, 2013).

American intelligence also warns of American youth joining Islamic State (ISIS) fighting in the Middle East to set up an Islamic caliphate (Trott, 2015).

The fundamental origins of Islamist extremism and militancy lie in the failure of the Muslim leadership and governments and other states with Muslim populations, to deliver jobs, justice and dignity to a growing army of young people. The economics, social and demographic indicator in Muslim countries is some of the worst in the world. Their societies are imbued with inequality and injustice (Akram, 2015).

Globally, an estimated 300,000 youth serve not only as combatants, but also as medics, laborers, cooks, domestics, bodyguards, spies and sex slaves. In post 2002 fighting in Liberia, children comprised nearly half of the soldiers (Dupuy, 2008). In Sierra Leone, where the war ended in 2001, nearly half of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers were children of whom 25 percent were girls (Novelli & Smith, 2011). In Columbia, children make up nearly half of some Guerrilla units. As recently, as 2 years ago, the Burmese Government forces exploited an estimated 50000 children as soldiers. Children are exploited as soldiers because in war zones, children are readily available, cheap and useful to troop-hungry commanders, who cloak their abuse of children. Commanders frequently prefer child soldier because they can be manipulated and terrorized and or often willing to accept the most dangerous assignments because they lack a full sense of their own mortality. Worldwide , there are over 500 million lightweight weapons such as the AK-47 assault rifle that enable even 10 year olds to be effective combatant. Easy access to technology had made it easy for children to know how to use these weapons. Movies and CD dramas are playing important role in shaping the social bonds for these sort of activities, where there is very less check and censorship (A. Ali, 2012).

## **1.2 Pakistan historical background**

Although terrorism and the involvements of youth in terror activities is a global phenomenon, but Pakistan face severe terrorism where young generation is used as a fuel in several horrific ways. Young teenagers are used for transporting explosive devices and carrying out suicide mission. They are brain washed in a way that they consider suicide as essential part of Islamic Jihad. Besides these activities they are used also by gangsters for gang war, robberies and thief purposes in major cities.

Pakistan's conflict history is very complex. On one hand, it faces conflict on the bases of ethnic diversion, and their history start right from its independence. The federal government failed to mainstream all ethnic groups in a national threshold. Due to these growing differences on the basis of ethnic issues and failing to address these issues timely, Pakistan lost its Eastern part (Bangladesh) in 1971. Since that, we did not learn from history and failed to merge small ethnic groups within the national main streamline, which is failing to accept diversity. That had led us again to the edge of another break-up, Baluchistan issue is the most highlighted and burning issue of modern day Pakistan, and its historical background is not very different from that of Bangladesh. There are two types of ethnic militancy in Pakistan.

i). First type of ethnic conflict is of the trust deficit between state and a specific ethnicity, for example the Baloch separatist issue emerged due to trust deficit between federal government and Baloch nationalist.

ii) Second type of ethnic conflict emerges between two different ethnicities for economic and political gain. That does emerge when state fails in coping people from different ethnic groups within the same basket. These issues are often exploited by political parties for their vested interests. Basic factors for both of these two type of ethnic conflicts are economic opportunities, political status etc.

Apart from this menace, Pakistan also faces the sectarian violence. Due to religious extremism and sectarian menace, Pakistan national integrity is facing severe threat. The civil and military top brass openly confessed that the internal conflict is more dangerous than the external threats. And that's why currently the civil and military top leadership jointly vow to fight against extremism on all odd.

### **1.3. Historical overview of FATA**

The tribal belt along the Pak-Afghan border is currently claimed as the epicenter of terrorist activities, and is dubbed as safe haven for militancy among the international community. Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) stretch over an area of almost 27220 square Km, covering round about 3 percent of the total geographic area of Pakistan. Geographically FATA is bordered with Afghanistan to the west, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the east and Punjab to the south-east and Baluchistan to the south. FATA comprise of 7 large agencies namely Bajur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, South and North Waziristan and 6 Frontier Regions (FRs) namely FR Kohat, FR Peshawar, FR Bannu, FR Tank, FR Lukka Marwat and FR DI Khan. According to 1998 censuses, FATA total population was about 3.1 million that's now about 6 million while some sources declare it as 7 million (Yusufzai, 2014). The estimated figure changes especially after the real number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from North Waziristan were counted in Bannu and other areas.

### **1.4. War on terror and its implications for FATA**

War on terror brought enormous humiliation for tribal people (Firdous, 2014). Majority of the Taliban remains came to these safe heavens so that to start a guerilla war against US-NATO led army. FATA because of its geographical isolation, difficult terrain and relatively stable coalition of militant groups, the region had become the most important hub of militancy in FATA, the presence and operation against militants caused local residents unimaginable suffering and humiliation”(Rehaman, 2014). Due to the ongoing operation against militant thousands people have been compelled to leave their home and now living in internally displaced peoples (IDPs) camps in different part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This is really humiliating for these people.

### **1.5. Blame Game between Pak-Afghan Governments**

Today, FATA is being called a cause and centre of militancy by many, not just in Pakistan but in the entire region (Laub, 2013). Both Pakistan and Afghanistan blame each other, that they are using tribal area against each other. Pakistan is blamed by NATO and Afghan government that it had sympathies for some militant groups that conduct attacks on USA-NATO allied forces and Afghan government installation in Afghanistan. While the Afghan government and the international community is blaming Pakistan for providing safe havens to militants in its FATA region, the government of Pakistan believes that the growing number of suicide attacks and other violent incidents have their roots in this tribal area (Sulaiman, 2008; Yusuf, 2014) . Meanwhile, the people of FATA feel that they are being subjected to killings and forcible displacements by all parties that include not only the US and NATO led forces but by the Pakistani army and the militant groups as well (Orakzi, 2009).

Termed as hub for Taliban activities (Bajoria & Masters, 2010; Nawaz & de Borchgrave, 2009), Time Magazine reported of a Summit of Terrorist in March 2004 in South Waziristan that was denied by Pakistani authority (News, 17 August, 2004). The statement from both side shows that this area is used by both countries, while the local people become sandwich between these two rivals. Many local people think that Pakistan has used this area as a buffer zone against the occupier in Afghanistan time to time.

### **1.6. Youth as a fuel for Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan (TTP)**

Now a day's youth take part very actively in conflict among state armed forces and militant in Pakistan. They are motivated by different factors and these factors are different among different factions of TTP. There are many of them who think that they have joined the right side to bring

Sharia in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. Some of them join taliban to gain power while some do it for money. They are very easy to train and brain washed. Both in Pakistan and Afghanistan young have been used widely but things goes worse when even young girl are used.

A 10 year Afghan girl was caught in Helmand province of Afghanistan wearing a bomb vest after she was convinced by her brother to carry out a suicide attack, police official said. Her brother was trained in Pakistan tribal area (Farmer, 2014). The Taliban opponents blame Taliban for using young male (mostly teenager) as fuel against US-NATO allied forces in Afghanistan. They have proof for such blames while referring to an eight year old boy who was ready for a suicide attack (Reilly, 2014). This is not the single case; they even blame Taliban for using women dress and burqas (shuttlecock) to deceive NATO forces and then attack them.

Pakistan is facing the same situation. Police here arrested many young ready for attacks, bomb blast and suicide mission. In Islamabad, police arrested a Taliban leader involved in training underage boys of Islamabad seminaries for suicide bombing and other terrorist activities, SSP Islamabad Police Tahir Alam Khan told media persons (SATP, 2009). These sort of trainees are hidden everywhere in Pakistan who trained those ready for their so called Jihad. In a similar case Islamabad police arrested 2 high profile terrorist in federal capital Islamabad, both of them belong to Ghazi Force and were accused of recruiting young men from Islamabad and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) (SATP, 2009). Teenagers is not an easy task to spot in, they can hide anywhere easily and can easily carry out attack on their target. A teen suicide bomber kills 31 at Pakistan army center in Mardan district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the boy was in school uniform (Guerin, 2004). In the very first stage they were attacking Pakistan military and paramilitary forces and then they expand their war even against common people by declaring them as infidels.

To kill maximum people they started attacking public places, markets, mosques and shrines. Shrines were declared as a prime source for polytheism. Umar Fidai, 18 year age, was one of the 3 suspects involved in Sakhi Sarwar shrine bomb blast in Dera Ghazi Khan (DG Khan) that kills 50 and wounded more than 100. Second suspect was a 16 year boy Ismail.<sup>1</sup> In similar way many shrines were attacked in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA including attacks on renowned poets Abul Rehman Baba tomb, Ajmal Khattak, Hamza Khan Shinwari shrine and a renowned saint known as kaka Saib shrine in Nowshera. In a similar move, in the very first stage of militancy, the militant captured the shrine of former freedom fighter against British regime, Haji Sahib Turangzai and was renamed as Lal Masjid; the incident took place right after Lal Masjid operation in 2007 (I. Ali, 2008b).

### **1.7. Factors that attract young's towards militancy**

Possible reasons that attract young generation towards militancy vary from country to country, but there are many similarities too. For example, broadly speaking, majority of the conflict rises due to 4 major factors, namely economic, political, social and security.

Dr. Muhammad Hafeez, professor and director of the Institute of Social and Cultural Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, attributed the child trade to a combination of factors but ranked poverty high among them. Parents who can't afford to send their children to good and modern day schools enroll them in such religious seminaries, he said (Ismaeel, 2011). Here two main reasons have been mentioned for joining militancy, poverty and lack of educational facilities. Here both look like dependent on each other and tells us that if there is poverty there will be illiteracy. In FATA poverty is higher as compare to rest of the Pakistan. Per capita income

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1. Ismaeel, T. (2011). Sakhi Sarwar attack: Bomber apologises to the nation. [The Express Tribune](#).

(\$250) is quite low (PCNA, 2010). Schooling facilities were low and the recent school destruction has made it much difficult for a common man to have education facilities at door step for his kids. This extreme poverty keeps away parents from enrolling their kids in school. The evidence provides enough from many Tehsils of Mohmand Agency where school have been destroyed constantly.

### **1.8. Frontier Crimes Regulation, the draconian rules & militancy**

Tribal area remained independent during British rule over Indian-sub-continent. To control this area, British Government imposed FCR so that to secure its trade with Afghanistan through local assistance. Help was sorted out from local elders in form of Khasadar's, a small remuneration used to pay to each Khasadar. In return, they used to protect trades routes and caravans.

When it comes to FATA the role of FCR cannot be ignored in illegal activities and extremist tendency. FCR had kept the local people deprived from their very basic rights since decades which pushed them to illegal activities to have their livelihoods, which can finally improve their financial status.

Collective Responsibility approach under FCR is used very largely for punishing the local people for a crime that they did not commit. Political Administration catch innocent people while the criminal run away. They seal their businesses, markets, catch their vehicles and ban their traveling that help in widening the gap between common masses and Political Administration. One of the most severe cases, under collective responsibility is the demolishing of houses that may compel local people to join illegal activities and thus can result in joining militants. That's why it is labeled as Draconian Law (Black law). Justice is denied under FCR described interestingly by (Rahmanullah, 2012), he says that FCR denied the basic rights of *appeal, wakeel*



(the right to legal counsel) and *daleel* (the right to present evidence). Political Agent can jail any person for 150 years maximum and can jail any one for 3 years without any reason. This type of illegal custody is humiliating to humanity (HRCP, 2005).

Here is a glimpse of FCR penalties section often describe as Collective Responsibility. Its section 4 of FCR that start from article 21 to 30, we must know that FCR consists total 64 different articles.

21. Blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribe.

22. Fines on communities accessory to crime.

23. Fines on communities where murder or culpable homicide is committed or attempted.

24. Recovery of fines.

25. Forfeiture of remissions of revenue, etc., in the case of communities and persons accessory to crime.

26. Forfeiture of public emoluments, etc., of persons guilty of serious offences or of conniving at crime.

27. Power to direct forfeiture.

28. Powers of Local Government saved.

29. Preparation to commit certain offences.

30. Adultery (FATA Reforms, February 21, 2013)

These sections have been discussed in detail in appendix section.

### **1.9. Emergence of TTP in FATA, especially in Mohmand**

After 9/11, international focus shifted to War on Terror globally and specially to Afghanistan and Pakistan. After Taliban fall in Afghanistan, many Taliban fighters entered Pakistan for safe shelters in tribal belt. Pakistan Tribal Belt (FATA) became the prime location for guerilla war

against US-NATO led forces. In 2007-08 Taliban sympathizers in Tribal Belt formed an umbrella organization called Tahrik Taliban Pakistan (Firdous, 2014).

Mohmand Agency total population by 2011 was about 600,000 living in its 7 tehsil including Ekkaghund, Ambar, Prang Ghar, Ghalanai, Pandialai, Khwezai-Baizai and Safi. The Agency is further divide into 2 main region; Upper Mohmand and Lower Mohmand (ASWED, 2013).

In Mohmand Agency Taliban movement started in July 2007, right After Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation in Islamabad. Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) religious leaders tried to impose Sharia (Islamic Law) in the capital of the country. In Mohmand, first of all they captured the shrine of famous anti-colonialist fighter, Haji Sahib Turangzai (whose real name was Fazli Wahid) and declare it as Lal Masjid and announced that a small Madrassa will be established called Jamia Hafsa in memory of those who lost their lives in Lal Masjid operation. Commander Umar Khalid Khurrasani (real name Abdul Wali Safi belong to famous Pashtun tribe Safi) is leading the Taliban since 2007 uprising(I. Ali, 2008a; Rehman, 2011). In 2008 he defeated the rival Taliban commander Shah Khalid also known as Shah Saib of Lashkar i Tayyeba (The fight was also named as Sunni-Akhli Hadith conflict) though denied by Umar Khalid Khurasani.

Due to ongoing conflict in Tribal Area, both forces and militant are using school and colleges as hideouts against each other, in most cases first they destroy these institutions and then they use it for fighting. Due to this situation, thousand of tribal students are unable to continue their study, now many of them choose to study as private students, especially those who can afford. Some families have migrated to the nearby districts of KP living in IDPs camps or with their relatives. But still due to school closure many students are unable to continue their studies. Due to school closure, many young spend their spare time in militant activities, and further that can be used for

war both side of the boarder. Unrest has been increased due to spread of militant ideology and FATA has been used as a hub and sanctuary for all these activities. While military intervention have been failed so far, there is a dire need of policy shift towards FATA (Fiaz, 2012).

### **1.10. Economic Factors role in militancy**

FATA faces challenges of peace and stability that could have led to economic development and wellbeing of the local people inhabiting the area. Sustaining peace does not mean only an end to ongoing fighting and a political agreement but also social and economic development. Economic factors plays vital role in having education opportunities, as we know that Pakistan is a developing country, we need investment almost in each and every sector, education sector is one of them, the most important one.

Here in FATA generally and in Mohmand Agency particular job opportunities are very limited due to low literacy rate and then competition from well-qualified people from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Local educated people (that is minor portion of the population) are contesting with strong bureaucracy and dual domicile holder of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Some people also join armed forces (FC, Levies, and Army etc). Education together with jobs availability, health facilities and quick justice can contribute to Peace-building. Due to school closure in Tribal belt (FATA), and migration from their home towns, young school boys were seeking for jobs mostly as a daily wagers so that to lessen burden on their parents though there is no accurate record of these people. Many of them start small businesses (vender, fruit/ vegetable seller) in major cities.

In Mohmand Agency agriculture sectors has very low contribution to the economic wellbeing of the local people due to lack of irrigation water/canal system. The proposed Munda Dam is capable of irrigating its uncultivated land but due to national politics on dam, its construction is

getting very late. Its estimated cost is US \$1401mn while 15,100 acre area can be irrigated through its water channel (WAPDA, 2012). Munda Dam Project will store 1.29 million acre feet (MAF) of water for irrigation, while power generation capacity stands at 740 mega watt (MW), contributing about 2.4 billion units of electricity to the national grid every year. Benefits of the project have been estimated at Rs 20.2 billion per annum (News, 2012)<sup>2</sup>. This would be a multi-purposes project, power generation is its core aim and will contribute 740 MW to national grid, and second this dam will protect Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from floods and will provide water for irrigation purposes to uncultivated areas of Mohmand Agency.

### **1.11. Social Factors and militancy**

Social factors also play key role in development of every society. After independence of Pakistan, there was a movement in tribal area that use to support the idea of Pakhtunistan, due to that movement local elder start opposing Government school, public building and developmental work from Federal Government. But there is a significance change in the mindset of the people now and the literacy rate both for men and women have been increased as latest survey of Pakistan Education Atlas shows that that number of student reaching from Primary to Middle has been increased in Pakistan, and specially in FATA where the number jumped from 44 percent in 2010 to 61 percent in 2013 beating Sind and Baluchistan (59 percent) but the literacy rate was high before 2000<sup>3</sup>. The religious factor is still strong but has less opposition for education now though they stress more on Religious education. Education can play both roles, as a peace catalyst as well as root for catering fuel to conflict and this is called two faces of education.

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<sup>2</sup> Dawn News, November 06<sup>th</sup>, 2012

<sup>3</sup> See details in Pakistan Education Atlas, 2013

### **1.12. Problem Statement**

FATA is a conflict endemic area with periodic outbreaks of violence since 2002. Mohmand Agency saw an outbreak of violence right after 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation. Due to school destruction many students were unable to continue their studies. Due to less economic activities in the area, many young were wasting their time in bad companies. Religious sentiments were strong in the area, and that's why many young were inspired by militants. Young were the prime target for militant recruitment, for this purpose, militants in the very first stage targeted local elder. These people joined Taliban for many reasons, though, according to them, the prime reason was to support an Islamic uprising in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A comprehensive study was needed therefore to explore many important issues related to youth and to find out the reason that attracted young towards militancy in tribal area of Pakistan. Most of the militants are either young men from the tribal area or outsiders from other parts of the country, mostly belonging to banned militant organizations operating in Kashmir (I. Ali, 2008b)

The literature available on legal status of the tribal area in Pakistan (nature of militancy and education role) was sorted out along with research articles, newspapers etc. Educational data was taken from Education office in Mohmand Agency and some secondary sources (Educational Atlas of Pakistan). The data was obtained on number of total schools before conflict, destroyed school and the number of effected students.

### **1.13. Aims in conducting the research**

This research aims to find out different motives that shape youth tendencies towards militancy. These reasons were broadly divided into 4 main categories, economic, political, social and

security. The research will further provide brief suggestion that how to mainstream these young that is falling prey to militants.

Several factors point to the value of such research. First of all, FATA is still governed under the draconian law of FCR. Secondly, there is almost no research done on armed conflict in tribal context of Mohmand Agency from FCR's collective responsibility perspective. It is also important to know the effect of educational facilities, socio-economic condition and political exclusion on tribal youth and trend towards militancy.

There was also a need to check the differences in opinion regarding militancy in youth vs elders and literate vs. illiterate. For this purpose, interviews were conducted almost equally and randomly.

#### **1.14. Objectives of the study**

The study aimed to extend literature on the following

1. This Study will try to determine the different factors/ motives that the local people deem responsible for pushing youths toward militancy.
2. The study will try to explore local people views about some aspects of FCR that are generally thought as militancy enhancing rather its curbing among the youth.

This study will help us to find the possible solution that would help policy makers in solution of present and future conflicts within a tribal context, that's mostly ignored in Pakistan.

### **1.15 Hypotheses**

- Family income, family background, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, religious and sectarian education contribute to militancy.
- Collective responsibility play important role in the ongoing militancy.

This study helped us to find the possible solution that would help policy makers in solving the issues related to our youth that eventually lead them to militancy. Questions were asked from different angles so that to cover one factors from different dimensions. In income portion; questions were asked about total family income, sources of income. In family background related we asked questions about respondent's family enmity if any in the past, joining of militants to secure his family type questions were asked. Role of poverty was inquired through questions like role of financial constraints in pursuing education. I tried to find out that whether it is just education that can help us in shaping our young towards a positive direction or even type of education matters. Role of religious factors was figure out through questions like influence of religion and religious slogan on local people, presence of sectarian issues, contribution of sectarian issues to militancy, connection between religious education and contents/ literature of Madrassah in militancy.

Study tried to evaluate the impacts of collective responsibility on tribal people generally and youth specially. This portion include question on awareness about FCR, arrest under collective responsibility (CR), status of the arrested one, satisfaction from CR, fine imposed on tribe, lack of justice under CR and non extension of constitution to FATA.

## **1.16. Thesis Organization**

The thesis begins with an introduction to historical background on armed conflict, the reaction of youth to militancy and its factors. Then it is followed by literature reviews of armed conflict and their consequences, schooling, economic depravity and other component of social exclusion. Furthermore, the thesis explains the details of the research methodology, analysis of results and discusses the important findings of the study.

This study material organized in five chapters, the outline of which is as follows.

### **Chapter 1: Background of study**

In this chapter information on status of armed conflict had been discussed from a global perspective. Further background of area of study and origin of FCR, role of economic depravity and availability of educational facilities is discussed. In last part of the chapter, problem is stated and objectives are framed to address this problem.

### **Chapter 2: Literature review**

In this chapter, legal status of the tribal people, role of illiteracy and educational facilities in construction of a society, and other social catalyst have been analyzed with the purpose of gaining a more detailed enlightenment of their causes and consequences, particularly with regard to the affected population. It also highlights the deficiency in academic literature, related data and material regarding CR role in breeding militancy.



### **Chapter 3: Research Methodology**

Details of the research methodology are provided in this chapter. It discusses the theoretical framework of the research; methods used and the reasons for choosing the methods and their application; and the research process such as the sampling procedure and the analysis of the data.

### **Chapter 4: Results and Discussion**

This chapter presents qualitative data of the local people and their perceptions about the current scenario. Categories were developed from qualitative data regarding Mohmand's social status generally and access to essential educational services offered by the public sector specially. It also examines barrier to justice under FCR, and its contribution to militancy.

### **Chapter 5: Conclusion**

This chapter brings together the findings of the research with the evidence of the educational facilities, political and other social needs of the local people. This is followed by discussion and arguments regarding the findings of the research and their support in the literature. Further limitations of the study and insights for relevant research are explored. Chapter last section concludes the argument by formulating recommendations for the Pakistani Federal government in order to improve educational systems, extend parliament legislations to FATA for future's perspective.

## **Chapter-2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The literature has been reviewed so that to find out the causes and drivers that force or attract youth to militancy from the available literature and then check it whether it is applicable to Pakistan's militant history or not? Efforts have been made to find out the gap between international conflict and Pakistan's conflict, reason that have not been discovered. Focus was especially given to education sector and its possible role in getting rid of militancy or fueling conflict, also the role of FCR specially its section collective responsibility was critically analyzed so that to find out its contribution to militancy. There are so many commonalities between Pakistan and other countries conflict. Among them drivers of the conflict are found in many cases close to each other including economic background, political awareness, security, social structure of the society and most importantly, access to the education.

Pakistan has been facing high levels of violence around sectarianism, ethnicity, global politics as well as domestic, extreme poverty, domestic abuse, drugs and other criminal activities—in almost all areas but particularly in Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), Provincially Administrated Tribal Area (PATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Baluchistan, Karachi, Lahore and other urban centers (Mustafa, 2013).

The fundamental origins of Islamist extremism and militancy lie in the failure of the Muslim leadership and governments and other states with Muslim populations, to deliver jobs, justice and dignity to a growing army of young people. The economics, social and demographic indicator in Muslim countries is some of the worst in the world. Their societies are imbued with inequality and injustice (Akram, 2015)

An understanding of why young male joins armed groups was necessary for the construction of well-informed means of preventing their engagement as a soldier. In the post conflict scenario, a high priority is to reintegrate former soldiers into society, reducing their propensity to use violence as a means of meeting their wants and continuing vicious cycles of violence. Here we are referring to the formula of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-belligerents; that is widely used now a day's globally (Unesco, 2011).

Peace is not just simply the absence of war as defined by a school of thought but it's actually the availability of justice and equal access to resources and opportunities .If we study any conflict deeply around the globe, we have many clear approaches that identify Security, Political, Economic and Social factors as key drivers for any conflict, although among its key element education and political maturity of the masses are more important, that is fueling the process. And that's why we have tried to reach the roots of the conflict, which is lack of education/ educational institution. These drivers are actually a systematic method to understand conflict complexity in a very simple way.

In case of FATA, though we talk about many other factors, but actually these may be the key ones that lead young to join militancy. We will discuss them broadly as well in the context of FATA. Here first we will talk about the security issues and then we will elaborate other factor one by one. FATA; because of its geographical isolation, difficult terrain and relatively stable coalition of militant groups, the region had become the most important hub of militancy in FATA, the presence and operation against militants caused local residents unimaginable suffering and humiliation”(Rehaman, 2014).

Today, FATA is being called a cause and centre of militancy by many, not just in Pakistan but in the entire region (Laub, 2013). Meanwhile, the people of FATA feel that they are being subjected to killings and forcible displacements by all parties that not only the US and NATO led forces but by the Pakistani army and the militant groups as well (Orakzi, 2009).

The relationship between education, militancy and peacekeeping in the post war scenario of a society has received greater attention over the last half century, both in policy and academic context. Much of the today's literature on education and conflict focuses narrowly on the two faces of education – namely, that education can prevent militancy, but also can foster extremism and violent militancy – and education as service delivery, and resultantly neglects the complex relationship between education, state building and society-building and how education can contribute to broader social changes and pluralism that insure a sustainable peace (Novelli & Smith, 2011).

Education has a two way impacts on conflict and peace building, it can fuel the conflict and it can reduce the conflict, everything of the two cases is possible. It depends how state and other international agencies want to affect the local scenario. (Spink\*, 2005) reveals that there are many factors accountable for the lack of positive impacts of education on peace building that consist much politicized text book/curriculum and less educated/untrained teachers that contribute in provoking deep ethnic/religious hatred. He stressed on the transformation of textbook/curriculum towards more liberal, wholehearted and pluralistic views. Many of us don't understand the two faces of the same picture and that's why we often choose one side of the picture that best fit our desires. For instance, the interpretation of the Quran verses plays a vital role. The hate in disguise of Jihad's literature that was penetrated well into the society left hardly a single section of the society unaffected (A. Ali, 2012). Hate literature can play role in

widening the gap between different classes of society that often bring destruction to the society. It has always prevented from establishing a pluralistic society.

Dr. Muhammad Hafeez, attributed the child trade to a combination of factors but ranked poverty high among them. Parents who can't afford to send their children to good and modern day schools enroll them in such religious seminaries, he said (Ismaeel, 2011). The Taliban opponents blame Taliban for using young male (mostly teenager) as fuel against US-NATO allied forces in Afghanistan. They have proof for such blames while referring to an eight year old boy who was ready for a suicide attack (Reilly, 2014)

Famous German Philosopher Bentham says "Each and every human action is motivated by the desire to achieve as much pleasure and avoid as much pain as possible". So, according to German Philosophers there are two main factors that drive human beings to achieve his desires, that to get maximum pleasure and less pain, to achieve these two, the man can go wild and violent. So violence is not a very new phenomenon, rather, it's an old one since the human being was created. Aggressive nature will lead to the violence; and further violence is the road towards Terrorism, this violence can be different according to the situation and according to societal condition.

In conflict scenario, it has been observed that in the very first stage, the armed men from each side will attack the educational system and building. Alan Smith (2011) found that education is the key to peace building, he expresses his concerns that in the very beginning educational institutes are attacked and is of the opinion that Education must not harm the society and it must lead to peace building, that's the difference that a society need. By education not harming the society he means that it must play its positive role, that's avoiding fueling the already established gap between different classes (ethnic, religious, sectarian, linguistic) in the same society (Smith

Ellison & Smith, 2012). He suggested us to have a look on the positive side of the education rather than fueling hatred through sources of a noble cause.

This sort of literature (literature full of hate content) is produced to provide fuel (Young) for the conflicts through brainwashing them and further prepare ground for the conflict. Afghanistan has a long history of becoming a battle field for super powers, to make long term impact on the region, first of all they target education sector. The refining of a new set of books for Afghan was supported by the US through the assistance of the University of Nebraska Omaha (UNO). Originally established in 1972, UNO participated in an exchange program with Kabul University (Gundara & Jones, 1994). These books were full of hate for communism, for example books were consist on such questions, how many communist you can kill with a single bullet?

According to a report prepared by The Washington Post Investigator ( 23<sup>rd</sup> March, 2002) ,over the past two decades the US had spent millions of dollars producing extremist and fanatical schoolbooks, which were then distributed in the Afghan educational Institute. These fanatical books were developed in the early 1980s under a USAID grant to the University of Nebraska-Omaha, and the center for Afghanistan Studies. The contents, which were all about Jihadist Context and were featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then as Afghanistan school system's core curriculum. This was one of the core reasons for Afghanistan to fail as a pluralistic country, where only Pashtoon were given more coverage as an ethnicity further supported by Sunni factor.(Goodhand, 2002) also refers to that, that aid have been used for promoting violence in Afghanistan.

Many countries use education for their own vested interest; they fail to understand that this is the first step to ensure long term peace. (Buckland, 2005) characterizes education as; Educational

programming in post-conflict societies cannot be dealt as usual business. Education has a critical role to play in the reconstruction of the society, from building peace and social cohesion to facilitating economic recovery and getting the country into an accelerated development track. Thus, economic development is possible only by focusing more on education side so that to bring changes in the mindset of ex combatant.

More recently, the focus has shifted from ‘education in emergencies and humanitarian responses’ to the role of education in preventing the relapse into war and establishing a long-lasting peace in the post- conflict scenario (Tebbe, 2006). UN agencies have started to recognize the role that education plays in the less secure environment in which post-conflict peace building processes take place (Selenica, 2012). To achieve the goal of long lasting peace, economic developments have to be incorporated with education and political awareness.

Another stream of existing literature has examined the way through which educational opportunities and access affect the probability of the restart of the conflict and relapse of young into war, here success has been measured in terms of enrollment rates, and the focus has been on the quantity of education (Selenica quoted in Dixon, 2009; Ishiyama & Breuning, 2012:8). Literacy rate is universally calculated for population above 10 years of age. In Pakistan 37 percent of the population over 10 years is literate. However, population between 10 to 18 which is about 18 percent of the total population is about 50 percent literate due to sharp increase in enrollment rate in recent years (A. H. Khan & Mahmood, 1997).

The gloomy situation of FATA suggests that we have to enroll more and more student because many people blame illiteracy for ongoing conflict and its true in the case of the tribal area. Though for critical analysis one need to be educated more so that he can understand the myth not

just from surface, but he must have the ability to do in-depth analysis. This is one of the methods one can pass knowledge to others too about a specific issue. There is a common assumption that a higher level educational facilities access can boost peace and is necessary for durable and long term peace, but this assumption is challenged by several researchers (Retamal & Aedo-Richmond, 1998). As far as tribal areas are concerned this assumption could be proven true because majority of the militants are illiterate. In case of Mohmand Agency, Umar Khalid Khurasani doesn't have formal education, but he had worked as a journalist. So if the leader is illiterate, it is not compulsory for the follower to be an educated one.

According to a new report about 7 million children are out of Primary school in Pakistan. According to Political Administration of Khyber Agency, 25000 children are out of school only in 2 Tehsil of Jamrud and Landi Kotal (Masud, 2012) while situation in Bara is worse due to school closure since 2009.

As far as FATA is concerned, it has encouraging results in terms of students making it to the Middle level from Primary; in 2010 the number was 44 percent that reached now to 61 percent that's better than Sindh and Baluchistan Primary to Middle ratio (59 percent) (World Food Programme, 2013).

Education plays a pivotal role in underpinning human rights and non-violence issues, transformation in a political environment, socioeconomic recovery and reform specially related to security, quick and timely justice and policy making (Hasan, 2012). Illiteracy and lack of employment opportunities become one of the main causes of youth joining militancy where they can have what they cannot get in their daily life. Youth are not the prime target of violent extremists but the neglected and marginalized classes of the society also join these radical



extremist groups to get prestige and save their unique ideology and identity (Chaudhry & Wazir, 2012).

Even in FATA, the peace movements, if any, were started by educated people, whether it's on social media or other means. Aman Tahrik (Peace Movement) and TNC (Tribal NGOs Consortium) both started works to bring peace in Pakhtunkhwa belt. Due to the significance of the education both militant and armed forces started invading these institutions. Cause they were aware that only illiterate people can serve them in a better way, while an educated mind can give you more awareness and can understand the whole scenario in a better way as compare to illiterate or less educated. The Young generation will transfer their experience to the new and next generation, so that they could learn from their experience and past history, the situation for next generation may be horrible or better, both are possible, depend on young generation that how they react to the current scenario. So if we provide maximum chances for peace building in Tribal Belt, it will bring fruit at some point, maybe in the long term. Education is termed as key to developmental activities that can help to tackle the destruction caused by war, moreover education is also key to reach all other MDG's (Millennium Developmental Goals) that include health, nutrition, gender equality, child survival, environment and poverty reduction (Ashdown, 2011).

Different studies suggest that a pluralistic society can help the society to develop a responsible civic sense and bridge the gap between different social groups / class, which is giving stress on pluralistic approach and highlighting the mutually shared and common interest between two different groups (sectarian and ethnic basis). Giving importance of education in peace building efforts associate it with the awareness that education has the power of finding a solution and overcoming socio-economic inequalities, disparities and imbalances of power, giving more opportunities to education sector and development, promoting a curriculum that avoids

discrimination and restoring judiciary that insure quick justice and equity (Wedge, 2008). UNESCO (2011) stresses more on the rising role of education in peace building and stress on giving priority to inclusive educational interventions from the very first stage in the entire process. Though there is disagreement from the World Bank, which prioritizes security and adult franchise right (voting right) and keep education in the middle rather than on first priority like UNESCO, this also shows that there is a big gap between international actors regarding their concept towards the same issue. Though there might be disagreement about timing and sequence of educational programming, but there is strong agreement that large scale reforms without early attention to social sector are not enough to maintain long term peace. Study finds out that long term peace building need to involve earlier with social and educational reform and special attention must be paid to the contribution of education for social change/ social transformation (Jones, 2007).

We can't deny the role of the proper education system. High literacy rate is important for any nation to reach at the peak of socioeconomic development and prosperity. Unfortunately, the literacy rate in FATA is the lowest in the country, rooted from economic depravity and escalated poverty in the tribal region well-incorporated by the draconian rules. According to a current education atlas, the overall literacy rate in FATA is hardly 17 percent or more and the ratio of male illiteracy is almost 82 percent and for the female it is 97 percent (PRDS, 2011). Moreover, the current wave of militancy in the region has further worsened the attainment of education in FATA by destroying schools. According to a report, in 2013 more than 480 schools have been destroyed, depriving almost 50 thousands children in FATA from further schooling (Madni, 2013).

Though there is a lack of communication between policy and practice in real world and academic one, both are unable to work jointly. Through the policy of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) we can merge these former combatants in our society. Then we have to educate them. We can't deny education role in constructing a healthy society and peaceful environment for its resident. Pakistan needs to follow the Saudi and Swiss model here (Educational and practical technical and non technical training) to curb radical thinking in their midst in its very first stage, so for it is following the said model. This will highlight the role of these sort of institutes in peace building and reducing the gap between two different extreme. Famous American jazz singer Carlos Santana saying will be perfect to post here.

***'Peace has never come from dropping bombs. Real peace comes from enlightening and educating people to behave more in a divine manner'***

Once the gap established in the society between different groups, someone have to fulfill that vacuum. Society is a cluster of people with different thoughts and opinions and their priorities are also different from each other. When the conflict starts in a society, people who had a dislike or hatred for other segment of the society start joining the opponent groups. They are motivated by different aims and objectives. First of all we need to understand the drivers that push youth to join the conflict; these may be different and vary from case to case and region to region. Mansur Khan Mahsud (2012) found that in Tribal Belt the drivers are different and 150 groups are active under an umbrella in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA among them only 116 are operating in FATA but still there are differences between these groups and that's very clear from their activities against each other. Then we have to study the possible educational and political intervention that can help while addressing/mediating these drivers.

These drivers that attract young to join militant are differ among different people. For some people it was a strategy to outset, American from Afghanistan. While some people join these militant for enforcing Sharia in Pakistan. Mansur Khan Mahsud (2012) says that some people were driven by other factors like poverty, fame, power. Like, Anwar from TTP Orakzai. Anwar Alias (Mama Group) is headed by Anwar, 37 years old. He belongs to a poor family in Ghaljo Orakzai. He just passed middle class education and has very limited knowledge of Islamic Sharia. He is not a Madrassa graduate. Before joining TTP, he was involved in robberies, theft and car snatching to earn his livelihood. He joined TTP in 2007 and was declared as Head of TTP in 2008. He never fought against US-NATO forces in Afghanistan but involved in waging war against Pakistani military forces and government installation. He did not join Taliban of his religious zealot against American forces nor was he interested in enforcing Sharia Law. He is more interested in increasing his stature, power so that to earn more money (Mahsud, 2012).

Worldwide, an estimated 300,000 young serve not just as combatants but also as medics, laborers cooks, domestics, bodyguards, spies and sex slaves. In post 2002 fighting in Liberia, children comprised nearly 50 percent of the soldiers (Dupuy, 2008).

In contemporary world history, ethnic heterogeneity in a society is a usual phenomenon. All multiethnic societies like Pakistan confront with the problem of accommodating various ethnic groups. The issue becomes more severe when these ethnic groups owe allegiance to their own ideology and philosophy. The continuous tussle and hate among them not only a cause of national security dilemma but also proved a constant threat for the prosperity of the nation and progress of the state once it reaches its peak, which is armed conflict (Javaid & Hashmi, 2012).

Pakistan also faces the sectarian issues of Shia Sunni. 1979 marked the Shia uprising in Iran and consequently it started pouring to other neighboring countries. To counter this expansion in Pakistan, some Sunni extremist groups came into being and started armed resistance to this growing population of Shia Muslim. Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi of JUI-(F) founded Anjuman Sipha-i-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP) in 1985, later renamed as Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in Jhang. It was the very first organized Sunni Party with an overt objective to defend the honor of Sahaba (RA) and counter what Maulana Jhangvi perceived as the increasing Shia activism impressed by Iranian Shia leader's revolution. (Ahmar, 2009).

Shia extremist entities include Hizbullah, Mehdi Militia and Hydri Taliban. The major Sunni militant group includes TTP active under Fazl Saeed Haqqani and Haqqani Network. Fazl Saeed parted away from his former group and formed Tehrik e Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP) (Chaudhry & Wazir, 2012). The nature of armed conflict varies from one district to district (agency) in tribal belt. Along with insurgency, drone intrusion and military offensive, sectarian tussles are also the major causes contributing to violence throughout tribal belt (Abbasi, 2014). This is unjust if we talk about militancy in tribal area and does not discuss FCR and its role in militancy, we specially highlighted the role of section 21 to 30 (Collective Responsibility) of FCR.

To maintain long term peace/cease fire (sustainable peace) and starts developing works is one of the intervention called Hybrid Governance (Private sector operation under public sector supervision). Hybrid governance is termed as important for keeping peace building for long term and that's why (Unicef, 2011) has termed joint effort as a key to unlock the full potential of education to act as a force for peace. In case of FATA, there is a lack of joint effort between government and Non-Government Organization for restoring peace, some people declare it as mistrust between two. In this research the assumption is that that an understanding of the

relationship between education and post conflict scenario is important for healthy education and interventions for Peace building (UNDP, 2003).

To control tribal people without direct ruling them, the British came to know that tribal elders are more powerful and they (British) got that point very quickly. These tribal chiefs (Maliks) were incorporated by the British regime into the legal framework to guarantee peace, stability and governability in this region. This is how the concept of clause “collective responsibility” was emerged and introduced into FATA under FCR. The responsibility under this law solely lies on the shoulder of the tribal elders, notables and Government jobs holder, making them responsible and liable for every act committed by his tribe men (A. K. W. a. M. Z. Khan, 2014). FCR consists of total 6 chapters and 64 articles. The most notorious are article 21-30 called CR clause.

FATA enjoys a special constitutional status. The area falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government, which appoints the Governor (of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) as its agent who is the Chief Executive of the FATA. Twelve members of the National Assembly from FATA are elected on an adult franchise basis since 1997. But, unfortunately, whereas they can formulate legislation for the rest of the country, they cannot legislate for their own people and FATA; it is quite disgusting (Orakzi, 2009).

After independence back in 1947, when Pakistan become a sovereign state, the special status of FATA was kept intact under Articles 246-247 of the 1973 constitution under PPP led Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government. No efforts were ever made to make amendments to Frontier Crimes Regulation and the hegemonic role of the hereditary circle of tribal elders or tribal Malik, to enhance the poor level of political maturity, human rights degradation, socio-economic uplift in

this least developed, neglected and marginalized tribal belt of our country (A. K. W. a. M. Z. Khan, 2014).

Article 247 of the 1973 constitution is an obstacle in legislation as it obstructs the elected MNAs from tribal area to legislate on behalf of their own people, thus FATA MNAs sit there just for having funds to fulfill their vested interests. Moreover, under this Article the higher courts cannot extend their jurisdiction to the FATA. In this case, the political parties' act of 2002 is useless as the tribal people do not have any decision making right. This is exclusive approach, and will never benefit FATA until a holistic approach. The viable means of sensitizing governance and development is through the incorporation of the local concerns into planning and implementation process, this study is a sincere attempt to inform those debates that desire a greater understanding of the aspiration of tribal people, and the possible opportunities for local ownership of programs (Shinwari, 2012b).

Article 104 (1956) of the constitution authorizes the President with administrative power over FATA and the governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa being as representative to president exercises the executive authorities in the tribal belt (A. K. W. a. M. Z. Khan, 2014).

According to article 247 of the 1973 constitution, parliament has no power to legislate for FATA and FATA is also denied access to court under this act. Only the president can extend any law if he thinks it suits FATA. 2011 reforms in the FCR Confirm the access to courts for tribal people through a tribunal. The reforms specify that the membership of the Tribunal must consist of chairman who has been a civil servant and must be at least BPS-21 knowing about FATA administration and the remaining two members out of whom one is supposed to be qualified enough to be a high court judge and supposed to be familiar with the local customs/culture and the third one should be civil servants at BPS-20 (A. K. W. a. M. Z. Khan, 2014).

To mainstream FATA, reforms were introduced by Musharaf government in 2002 for local government system, but they were unable to execute it practically and properly. Local governments were established in 2004 that existed just for a few months and were dissolved very soon. Though there was no election for these local government bodies (LGB), they were selected among the tribal elders (also known as Malik) (Zahra, 2014).

FCR is one of the root causes deemed responsible for less development and the rapid growth in poverty in the tribal regions. FATA is still one of the least developed regions in Pakistan, with only 40 percent of its population living above the poverty line of \$2 per day and the unemployment rate is almost 70 percent plus. Similarly, 38percent population had no access to electricity. Though agriculture sector is one of the main sources of livelihood for the local tribesmen, but still 93 percent of the total area is not cultivable (SDP, 2006).

Worst part of the daily life for the locals of FATA is to face and having access to an independent and reliable judiciary as the local political Administration of tribal belt exercises all judicial Powers, serving as the final judge for providing justice in all cases, includes cases where he himself is guilty. Therefore, more amendments are the need of the hour to be introduced relating to the extension of jurisdiction of Higher Courts to the tribal belt (Mohmand, 2014).

Engineer Tor Gul Chamkani believes that FCR is mostly against human rights. Under article 21 to 26, collective responsibility is a part of it. Tribal people are Pakistani citizens, but under the article 247 (that gives power to President/Governor of the country to extend any law to FATA/PATA if they wish so) (Mohmand, 2013), FATA people are denied all kinds of civic and basic human rights. Through reform in FCR we also need to change the constitutional status of FATA. There are three suggestions. One is that majority people of the area want a separate province. Some of them want integration with KPK. While some other suggests and favors a



FATA Parliamentary council. We can solve this issue by holding a referendum in FATA about its future status. Collective responsibility affected education; PA receives money to grant a school to a Malik of his choice. The Malik appoints his own people in the school and then this school is used as a farm house or an inventory store. Same is the case with hospitals. In the present scenario the ongoing operations in FATA has closed the doors of education and progress in the whole region (Mohmand, 2014).

“Ideological recruitment is few; most of the reasons (for recruitment) are related to economic and political marginalization” (International Crises Group, 2009). It clearly indicates that there is no single reason to incite violence, instead it’s a basket of different reasons.

In first 5 years of Musharraf Government, some economic reforms were introduced in tribal belt for the economic uplift of the local people. For instance, the industrial areas were exempted from the jurisdiction of CR to industrialize in the tribal region, but still it lacks practical execution. To boost rapid industrialization, in 2005, the American government under President Bush Administration also proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) for the economic well-being of the region as 80percent of the economy of FATA has been destroyed due to war on terror since 9/11. But up till now, no practical measures have been taken for the establishment of ROZ in FATA. In a similar move, in 2006, Musharraf administration in collaboration with American government and other international stakeholder started a sustainable development program to better off the socio economic condition of the tribal people. \$2.46 billion dollars were fixed for almost one decade sustainable development program with five years of actual development following by four year of consolidating development with the prime objectives to improve the literacy rate of FATA from 17 percent to 30-40 percent up till 2015. But till date, no solid steps have been taken by the Pakistani Government to utilize these funds properly (Orakzi, 2009). Abundance of chromate and ore mine in Mohmand Agency could contribute to a feasible steal and metal industry.

The denial of fundamental human rights is one of the root causes of the marginalization of the tribal area under FCR. The intensifying poverty, the absurd state of literacy rate, poor health

facilities are the main catalyst that has pushed FATA to become the most least developed part of the world generally and Pakistan specially (Zahra, 2014).

Equal right is just a myth for tribal people, being a tribal thinking of these things is just imagination. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, tribal people are still deprived of their very basic rights (Ayaz, 2012). Some of the basic rights are noted here and can be divided further into 3 main categories of citizenship rights: civil rights that include freedom of speech and rule of law while political rights constitute right to vote, freedom to participate in political activities, third one is socio-economic rights that include one's security and equal access to opportunities (Zahra, 2014). These rights are mainly denied to tribal people.

Shinwari (2012) study shows that the 2010 survey mapped that the majority (59.7%) of respondents supported the extension of the ordinance in to FATA; in comparison to just 9.6 percent who opposed this decision. The survey of 2011, however, documents a surprising reduction in support for the political parties act to one-third, with the opposition rising to 16 percent. In 2011 there was 11% support for the current status of FATA while in 2010 survey only 2.9% supported FATA council while support for mergence of FATA in KP was high in 2008 (34%) and 2010 (30.7%).

Variations of opinion were prevalent with only 11 percent of respondents desiring 'no reform'. However, more than one-third of the FATA population was not able to offer an opinion. Overall, only 3.4% of people supported the establishment of a FATA council, while reforms appear to be generally supported concerns remain as to the value of the of the changes formalized August 2011 (Shinwari, 2012b).

Infect social exclusion theory is perfectly applied to FATA. It clinches the political aspect too concerns the denial of basic human and political rights to certain groups (on the basis of ethnic or religious/sectarian) of the population. The right as personal security, rule of law, freedom of speech, political participation and equality of opportunity and emphasis on human development strategies to eliminate poverty through political freedom and democracy (UNDP, 1992).

Escalating illiteracy and less employment opportunities become one of the prime factors of young joining radical extremist where they can get what they cannot do in their daily routine lives. It is not only the young who fall prey to militant, but the deprived and marginalized groups of the society also join militants to have influence, prestige and protect their identity (Chaudhry & Wazir, 2012).

Even local robbers and thieves start joining these groups just to have more approach to powerful in the society and get more power and money. For example Head of the Anwar alias Mama Group, Anwar was involved in robberies and thief in Peshawar and Orakzai before joining Tahrik i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Mahsud, 2012).

The socio-cultural fabric of the Pashtun society has been damaged a lot. More than 700 schools in Pakhtunkhwa province and 600 plus in the adjacent tribal belt have been either demolished or destroyed since 2007. More than 600 elders were killed in target killing in the ongoing conflict, leaving behind a huge social gap that is being filled by the radical Islamist. Besides, Pakhtun notables from all walks of life (singer, artist etc.) have either been killed or forced to flee the country. Shias and non- Muslim minorities who had been living peacefully in the Pakhtun areas for generations have been persecuted largely. The uniquely pluralistic outlook of Pakhtun society has been demolished (Kakar, 2014).

Peace building has no proper definition yet, it varies from case to case. Peace building is actually to address and overcome structural contradiction/differences that provide a ground for the conflict; we can call it the root of the conflict too. According to (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) (Ex UN Secretary General) report “An Agenda for Peace, peace building is “post conflict, action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. This statement clearly tells us that peace building is actually getting rid of violence and achieving sustainable peace.

According to UN Secretary General Policy Committee, definition of peace building “Peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels of conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”It’s obvious that educated people avoid violence because mainly of their pluralistic approach. Especially in armed conflict, they will take part in very rare cases, yes, there are evidences that educated people are also involved in fueling Conflict and violence by brainwashing through literature and other means, but their main reason might be to gain power and control over economic activities or sometime due to the radical religious background.

## **Chapter-3**

### **DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

This chapter focuses on methodology used, following the process of research design, the construction of the questionnaires, the sampling methods, the collection and the process of data analyses.

#### **3.2. Research Design**

Worldwide young people are the worst victims of violence and militancy. But there are several factors that push young people towards militancy. These factors include political, economic, social and security goals that inspire young people towards militancy. Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Area and particularly the Mohmand Agency is no exception to this. Low per capita income, lack of basic human and constitutional rights sanitation is a major cause pushing youth towards militancy in FATA. The problem is further aggravated by poor security and other social evils like lack of education, open drugs sale, smuggling and lust for power.

The assessment is aimed at identification of extent of these factors in pushing youth towards militancy in tribal belt and resultant problems as well as required measures/interventions to restore tribal's people faith on political system, economic opportunities and security. The report also chalked out strategies on how to assist the communities/authorities to enable them respond to the needs of the local people in local context.

Though primarily I have conducted this survey, but I was assisted by 10 other team members too. I trained them how to conduct the survey. For their easiness; the questionnaire was translated into Urdu. Their help was needed in some areas where I was having no access that include Khwazi-Baizi, Ambar

Tehsil, Tehsil Safi and some areas of Pandialai. Personally I conducted the survey in Halimzai, Ekaghund and Prang Ghar and many other villages of Pandialai.

In research designed, I identified the determinants of joining militancy, additionally; I identified the responses of local people with different intervention options available to the government. I also focused on household's characteristics such as income and income sources, employment status of male (female heads if no male head), occupation, education level, age, family size, and gender composition. For example, smuggling and arm business are important sources of income for many families in the tribal belt. It was of interest to see that whether such families' youth are more tempted to militancy as compared to others or not. We asked questions to know the status of household regarding the current conflict, their approach toward militancy, and their response to encounter militant. Besides this, household behavior toward the conflict, education, and Peace-building, the different response to militancy between Young and Senior citizen were measured, it is important, as in the very first stage, tribal leaders were targeted and more than 1600 tribal elder have been killed so far.

Special focus was paid to the availability and status of educational institutions in the area and their role in building youth behavior. People satisfaction about the education facilities was sorted out. The reasons of not attending schools were explored. The behavior of those young who attend schools was carefully studied to compare them and their views about militancy with the non-educated young's. We were particularly interested in formal education versus Madrassas education role in building youth tendencies. For example, if we found that it is not only the students of Madrassah who possess extreme tendencies in the region then we can search for other factors behind the issue. In this backdrop the contents of education, even in the formal educational institutions need to be carefully analyzed. Literature suggests that the content of the books plays

very vital role in breeding terrorist in a peaceful society. J-Spink (2005) study from Afghanistan suggest that literature was used to fuel the conflict on sectarian bases (Shia-Sunni) as well on ethnic bases (Pashtun Vs Hazara, Uzbek, Tajak, Noristaniets).

With regard to households' perception of tendency towards militancy, questions like the association with the militant group, Reason for joining Militancy (Lack of educational facilities, Poverty, sectarian issues in the area, army operation, to gain power, force to join militant were asked. Besides these fundamental questions, we extracted information regarding their knowledge about the Role of FCR in their daily life; where our special target was the impacts of the Collective Responsibility section on youth behavior towards militancy. Another question that was asked to find out the nearest other possible reason where the role of educational institutions in encountering militant behavior, role of Elder in encountering militancy and Government response to encounter. In the last section of the questionnaire, we focused to get a glimpse of the household responses to government intervention policies for conflict prevention. The role of the NGOs was also highlighted, especially its commitment to educate more people.

Similarly the culture of the area may have an important bearing on the behavior of youth about use of force. Show of arms and firing is a common practice among the people of all ages in FATA. People most of the time keeps arms as fashion and fun in the tribal area of Pakistan. One reason for such culture is that tribal people have to act like security forces in form of local Lashkar (armed tribal men) or have to bear everything under the rule of "Ejtemaye Zimadari" (Collective Responsibility) an article of FCR. But this practice, most of the time become a source of major casualties among the youth and by the youth even upon minor differences among them. Once commit a murder, the young built the view that the revenge could be avoided by getting more and more force and company of powerful people. Thus such culture may push the youth toward joining

militant groups. This aspect will be carefully analyzed through field survey by asking indirect questions from the people who are known to have some form of contacts with the militants. This helped us to find out that what were the post conflict activities of the young generation that now having a radical mindset?

One important factor that can play a role in youth militancy is the lack of institutions in FATA. Political administration is the only formal governmental institute which is operational and is controlling all aspects of life in FATA under the umbrella of FCR. Most of the practices under FCR are evils rather laws. Most of the time people are punished for the wrong doing of others. In case of any kidnapping from a nearby city, for example, all the people of the tribal area which attach that city are captured and put in prison and their salaries and other benefits are seized. They have no right to go to appeal to the court of law. So the only way they are left with, to compensate for their physical and material punishment for a sin that they have no direct or indirect link with, is to take revenge by their own. Such conduct of the political administration may cause the youth to join the people who have the power to engage the state. Keeping this in view, questions were asked to know that whether the young with the extreme tendencies about the state faced such harassment of the political administration in the past or not. In the last section of the questionnaire, we focused to get a glimpse of the household possible responses to government intervention policies for conflict prevention. Similarly Role of the NGOs and other such organization in peace building was discussed.

To find out the real factors that are responsible for the militancy in the area, primary work was done through questionnaire, because there are numerous issues and factors relating to the study and it is a subjective phenomenon. Keeping in view different perception regarding the determinants, a questionnaire was developed with the consultation of the supervisor. As it is an efficient way of data



collection, reformulated set of written questions and respondents are assigned. Due to time constraints and cost factor the questionnaire is selected because it is less costly as compared to interview and observation. Moreover information can be obtained on the spot through a questionnaire and it is less time consuming. The detailed questionnaire is given in the appendix.

### **3.3 Methodology**

This study is descriptive in nature and based on primary data. The data was collected through questionnaires.

### **3.4 Data Collection Tools**

#### **3.4.1 Questionnaires**

A questionnaire was designed for the collection of primary data covering the following sections.

- 1) Demographic data
- 2) Educational background
- 3) Education role in militancy
- 4) Family, area & social background & Militancy
- 5) Legal status (FCR and Constitution) of FATA and its role in Militancy

### **3.5 Review and analysis of existing data**

The literature available on legal status of the tribal area in Pakistan (nature of militancy and education role was sorted out along with research articles, newspapers etc). Educational data were taken from Education office in Mohmand Agency and some secondary sources

(Educational Atlas of Pakistan). The data were obtained on the number of total schools before the conflict, destroyed school and the number of affected students. Secondary data on schools already exist or destroyed and students affected were provided by official of Education Department at Ghalanai, Mohmand Agency. Table below contains details.

**Table 3.1: Number of damaged schools out of total school and effected students**

Tehsil	Total Schools	Destroyed School	Effected Student (Est)	
			Min	Max
Safi	97	67	3500	4000
Khwazi & Baizi	76	21	800	1000
Pandialai	61	14	500	800
Ekkaghund	93	11	2500	3000
Ambar	24	11	2000	2400
Halimzai	120	8	1600	2000
Prang Ghar	41	1	70	70
Total	512	133	10970	13270

Source: Education Department, Mohmand Agency

The table shows that Tehsil Safi affected on large scale, almost 69percent schools were destroyed physically, while the remaining are closed from last few years. On the other hand, in Tehsil Prang Ghar only one school was damaged during last one decade due to 2010 floods.

### **3.6 Primary Work Time Frame**

This research activity was conducted from November 2014 – December 2014 when the armed conflict in Mohmand Agency was not over yet. This research was conducted in key stages. First, conducting a literature and document review to give background and context to the study. Second, preparation of data collection tools such as constructing a survey instrument (a structured questionnaire). The formulation of the research questions was based not only on knowledge gained from the available literature but also from being a tribal youth, I used my own experiences.

### **3.7 Locale of the study**

#### **3.7.1. Mohmand Agency**

Mohmand Agency is one of the seven agencies in FATA region in Pakistan. It connects with Khyber Agency and Peshawar in the South. Also connects with Charsadda on South-East, Malakand in the East while connect with Bajur to Northern sides. Like many other tribal region, it also connect with the Afghanistan on the western border, also termed as Durand Line.

Tribal area of Pakistan both historically and traditionally has a distinct administrative and political setup from the former rulers, British since 1849. In 1893 demarcation was done with the Afghanistan through a border line called Durand Line. However Mohmand Agency was established in 1951 (before 1951, this area was part of Khyber Agency). Its total area is 2296 square km that inhabited by more than 0.6 Million (KPK Tribune). And according to 1998 census, Mohmand Agency population is 334,453.

### **3.7.2 Socio-Economic and political Profile of Mohmand Agency**

Rough topography-consisting of limited arable land and arid areas-combined with scant public infrastructure-particularly poor educational and health facilities-help to explain the enormous gaps between the conditions of the people of the FATA and the rest of Pakistan. In FATA 60 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line; a consequence of the per capita income for the region being half that of the national average. This disparity is intensified by per capita development expenditure being approximately one third of that spent in other areas of Pakistan (Shinwari, 2012b). Local issues are solved through Jirgah System (elder council). This was one of the strongest cultural symbols of tribal Pashtoon. Tribal elder was targeted on large scale during military operation that include almost 80 plus tribal elder killed in a single blast in 2010 in lower Mohmand. This was the only way to use young blood, leaving them with no guidance.

The militancy and subsequent operation by the security forces against the militants in Mohmand Agency has resulted into exodus of a large number of local populations to other districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The socio-economic setup and life fabrics of the communities widely disrupted and a number of infrastructures including those of schools and other public property were badly damaged or rendered unusable due to lack of proper maintenance. According to the political administration of Mohmand Agency, the impacts of the insurgency are:

- Militancy inflicted losses of approx Rs 2326.711 million to the property of Government and civilian.
- 5500 families were displaced from different areas.

- People lost livestock, household items, agriculture crops and mining activities worth millions of Rupees during insurgency.
- Educational activities were badly affected, specially in Safi and Khwazi-Baizi.
- Services delivery including health services were critically disturbed
- Tribal institutions like Hujra, Jirga, local culture and customs were severely damaged
- Development process was retarded (Rural Development Initiative, 2010)

The socio- economic condition of the local people had worsened specially after prolong power outage; that compel many industrialist to halt their marble businesses in Mohmand Agency. Power outage also had severe impacts on agriculture sector, which is irrigated from tube well. This also scenario compels many families to send their young to Middle East to earn their livelihoods. Overall per capita income (PCI) in FATA is almost \$250 that is very low from national average PCI. Developmental fund is much lower for FATA compare to that of other areas of Pakistan.

Shinwari (2012) study shows that the 2010 survey found that the majority (59.7 percent) of the respondents supported the extension of the Political Parties ordinance (PPO-2002) in to FATA; in comparison to just 9.6 percent who opposed this decision. The survey of 2011, however, documents a surprising reduction in support for the political parties act to one-third, with the opposition rising to 16 per cent.

Amid 2011 PPO extension, there is widespread awareness now among tribal youth. Huge rallies were conducted in remote areas of Bajur, Khyber, Waziristan and Mohmand to support the extension of constitutional amendments to FATA and to merge FATA into KP. That's why 22<sup>nd</sup>

amendment has been proposed in parliament by FATA parliamentarians to merge FATA in KP. Interestingly there is unique unity among all political stakeholders to support this merge.

As far as reform are concerned in FCR; variations of opinion were prevalent with only 11 per cent of respondents desiring 'no reform'. However, more than one-third of the FATA population was not able to offer an opinion. Overall, only 3.4% per cent of people supported the establishment of a FATA council. while reforms appear to be generally supported concerns remain as to the value of the of the changes formalized August 2011 (Shinwari, 2012b).

### **3.7.3. Administrative Setup**

For administrative purposes the agency has been divided into two sub division, Lower Sub division, and Upper Sub division, lower sub division is further divided into four Tehsils Ambar, Ekaghund, Pandyalai, Prang Ghar, while Upper Mohmand has been divided into three Tehsils that included Halimzai, Safi and Khwezi-Bayezi Tehsil<sup>4</sup>. Agency head quarter Ghalanai is also located in Halimzai Tehsils. In upper sub-division two tehsil of Safi and Khwazi-Bayezi constitute almost half of the population of the whole agency (47 percent, 1998 censuses). But currently, due to militancy and regular military operation, more than 60 percent of the population in both tehsils have been force to leave their home and shifted to IDPs (internally displaced people) in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province or Afghanistan.

An Agency head is called Political Agent (PA), he works as representative of the Federal Government. They worked as an executive, judge and revenue collector (Shinwari, 2012a). He is further assisted by an Additional Political Agent and three Assistant Political Agents (APAs). Lower Mohmand is headed by one APA while in Upper Mohmand, Halimzai and Safi are

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<sup>4</sup> FATA <http://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iId=29&fid=2&pId=25&mId=13>

headed by one APA, while Khwazi-Baizi, due to large area, is headed alone by an APA. Each Tehsil is governed by a tehsildar (FATA Awareness Initiatives, 2011). Further PA nominates Malik (local elder) to ensure local security and solve domestic disputes. But generally these Malik belong to elite class and do not represent the common masses. That's why many people think that they are subject to marginalization in the society (Shinwari, 2012a).

#### **3.7.4. Security Responsibility**

Before US intervention in Afghanistan, FATA security responsibility was solely on Frontier Corps (FC) assisted by Levi and Khasadars. Khasadars were recruited primarily by British before independence to protect the Indian-Afghan route from looters, and for the safe passage of non local traders. Khasadar's security responsibility is limited to roads and government building. Besides Khasadars, Local people under Collective Responsibility are also responsible for security measures. FC often remains limited to their camps, and can intervene only in severe situation.


After 9/11, Pakistan did intervene in the tribal belt for the first time through military operation to secure its western border from insurgents. For example, the army entered in the area of Salala (Khwazi-Baizi) for the first time in 2004.

#### **3.7.5. Major Tribes**

All of these seven Tehsil are inhabited by 3 different tribes of Ethnic Pashtoon; includes Mohmand, Safi and Utman Khel.. Among these seven Tehsil, four belong to Mohmand tribe from where the agency name has been taken. Safi tribe lives in Safi area constitute the second largest tribe of the Mohmand. Utman khel mainly lives in Tehsil Prang Ghar and Ambar. Further Mohmand Tribe has been divided into four sub tribes, which includes Halimzai, Tarakzai, Khwazi and Baizi. Halimzai are considered the most powerful in this area inhabiting in Halimzai Tehsil that

consist Agency headquarter, Ghalanai and its surrounding areas. In Mohmand Agency political history, majority of the MNAs and Senators were elected from this tribe. Safi tribe is also further divided between Garbuz and Masud tribe. Both Khwazi and Baizi tribes mainly lives in Khwazi-Baizi Tehsil. Utman Khel is divided in two major sub groups, Umar Khel and Laman Utman Khel. Umar Khel lives in Ambar Tehsil and also has significant number in upper Prang Ghar, Laman Utman Khel lives in Lower Prang Ghar. Mohmand Agency throughout its history remained peaceful. But the 1979 Russian's (USSR) Invasion in Afghanistan brought enormous social changes and challenges for its adjacent tribal belt of Pakistan.

**Map: Mohmand Agency & FATA**



Source: <http://thetribaltimes.com/wp-content/uploads/Mohmand.jpg>



Source: [http://www.understandingfata.org/uf-volume-v/Understanding\\_FATA\\_Vol-V-11.pdf](http://www.understandingfata.org/uf-volume-v/Understanding_FATA_Vol-V-11.pdf)



### **3.8 Samples size and its allocation**

Mohmand Agency total population is 334453 (1998 census). It is time consuming job to interview all of the population, to avoid this, I find out representative sample (268) through statistical tool with 95 percent confidence interval. The sample was collected from all Tehsil according to 1998 census Tehsil-wise proportion. The detail table has been provided under next heading of sampling methods.

### **3.9 Sampling Methods**

For this purpose, 268 individuals were entertained. In order to select the Tehsil and household for the collection of primary data, I applied simple-random sampling techniques. Household was selected randomly in all 7 Tehsils. Survey was conducted in all 7 Tehsils so that to cover every area of the agency.

During selection of household, we made this sure to select respondent from almost all background. Questions were asked indirectly to avoid any refusal. The obvious question was that no one will be ready, neither we will be able, to ask anyone directly about his illegal activities. But we were having the advantage of having first-hand knowledge of area. Tribal communities, leaving in an area are mostly belong from single tribe and are having strong interaction because of the tribal culture of Jirgas and Bitak system. Due to this tradition, local people know very well about the activities of other tribe men. So it was not difficult for us to identify those people who have militancy trends in past or in the present crisis. The question that they cannot be directly asked about their activities was handled through questionnaire design. Each of such participant was interrogated by asking that why the people of our region join the so called Taliban and jihadist in your view. Similarly, we asked question about militant trends. Questions were asked in way that they felt that I was giving my view about the general issue/trend in the area. Asking such question

in Bitak environment is not a difficult task from people who know the researcher and his family but this was not possible in all 7 Tehsils as many were scare that taliban can harm them if they reveal any info about Taliban especially in public places. To avoid this risk, I hired few local teachers; Urdu questionnaires were printed for them.

Questionnaire were allocated according to 1998 population censuses, where we have Tehsil-wise population throughout agency. For this purpose we found out the percentage of each Tehsil and then allocated same proportion of questionnaire to that Tehsil.

### 3.2 Tehsil-wise allocation of questionnaires

Tehsil	% Population (1998)	Total questionnaire/tehsil
Ambar	9%	24
Ekaghund	10%	27
Halimzai	14.5%	39
Pandialai	15.33%	41
Prang Ghar	5.8%	15
Safi	21.37%	58
Upper Mohmand	24%	64
Mohmand Agency	100%	268-Total

Source: 1998 census<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For detail see this [http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/other/pocket\\_book2006/2.pdf](http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/other/pocket_book2006/2.pdf)

The study also used secondary data of education facilities, literacy rate, population, gender ratio etc. at Agency level to know about the effect of Agency overall characteristics on youth behavior. For this purpose secondary data were collected from different sources such as National and international Surveys, FATA Secretariat and Local Education District Office, NGOs.

### 3.10 Priority Index

Last part of the questionnaire we asked respondents to rank different factors that fuel militancy. To find out the highest ranked factor, we have used priority index. Priority index formula was used to find out the highest rank one as well as lowest rank one.

Priority Index formula:

$$I = \frac{\sum si f_i}{N}$$

Where  $I$  = priority index such that  $0 \leq I \leq 1$

$S_i$  = scale value at the  $i$ th priority

$F_i$  = frequency of  $i$ th priority

$N$  = Total no. of observations =  $\sum f$

Now

Scale value 1/8

Scale

Sharia	Power	Poverty	Illiteracy	Literature	Revenge	CR(FCR)	Political Awareness	No Priority
1	0.875	0.75	0.625	0.5	0.375	0.25	0.125	0

### **3.11 Ethical Consideration**

Prior to the start of every activity, the researcher explained the purpose of the activity to the participants and also asked for their consent for recording and documentation. Confidentiality was ensured throughout the study process. All participants' were given the choice that whether they want to write their name on the questionnaire or they want to keep it secret.

## **Chapter-4**

### **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The chapter provides a brief description of the main finding of the study conducted in Mohmand Agency. Linkages between different factors, its impacts on youth tendencies have been found, these include family background and its impacts on youth, qualification of the respondents, youth perception about different educational factors (Parental education, lack of education, school closure) that add to militancy. Different sections under the collective responsibility play vital in cultivating the mindset towards militancy and it has been proved theoretically as well as empirically.

#### **4.2. Descriptive Analysis**

The Majority of the local were illiterate as also shown by other statistics that FATA has almost 27 percent literacy where Mohmand Agency stands at the bottom with only 17 percent literacy rate. The reason behind the low literacy rate in the area were; Family income (\$250 per capita income<sup>6</sup>), Parental education, Education facilities, school closure and lack of awareness.

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<sup>6</sup>See details in (PCNA, 2010)

### 4.3. Socio-demographic Characteristics

#### 4.3.1 Qualification of the target group

First row from the table given below consists of results of qualification of the respondents. Although the poor literacy rate is not something new in the tribal area, lack of infrastructure, cultural barrier, poverty and insecurity have added more to the existing illiteracy. The table shown below is about the literacy rate of the respondents. More than half of the respondents are educated. Total 107 respondents are illiterate out of 268. 22 and 19 out of 268 were primary and middle passed respectively. Total 49 respondents are from FA/FSc college level. 29 respondents out of 268 are from BA/BSc while 31 out of 268 are from MA/MSc level, and 1 respondent is from other field (MPhil). This table further help us in identifying the attitude of these people from different background to the same issue. It will help us in understanding that whether education has positive impacts on tribal youth or it has negative impacts (widening the gap among different social classes of the society). It further helped us to know the differences between literate and illiterate towards the same problem. Among these 268 respondents, 131 belong to youth group (age between 15 & 30 years) as given in the last two columns.

**Table 4.1: Qualification of the target group (Youth or household head)**

Qualification	No of Responent	Percentage	Youth	Percentage
Illiterates	114	42.5	25	19.1
Primary Passed	15	5.59	7	5.3
Middle	18	6.71	13	10
High School	10	3.73	7	5.3
Higher School	49	18.2	43	33

Bachelor	29	10.82	21	16
Master	32	11.94	14	10.6
MPhil/Other	1	0.37	1	0.8
Total	268	100	131	100.0

#### 4.4. Education and militancy nexus

##### 4.4.1. Perceptions about education role in militancy

The results in table 4.2 consists of different educational factors that local perceive a catalyst to militancy. It includes parental education impacts on youth, lack of education and its contribution to militancy, school closure role in escalating militancy. From the above table, we observed that Parental education and lack of education are two significant factors shaping youth's tendency towards militancy vice versa, respectively preferred by 76.5 percent and 92 percent.

From the below table, the result shows that parental education significantly impact youth toward militancy. The majority of the respondent (76.5 percent) termed parental education role vital in shaping towards militancy or reducing it. Almost 15 percent think that parental education has no impacts in shaping youth's tendency towards militancy while only 8.5 percent don't know.

From the table 4.2, it is observed that lack of education was given more weight. More than 92 percent think that the militancy was boosted by the lack of education, 4percent think that illiteracy is not a reason for pushing youth towards militancy. On the other hand 3.7 percent replied that they don't know about the illiteracy role in enhancing militancy, again, it's a small portion.

The table also clearly suggests that school closure has an important role in enhancing militancy, as 183 (68 percent) of total 268 respondents were agreed, while hardly only 24 percent negate the possible role of school/college closure as a militant enhancing factor. Almost 8 percent respondent was unaware of any school/college closure role in enhanced militancy. The idea is further supported by the destruction of school in Mohmand Agency, and consequently the drop out from school due to militants' threats. Mohmand Agency was among the top school blown up district in whole FATA. The data available to the Education Department at Agency Head quarter Ghalanai shows that almost 133 schools were blown up. Almost half of these schools were in Tehsil Safi including a college. Due to that fear, many schools and colleges were closed for years, which resulted in a more dangerous way as many young remained illiterate or opted to drop out of school.

Table 4.2, 4<sup>th</sup> row consists of respondent views about the connection between religious education and militancy. 64 percent say that there is no connection between two. Yes, there were strong religious sentiments and many answers as "No" due to their religious background. Only 25 percent were of the opinion that there is a connection between Madrassah's education and current militancy. Many of them were of the view that mostly less educated from Madrassah's often fall into this trap. 10 percent prefer not to know. It is totally in the opposite direction to Jeanine Spink (2005) findings.

Last part of the table reveals respondent views about trends in School vs. Madrassah student towards militancy. Almost 62 percent responded that there is a difference of behavior between these two types of student towards militancy. More than 19 percent were of the opinion that there is no difference of behavior between these two, and both have the almost same attitude towards militancy. Almost 19 percent were unable to differentiate between the two trends and opted for



‘Don’t Know’, that make almost the same figure who opted for ‘No’ answer. Still, both have less percentage than the first option mean that the majority of the local were agreed that there is a difference of behavior between two. Here again, integrates Jeanine Spink (2005) findings that reveals that literature played pivotal role in widening the gap between Shia-Sunni, Pashtoon and Non-Pashtoon.

**Table 4.2: Perceptions about educational factors adding to militancy**

Reason	Frequencies/Percentages	No	DK	Total
	Yes			
Parental Education	205 (76.5%)	40 (15%)	23 (8.5%)	268 (100%)
Lack of education	247 (92.2%)	11 (4.1%)	10 (3.7%)	268 (100%)
School closure	183 (68.3%)	64 (24)	21 (7.7%)	268 (100%)
Religious education	68 (25.4%)	172 (64.2%)	28 (10.4%)	268 (100%)
Behavior difference between School vs Madrassah Student	166 (62%)	52 (19.3%)	50 (18.7%)	268 (100%)

## **4.5. Family, area and Social Background**

### **4.5.1 Social factors impacts on youth behavior**

Table 4.3 shows the perceptions of the respondents about family background in shaping youth behavior. More than 78 percent respondents were agreed that family background impacts youth behavior. Young in their early age, learn from his family member how to respond to different events. 17 percent or more were of the opinion that family background had no impacts on youth behavior. More than 4 percent were unable to answer. Thus we can conclude that the majority of the local strongly agreed that family background do shape youth behavior.

First of all, responses were recorded against income source and its effect on youth behavior. 88 percent respondents were agreed that income source has impacts on youth behavior. Only 7 percent respondent was of the opinion that income source does not play any role, while almost 5 percent responded that can't figure out any relation between youth behavior and income source.

The second reason we founded out the relationship between unemployment and militancy has been figured out through frequency distribution. Almost 87 percent think that due to unemployment, many tribes did joined militants. Many of them were paid to fight on behalf of the militants; they were even paid for providing safe haven/shelter to the militants. This is largely because of unemployment, less economic activities and extreme poverty in the region. Almost 9 percent think that there is no concrete relationship between unemployment and militancy while 4 percent were unable to distinguish between two. While checking in detail, those who opted strongly agreed were consist 77 percent of those families who has family income ranging from less than 10000-30000 and 60 percent of them were either illiterate or less than higher schooling.

Table 4.3 also reveals responses of the local people about drugs smuggling nexus with militancy. More than 56 percent responded that drugs and smuggling enhance militancy. 31 percent say that there is no significant relation between drugs, smuggling and militancy. Almost 13 percent were unaware that whether drugs and smuggling do boost militancy or not. It is the fact that due to peak-Afghan border area, there is a huge amount of smuggling that range from non-custom paid vehicles to edible oils and other products, so smuggling of these things without the approval of militants is impossible now a days.

The table further explores that Kalashnikov culture also matter for militancy. Due to the presence of Pashtoon across the border, the culture boosted its roots across the tribal area specially and through Pakhtunkhwa belt generally. It is an easy way to make our young more vulnerable to militant behavior. More than 76 percent respondents supported that this culture played its role in enhancing extremism. Just 16 percent didn't agree and says that many people keep Kalashnikov for the sake of security and is also a sign of power, followed by a tinny 6percent who don't know if the Kalashnikov culture is enhancing militancy.

Table 4.3 also consists of respondent's perceptions about the tense class relation between poor and rich. 71 percent agreed that there is a tense class relation. 25 percent says there no such conflict, and it is normal in society. 4 percent says that they are unaware of such tense relationship, this is mainly because many of them live in poor areas (73 percent) or many of them or illiterate or less educated (62 percent, less than or equal to higher school).

In row 7<sup>th</sup>, responses show the results of the local enmities contribution to militancy, 87 percent were agreed that yes local people have joined TTP to target their opponents. For many people it was a strong element to join TTP. 6percent youth were in disagreement that there is no such

relationship between local enmity and militancy, the same figure was counted against those who don't know of such relation between two.

Row, 8th of the table 4.3 shows the responses that whether youth join militancy due to fear or not. 52 percent says there is no fear among youth while joining TTP, because no one joins horror because of fear. Only 43 percent says yes, people join militancy due to fear. Among those who answered. 60 percent respondent of Tehsil Safi and Khwazi-Baizi thinks that there was no fear. It is worth to mention that these two Tehsils are the epic center of militancy. Only 4.5 percent of the total says that don't know young joining militancy due to fear. These statistics are similar to Ali (2012) findings. Though he has given a descriptive analysis, but here it's proved statistically.

This table 4.3 includes perceptions of local people about the influences of religious/Sectarian slogans on youth. Almost 88 percent says that local people are being trapped on religious grounds though during the survey many people confessed that now the situation is changing. It was much cleared from 2002 election result where Motahida Majlisi Amal (MMA) candidate won election with an absolute majority like the rest of the Pakhtunkhwa belt. Only 9 percent responded that local are not blinded fool by religious slogan. Almost 3 percent says that they are not aware of such things. These statistics are similar to Jeanine Spink (2005) findings from Afghanistan.

Second last row consists on perceptions of the respondent about presence of sectarian issues in their area. The major sectarian issue is Deobandi-Barelvis issue in many areas. It is more highlighted in two Tehsils of Halimzai and Prang Ghar. In Prang Ghar almost 87 percent says that there are sectarian issues closely followed by Halimzai (33 percent). There were sectarian issues of Ahli Hadith and Sunnis but very tinny that resulted rift in TTP local chapter in its very

beginning. However, overall 72 percent says that there are no sectarian issues in their area while 5 percent says that they don't know about it. These results are similar to Javaid & Hashmi (2012) and Abbasi (2014) findings.

In last row we have estimated respondent's perceptions about sectarian issues and its contributions to militancy. There was strong presence of sectarian issues in two tehsils as estimated above. 18 percent of the respondents think that sectarian issues do contribute to militancy while 75 percent did not agree. 7 percent respondent responded that don't know about sectarian issue's contribution to militancy. Among those who responded that sectarian issues do contribute to militancy include 27 percent from Prang Ghar and 25 percent from Halimzai Tehsil. Results were similar to Ahmar (2006) and Khan (2012) findings on sectarian issues.

**Table 4.3: Social factors impacts on youth behavior**

Factors	Number of responses about family and area social background impacts on youth			Total
	Yes	No	DK	
Family Background	210 (78.4 %)	46 (17.2%)	12 (4.5%)	268 (100%)
Income Source	237 (88.4%)	19 (7.1%)	12 (4.5%)	268 (100%)
Unemployment	233 (86.9%)	25 (9.3%)	10 (3.7%)	268 (100%)
Drugs and Smuggling	152 (56.7%)	82 (30.6%)	34 (12.7%)	268 (100%)
Kalashnikov culture	208 (77.6%)	44 (16.4%)	16 (6%)	268 (100%)
Tense Class relation	190 (70.1%)	67 (25%)	11 (4.1%)	268 (100%)
Local enmity	234 (87.3%)	17 (6.3%)	17 (6.4%)	268 (100%)
Fear from militant	116 (43.3%)	140 (52.2%)	12 (4.5%)	268 (100%)
Religious Influence	235 (87.7%)	24 (9%)	9 (3.4%)	268 (100%)
Sectarian presence	60	194	14	268

	(22.4%)	(72.4%)	(5.2%)	(100%)
Sectarian issues	48	201	19	268
Contribution	(17.9%)	(75%)	(7.1%)	(100%)

#### **4.6. FATA legislative status and its role in current militancy wave**

##### **4.6.1 Contribution of poor security situation in militancy**

This section consists of perceptions of the local people about the poor security role in militancy. Mohmand Agency like the rest of the FATA ruled under FCR, which deprived local people from their very basic rights. Arrest for no reason under collective responsibility is very common. These attitudes have widened the gap between government and local people. With no proper co-operation from local, government very manage to maintain its writ in this part of the tribal area. 85 percent of the respondent deemed poor governance as a reason for militancy in Mohmand. 12 percent says that they don't know about any role of poor security in militancy while almost only 3 percent thinks that poor security play no role in increased militancy. These results are similar to Khan (2014) and (Shinwari, 2008).

##### **4.6.2 FCR role in breeding militancy**

Table 4.4, in its very 1<sup>st</sup> row shows the responses of local tribesmen about their responsibilities under collective responsibilities (CR) section of FCR. Almost 64 percent responded that they are aware somehow about CR. 35 percent responded that they don't know about CR, it is more than one third of the total sample. Just 1percent responded that they did not even hear about such penalties. It is worthy to mention that majority of the CR victims are the poor when it comes to arrestment under CR, government servants are the second victims when it comes to pay a huge fine imposed in tribal people.

In the below table 4.4, 2<sup>nd</sup> row consists of frequency distribution of the responses that, is there any of the respondent family member or he himself ever been arrested under CR? Almost half of the respondents (50 percent) responded that either he or his family member have been arrested under CR. Same way, 50 percent respondents reveals that they themselves or their family member were taken into custody under CR clause. Majority of them were arrested for the crimes of other as it is clear from the word 'collective responsibility. Next paragraph will further examine that how many of them were the real criminal and how many of them were innocent?

In the table 4.4, row, 3rd shows the responses about arrestment of any of the family members. Only 7 percent says that they were arrested because their family members have committed the crime. Majority of the respondent (92 percent) replied that their family members were not involved in any crime. Only 0.7 percent responded that they were unaware of the reason, for which they were taken into custody. It clearly shows that majority of the people were caught for crimes committed by other. Among those total 19 respondents involved in crimes, almost 52 percent respondents were from Safi and Prang Ghar. Further Safi's were mainly arrested for alleged militant activities while in Prang Ghar, the majority of people were caught for cropping opium poppy.

Row, 4th of the table 4.4 consists of responses that whether local people were arrested for a crime that was committed by his tribe men or they were arrested for someone else sins. Only 34 percent responded that their family members were jailed for crimes committed by their tribe's men. Almost 60 percent respondents were of the view that arrested for crimes that even their tribe's men did not commit. Between 6 percent respondents also reveals that they were unaware of any crimes.

In the table 4.4, row 5<sup>th</sup> consists of the responses that whether the local people are satisfied with the CR section of FCR. Only 4.5 percent responded that they are satisfied. Number of those who shows dissatisfaction from the law, consists more than 88 percent of the total respondents, 7 percent were having no concern with CR. Among those who responded that they are satisfied with CR, include 75 percent illiterate, 25 percent literate and 25 percent farmer, 33 percent laborer and 17 percent and 25 percent businessmen and students respectively. Further, more than 41 percent were from only one Tehsil, Ambar.

The below observations in row, 6th shows respondents' perceptions about appeal right for those who were arrested under CR. 85 percent respondent were of the opinion that the arrested one must be given the right to appeal, the right to court to prove themselves as innocent. In the remaining, 7 percent says don't consider appeal right for the arrested one while 8percent says that they don't know about arrestment under CR. These results are similar to Khan (2014).

The below table 4.4, in row 7<sup>th</sup>, shows respondents' views about the legitimacy/justification of the fine imposed on tribal people under the Collective Responsibility. More than 90 percent declare it unfair, because government impose fine mainly on government servant. Almost 6 percent says that it is fair. Among those who say that it's fair, consists of more than 70 percent illiterate. It makes sense, under CR, government impose fine only on government servants. Remaining 4 percent respondents were unaware of such fine from the government. These results justify the findings of FATA Reforms (2013).

Table 4.4, row 8<sup>th</sup> shows the respondents perceptions about the CR role in militancy. 75 percent think that the Government uses it to curb crimes; but in fact, it is enhancing crimes and further fueling militancy. House demolishing, fine imposition, halting businesses, road blockade, illegal



arrest and vehicle confiscation are something very usual in tribal life. Though amendments have been made to CR to stop demolition of houses and arrest of young kids and elder, but yet it's not implemented. 12 percent thinks CR has no role in increased in militancy while just more than 12 percent responded they don't know about the consequence of CR. These are the results are similar to (Zahra, 2014) findings.

**Table 4.4: Collective Responsibility; curbing militancy or nurturing it further?**


Factors	Frequencies/percentages of the respondents' perceptions about the CR role in militancy			Total
	Yes	No	DK	
Awareness about CR	171 (63.8%)	95 (35.5 %)	2 (0.7 %)	268 (100%)
Family member taken into custody under CR	133 (49.6%)	135 (50.4%)	0 (0%)	268 (100%)
Family member committed crime	19 (7.1%)	248 (92.5%)	1 (0.4%)	268 (100%)
Tribe men committed that crime	92 (34.3%)	160 (59.7%)	16 (6%)	268 (100%)
Satisfaction with CR-FCR	12 (4.5%)	237 (88.4%)	19 (7.1%)	268 (100%)
Access to the court/Appeal right	227 (84.7%)	20 (7.5%)	21 (7.8%)	268 (100%)
Heavy fine imposed on tribe	17 (6.3%)	242 (90.3%)	9 (3.4%)	268 (100%)
Injustice under CR	201 (75%)	33 (12.3%)	34 (12.7%)	268 (100%)

#### **4.6.3 Local perceptions about arrest under collective responsibility**

The Bar chart 4.5 shows respondent's perceptions about the arrested people under CR. Responses were drawn on x-axis while frequencies were put on y-axis. Majority of the responded (58 percent) were of the opinion that they were innocent and were caught on behalf of someone else. 7.5 percent think that the real culprits have been caught under CR. 34 percent responded that under CR government catch both, criminal and innocent. The results for arrest

under CR are in line with the findings of Save the Children (2008). It was somehow important to know area wise support for CR. There was zero response from Safi and Utman Khel tribe living in three tehsils in support of CR.

**Bar Chart-4.5: Status of the allege arrested people under CR**




**4.6.4 Local’s perception about extension of Constitution to FATA**

In the last part of the legal observation, respondents were asked that whether they favor extension of the constitution and other courts to FATA. Responses were drawn on x-axis while frequencies were put on y-axis. 72 percent responded that yes, we need reforms; we need equal access to courts. These results support Orakzi (2009) and UNDP (1992) and Shinwari (2012) findings. Just 5 percent were against the extension of the constitution to FATA, they were of the view that if we do some reforms in FCR, then it is much better than the constitution. 23 percent replied that they have nothing to do with the constitution, as they have never been asked for

anything in government businesses. But still, overall, almost  $\frac{3}{4}$ th of the respondents were in favor of extension of the parliament legislation to FATA.

**Bar Chart-4.6 Perceptions about extension of constitution to FATA**



#### **4.7 Prioritizing the factors responsible for increasing militancy**

Table 4.7 consists of scaled values of different factors. The highest value for illiteracy (0.85) means that illiteracy contributed more to militancy, followed by Poverty (0.79) and Collective Responsibility (0.59) respectively. These results are similar to SDP (2006) and Pulse (2013) findings. Thirst for power (0.58) has been given more priority than Sharia (0.55), mean that many of the local people joined militancy to have more power, that is similar to finding of (International Crises Group, 2009) that reveals that very few people joined armed conflict for ideological purpose. Literature (0.34) and Revenge (0.37) have been given low priority though

there were strong feelings that many people joined TTP to protect themselves from their opponent or to target them (enemies). These results are similar to Mahsud (2012) and Novelli (2011) findings respectively. Overall the results are similar to ICG (2009) that says that it's a bunch of reason that attract youth towards militancy.

**Table 4.7: prioritizing factors responsible for increased militancy**

Priority	Priority index	Ranking in order of priority
Sharia	0.55	5
Thirst for Power	0.58	4
Poverty	0.79	2
Illiteracy	0.85	1
Literature	0.34	8
Revenge	0.37	7
CR-FCR	0.59	3
Lack of Political Awareness	0.43	6

## Chapter-5

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Summary

This study was aimed to find out different factors pushing our youth towards militancy. These factors include lack of education, literature, poverty and the collective responsibility clause of FCR. These factors were further gage by its different components. Among education, 92 percent responded that illiteracy is a major source of pushing our youth towards militancy while 68 percent thinks that religious education was a key element in breeding militancy. Almost half of the respondents responded that they or their family member were caught under collective responsibility. 88 percent showed disappointment about the promulgation of collective responsibility while almost 85 percent want access to courts.

The study found that the monthly income of the majority (29.5 percent) of the respondent was less than 10000, while more than 28 percent had a monthly income ranging between 10000 and 19000. 88 percent respondents monthly income was less than or equal to 39000. This study had found that the majority of people joined the insurgent just because of illiteracy, followed by poverty. Poverty was ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> (0.79) through the priority index, among different other factor as a source for breeding militancy.

Poverty, emerge also due to unemployment. During the study, 86percent respondent thinks that young people joined militant due to lack of economic opportunities. Ina tribal society, where there is a lack of economic opportunities, joining militancy was an ultimate answer to make money, have power, and other privileges.

The denial of fundamental human rights is one of the root causes of marginalization of the tribal area under the FCR. The escalating poverty, the absurd state of literacy rate, poor health facilities are the catalyst that has pushed FATA to become the most deprived part of the world (Zahra, 2014). Though, there are supporters of the status quo, who support FCR and don't want an extension of the constitution to tribal area. But the educated and politically matured people's perceptions show that they want equal representation in the mainstream government businesses. 85 percent of the respondent perceives that poor governance is the key factor for less development and poverty in the Mohmand Agency.

More than 88 percent of the respondent perceptions show dissatisfaction with the promulgation of collective responsibility, while 72 percent responded that they favor extension of the parliament legislation to FATA. Arrest under CR was considered un-fair by 90 percent people. 58 percent respondent responded that under CR only innocent have been caught so far, while 34 percent responded that both criminal and innocent people have been arrested. Collective responsibility (CR) was ranked 3<sup>rd</sup> (0.597) by local people as the main factor contributing to militancy.

Unfortunately, the literacy rate in FATA is the lowest in the country, rooted from economic depravity and poverty in the tribal region. Education atlas shows that the overall literacy rate in FATA is hardly 17 percent or more and the ratio of the male literacy rate being 18 percent and that of females is 3 percent (PRDS, 2011).

Moreover, the current wave of militancy in the region has further deteriorated the attainment of education in FATA by blowing up schools. According to a report, in 2013

almost 485 schools had been destroyed, depriving almost 500,000 children in FATA from schooling (Madni, 2013).

This study found that total 11000-13000 students were directly affected from blowing up 133 schools in Mohmand Agency; it does not include those students who left school due to fear of militants.

Meanwhile, in Mohmand Agency, the overall literacy rate (17 percent) is gloomy and is less than FATA's overall average (18 percent). Though during study, we did not find the literacy rate, but almost 2 out of 5 of the respondents were illiterate. During this survey, we interviewed almost 43 percent illiterate, only 41 percent were intermediate or higher. The survey was targeted so that we can have a balanced response, and find out the behavior of literate, illiterate towards the same issue from a different angle. Illiteracy was ranked highest among different other factors a main source for fueling militancy. Priority index value, 0.847 was the highest for illiteracy closely followed by poverty 0.79.

In 2003-2004, few economic reforms were introduced in FATA for the economic development of the tribal region. For instance, the industrial estates were exempted from the jurisdiction of CR to boost industrial development in the tribal region, but still it lacks practical execution. Similarly, in 2005, the US government also proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) for the economic well-being of the region as 80 percent of the economy of FATA has been destroyed due to war on terror, up till now, no practical measures has been taken for the establishment of ROZ in FATA. Likewise, in 2006 the Pakistani government in collaboration with US government and other international organizations initiated a sustainable development program to enhance the socio economic

condition of the tribal regions. \$2.46 billion were pledged for a nine year sustainable development program with five years of actual development following by four years of integrative development with solid objectives to improve the literacy rate of FATA from 17 percent to 30-40 percent up till 2015. But up till now no solid steps have been taken by the government of Pakistan to utilize these funds properly (Orakzi, 2009). These goals cannot be achieved as militants destroyed more school that discourages education in areas like Safi, Khwazi-Baizi and Ambar. Rich chromate and ore mine in the Mohmand could contribute to a feasible steel and metal industry. Local people think that they have been subject to all kinds of miseries; they can't express their view about both TTP and Government openly.

Social exclusion theory clinches the political dimension too concerns with the denial of basic human and political rights to certain groups (on the basis of ethnic or religious/sectarian) of the population (Sen, 2000). The right as personal security, rule of law, freedom of speech, political participation and equality of opportunity and emphasis on human development strategies to eliminate poverty through political freedom and democracy (Huq & Reid, 2004; UNDP, 1992).

The vast majority of the local people wants to get rid of this exclusive approach of government, and want to abolish FCR, specially more concern was shown against the implementation of CR, though some amendments have been don't but yet there is no practical practice. Still local people are dealt with same old yard stick.



## **5.2. Limitations of the Research**

In agencies like Kurram, Orakzai, and Khyber armed conflict was started on sectarian basis. In Mohmand except a fight (between TTP different sections) that took more than 100 lives, there is no sectarian war, but there is enormous hatred and can give way to sectarian conflict. Many of the locals went to Khyber Agency to join their own like-minded people. Hence some findings of this study cannot be generalized for all FATA regions.

Lastly, many people in Mohmand were reluctant to speak openly during the interviews because of fear of Taliban and security forces and tried to hide the truth which may have exposed some more information in this study. Many of them were not ready even to mention their names due to the sensitivity of the issue.

## **5.3. Conclusions**

The main conclusion of this study highlighted the inadequacy and inappropriateness of educational service facilities provided to tribal people generally and more specially in Mohmand. School buildings were remained unprotected and that's why more than 130 were destroyed in this tribal belt. Even the security check-posts proved to be a hurdle for school kids, as many schools and colleges are now being used by security forces as camps and barracks.

Also, it was found that there was no proper coordination between NGOs and Public sector to establish schools. Many NGOs build school in those areas that have already school and many least accessible areas remained without any school even today. There was no proper check on the school specially in the private sector.

Due to military operation in the area, low agricultural activities, and least developed infrastructure that was destroyed again in current militancy, Mohmand Agency remains on top with illiteracy, unemployment and poverty. Many local people work overseas and earn to the subsistence level. The majority of the local also shifted to many other cities to earn money.

FCR, that is declared as a draconian law had made life harder for the tribal people. Under Collective Responsibility, they are paying the prices on behalf of others. Sometime they even don't know that why they have been captured or their businesses have been sealed. Road blockade is very common. Government don't want to establish its writ, instead they are making life terrible for other.

Finally, the question that why Mohmand Youth joined militant, was interesting. Many of them joined militant to have more money, and to pressurize their opponent through Taliban. In many cases young from rival family joined Taliban so that to protect their own family from their opponent. These young are collecting huge amount as extortion from local people. Very few went for Sharia. Infact this is due to escalating illiteracy and poverty that local were deceived on the name of Islam.

#### **5.4. Recommendations**

Based on the findings from this research and the conclusions presented above, the following recommendations are made for effective interventions towards the Mohmand people development.

1. Government must take proper step to improve literacy rate, there are significant efforts from UNCEF, WFO, Aus-Aid, UK-Aid.
2. The security forces need to vacate all educational buildings so that schooling resume, many schools are closed since 2009.
3. To eliminate unemployment among Mohmand's, government and NGOs should initiate livelihood programs.
4. Marble is a huge mining industry, there were 100's of marble factories that is now closed due to power shortage, that is the only key industry in the area.
5. On the legal side, article 247 of the constitution need to be amended. It is main hurdle for FATA MNAs to do legislation on behalf of tribal people.
6. To stop sectarian issues, there must be a regulatory body to have checked on Mosque, literature, Friday Sermon. Also use of loud speaker must be allowed for specific activities.
7. Drugs (Opium, heroin, etc.) stores are found in each part of Mohmand, there is a dire need to get rid of it, to protect our future generation.

**APPENDICES**

**Appendix A. Questionnaire:**

**Profile of the Respondent:**

**(i) Your name..... (Optional)**

**(ii) Tehsil..... (iii) Village.....**

**(iv) Your age.....years (v) Your education.....years**

**(ix) Employment status.....**

**A-1. Are you a household head?**

No..... 0

Yes..... 1

*The following questions apply to you If you are a household head. But if you are not household head then give information about the head of the household.*

**A-2. Household Profile:**

- i. Total family size: \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Male (15 or above years of age) \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Number of literate male: \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. Number of literate female (15 & Above) \_\_\_\_\_

**A-3 Your/ household head age in years.....**

**A-4 Your/household head gender**

Female..... 1

Male..... 2

**A-5 Your/householder employment status**

Not employed/retired..... 0

Employed part-time..... 1

Employed full-time..... 2

**A-6 Your/ household head highest degree or level of schooling completed.**

No schooling completed..... 0

- Primary..... 1
- Middle level of schooling..... 2
- High school ..... 3
- Higher school ..... 4
- Bachelor’s degree..... 5
- Master’s degree..... 6
- Any other, please specify..... 7

**A-7. Including all of the income sources, which category best describes the total monthly combined income of all household members?**

- Less than Rs.1, 0000..... 1
- Rs 10000 to Rs 19990..... 2
- Rs.20, 000 to Rs.29, 990..... 3
- Rs.30, 000 to Rs.39,990..... 4
- Rs.40, 000 to Rs.49, 990..... 5
- Rs.50, 000 to Rs.59, 990..... 6
- Rs Rs.60, 000 or more.....7

**A-8.The major income source(s) of this household (in case of more than one income sources please rank, with 1 the most important one, 2 the second important, 3 the third important income source, in the given space)**

- Employment in government organization..... 1
- Employment in private organization..... 2
- Business income..... 3
- Agriculture income..... 4
- Foreign earning..... 5
- Rental properties ..... 6
- Own manufacturing unit..... 7
- Any other, please specify..... 8

**1. Educational Profile:**

- i. Availability of educational facility at your home town?  
Yes\_\_\_\_\_ No\_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Level of education that is provided in your village

School type	Available	Not available	Distance (km)
Primary School			
Middle School			
High School			
College level			

iii. Facilities in the school/college

- Very Good\_\_\_\_\_
- Good\_\_\_\_\_
- Satisfactory\_\_\_\_\_
- Not satisfactory\_\_\_\_\_
- Least satisfactory\_\_\_\_\_

iv. Teaching quality at school/college

- Very Good\_\_\_\_\_
- Good\_\_\_\_\_
- Satisfactory\_\_\_\_\_
- Not satisfactory\_\_\_\_\_
- Least satisfactory\_\_\_\_\_

v. How do you manage cost of the education of your children? Tick (√) all possible answer.

Your own income	
Support from Govt	
Support from NGOs	
Other	

x. Do you think financial constraints play its role in access to education?

- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
- No\_\_\_\_\_
- Don't know\_\_\_\_\_

xi. Do you have any Madrassa graduate at your home?

Yes..... No.....

If yes, then answer the following question.

- Total male graduate at Madrassa\_\_\_\_\_
- Total female graduate at Madrassa\_\_\_\_\_

## 1.1. Perception about education & militancy:

- i. Do you think parents' educational background had impacts on the youth's the tendency towards militancy?
  - Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Do you think lack of education is a possible reason for the youth's tendency towards militancy?
  - Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Do you think that the closure of school/colleges due to fear of militant is a reason for increased militancy?
  - Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
- iv. Do you think that there is a difference of behavior in school vs Madrassa students towards militancy? If yes, then answer to next 2 questions.
  - Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
- v. Do you think that Contents of the school/Madrassa books, play a role in the radicalization of our young?
  - Strongly agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
  - Disagree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Strongly disagree\_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Who is more prone to militancy?
  - School Student\_\_\_\_\_
  - Madrassa Student\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Do you think there is a close connection between religious education and militancy?
  - Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_

## 2. Family, area & social background:

- i. Do you think family background had impacts on youth behavior?
  - Yes\_\_\_\_\_

- No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Do you think that income source has impacts on youth behavior?
- Strongly agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
  - Disagree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Strongly disagree\_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Do you think unemployment forced youth to join militant?
- Strongly agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
  - Disagree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Strongly disagree\_\_\_\_\_
- iv. Do you think militancy was boosted by drugs and smuggling?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
- v. Do you think the Kalashnikov culture introduced after the USSR invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 had impacts on tribal youth, especially in Mohmand Agency?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Is there any role of tense class relations between the rich and poor that caused militancy?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Enmity between local people/tribes a factor to join militant and target their opponent?
- Strongly agreed\_\_\_\_\_
  - Agreed\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
  - Disagree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Strongly disagree\_\_\_\_\_
- viii. Local people joined militant due to fear
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_



- No\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_
- ix. Do you think local people are normally influenced by religious slogans?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_
- x. Is there any presence of sectarian issues in your area?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_
- xi. Do you think sectarian issues contributed to militancy in your area?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_

### **3. Legal Status of FATA (Constitution & FCR)**

- i. Do you think poor security played its role in current wave of militancy in Mohmand Agency?
- Strongly agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Agree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know\_\_\_\_\_
  - Disagree\_\_\_\_\_
  - Strongly disagree\_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Do you know about your rights/responsibilities under Collective responsibility section of FCR?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Have you/your family member ever been arrested under Collective responsibility?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
- if yes, then answer question iv, v
- iv. Did you/your family member commit that crime?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- v. Did your tribe's men commit that crime?

- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Are you people satisfied with the Collective responsibility section of FCR?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Often tribal people arrested due to collective responsibility, do you think it's a fare tradition?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- viii. Do you think that those arrested under collective responsibilities were mostly ---
- guilty/criminal \_\_\_\_\_
  - Innocent\_\_\_\_\_
  - both \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. Do you think appeal right must be given to them?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- x. Do you think the heavy fine imposed on a tribe is a fair tradition under collective responsibility?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- xi. Do you think lack of justice under Collective responsibility is a reason for joining extremist groups?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- xii. Do you favor extension of constitution to FATA?
- Yes\_\_\_\_\_
  - No\_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know\_\_\_\_\_
- xiii. Which factor influence youth more towards joining militancy in Mohmand Agency? Rank the following (1=most, 8 least)

Factors	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>	6 <sup>th</sup>	7 <sup>th</sup>	8 <sup>th</sup>
i. Sharia								
ii. Thirst for Power								
iii. Poverty								
iv. Illiteracy								
v. Literature								
vi. Revenge								
vii. FCR(Collective Responsibility)								
viii. Lack of political awareness								

## **Appendix-B: Penalties section of FCR (Collective Responsibility)**

### **21. Blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribe.**

In the event of any frontier tribe, or of any section or members of such tribe, acting in a hostile or unfriendly manner towards the British Government or towards persons residing within British India, the Deputy Commissioner may with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, by order in writing, direct.

- a) The seizure, wherever they may be found, of all or any of the members of such tribe and of all or any property belonging to them or any of them",
- b) The detention in safe custody of any person or property so seized and; the confiscation of any such property;
- c) and may, with the like sanction by public proclamation;
- d) debar all or any member of the tribe from all access into British India; and
- e) prohibit all or any persons within the limits of British India from all inter-course or communication of any kind whatsoever, or of any specified kind or kinds with such tribe or any section or members thereof.

### **22. Fines on communities accessory to crime.**

Where, from the circumstances of any case, there appears to be good reason to believe that the inhabitants of any village, or part of a village, or any of them, have

- a) connived at, or in any way abetted, the commission of an offence; or
- b) failed to render all assistance in their power to discover the offenders or to effect their arrest;
- c) connived at the escape of, or harboured, any offender or person suspected of having taken

part in the commission of an offence; or

d) combined to suppress material evidence of the commission of an offence; the Deputy Commissioner may, with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, impose a fine on the inhabitants of such village or part of a village, or any of them as a whole.

**23. Fines on communities where murder or culpable homicide is committed or attempted.**

Where, within the area occupied by a village community or part of a village-community, a person is dangerously or fatally wounded by an unlawful act, or the body is found of a person believed to have been unlawfully killed, the members of the village community or part thereof shall be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 22, unless the headmen of the village-community or part thereof can show that the members thereof -

- a) had not an opportunity of preventing the offence or arresting the offender; or
- b) have used all reasonable means to bring the offender to justice.

**24. Recovery of fines.**

Fines imposed under Section 22 shall, in default of payment, be recoverable as if they were arrears of land revenue due by the members of the community or part thereof upon whom the fine is imposed.

**25. Forfeiture of remissions of revenue etc. in the case of communities and persons accessory to crime.**

Where a village-community or part of a village-community has become liable to fine under Section 22, it shall further be liable to forfeit, in whole or in part, and for a term or in perpetuity, any remission of land revenue of which it may be in joint enjoyment, and the members of the village community or part thereof, as the case may be, shall in like manner

be liable severally to forfeit any assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance paid out of public funds which they, or any of them, may enjoy.

**26. Forfeiture of public emoluments etc. of persons guilty of serious offences or of conniving at crime.**

Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner that any person who is in the enjoyment of an assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance payable out of public funds, has been guilty of a serious offence, or has colluded with or harboured any criminal, or has suppressed material evidence of the commission of any offence, or has failed, on the investigation of any criminal case, to render loyal and proper assistance to the authorities to the best of his ability, the Deputy Commissioner may, in addition to any other penalty to which such person may be liable under any law for the time being in force, direct the forfeiture, in whole or in part and for a term or in perpetuity, of such assignment or remission of land-revenue or allowance, as the case may be.

Explanation, for the purposes of this section the expression "serious offence" means any offence punishable with transportation or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or more.

**27. Powers to direct forfeiture.**

Forfeiture under Section 25 or Section 26 may be adjudged by order of the Deputy Commissioner for a term, which may extend to three years, and by order of the Commissioner for any longer term or in perpetuity.

## **28. Powers of Provincial Government saved.**

Nothing in Sections 25, 26 and 27 shall affect the powers of the 21 [Provincial Government] with respect to the grant, continuance or forfeiture, in whole or in part, of any assignment or remission of land-revenue or of any allowance paid out of public funds.

## **29. Preparation to commit certain offences.**

Where a person is found carrying arms in such manner or in such circumstances as to afford just grounds of suspicion that the arms are being carried by him with intent to use them for an unlawful purpose, and that person has taken precautions to elude observation or evade arrest, or is found after sunset and before sunrise within the limits of any military camp, cantonment or of any municipality, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both, and the arms carried by him may be confiscated.

## **30. Adultery.**

(1) A married woman .who, knowingly and by her own consent, has sexual intercourse with any man who is not her husband is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punishable with imprisonment for .a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both.

(2) Cognizance shall not be taken of an offence under this section unless a complaint has been made by the husband of the women or, in his absence, by a person who had care of the women on his behalf at the time when the offence was committed (HRCP, 2005).

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